Stevenson (Roger)
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MILITARY INSTRUCTIONS

FOR

OFFICERS

DETACHED IN THE FIELD:

CONTAINING

A SCHEME

FOR FORMING

A CORPS OF A PARTISAN.

ILLUSTRATED WITH

PLANS of the MANOEUVRES

Neceſſary in carrying on the PETITE GUERRE.

Fas eſt et ab hoſte doceri. OVID.

BY AN OFFICER.

The SECOND EDITION, Corrected and Improved.

LONDON,

Printed for JOHN MILLAN, Charing-Croſs; and EDWARD and CHARLES DILLY, in the Poultry.

MDCCLXXIX.

TO

THE MARQUIS OF

LOTHIAN,

COLONEL OF HIS MAJESTY'S FIRST-TROOP OF HORSE-GUARDS.

MY LORD,

THE following little Eſſay, which was compiled from books, converſation, and reflection, for myſelf as a Subaltern, having had the honour to be approved by Your Lordſhip, and well received by the Public; I am happy that the giving this improved Edition affords me an opportunity of

declaring the profound reſpect, with which I have the honour to be,

MY LORD,

Your Lordſhip's

much obliged and

moſt obedient Servant,

ROGER STEVENSON.

CON-

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INTRO-

INTRODUCTION.

THOUGH we have numberleſs treatiſes on military ſubjects, it has always been regretted that none of the authors have deſcended lower than to inſtruct Generals in the operations of armies, except thoſe who confine themſelves to the duties of the parade and garriſon; ſo that inferior officers have had no ſource from whence they could derive any inſtruction concerning their duties in the field.

Every one knows of what importance even the ſmalleſt detachments are to an army, and muſt be ſenſible, that, if they happen to be commanded by officers who are ignorant of their duty, they can neither expect to procure advantage to the army, nor honour to themſelves; but as it is

only on occaſion of being employed in commanding ſmall detachments, that the inferior officers can hope to ſignalize themſelves, the knowledge of this particular branch is an object the moſt worthy their ſtudy and regard. Nor can an officer, who would diſtinguiſh himſelf as an alert Partiſan, be too minutely acquainted with a ſubject of as much importance to him, as he is to the army with whom he ſerves; eſpecially ſince the preſent method of forming ſtrong corps under partiſans has prevailed.

The duties of the field and garriſon have ſo little reſemblance, that they may be reckoned almoſt diſtinct profeſſions. We have authors to inſtruct us in the minuteſt points of garriſon duty, but none to teach the ſubaltern officers their particular duties in the field; unleſs I may except the excellent treatiſe on fortifying of poſts by Mr. Pleydell, which did not fall into

into my hands till ſome time after the firſt edition of the following Eſſay was printed, and which would have rendered a republication of theſe Inſtructions unneceſſary, if the duties of inferior officers in the field had been limited to the fortifying of out-poſts: but when we reflect that the fortifying of poſts is but one of the many ſubjects which demand the attention of the officer in the field, I hope the following Eſſay will not be thought a uſeleſs companion to the young officer, who will find the manoeuvres of the Partiſan, in ſecret marches; occupying, defending, and attacking poſts; reconnoitring countries, or the enemy; placing of ambuſcades; purſuits and retreats; which is called carrying on the *Petite Guerre*, are attempted to be explained.

Thoſe officers, who were employed laſt war in the field againſt an enemy acquainted with the art of war, will ſee a

detail with which their daily duties made them familiar; the reſt of the army will be enabled to compare their ſervices with the contending againſt ſkilful regulars in the field; and they who have ſeen no ſervice will be inſtructed in the duties to which they are expoſed by their profeſſion.

When every ſchool is called an academy, and young gentlemen are promiſed an education for the army, we are ſorry to ſee them join their regiments without any inſtruction that relates particularly to the profeſſion, except, perhaps, the theory of geometry and fortification. The different branches of mathematics taught in theſe academies are certainly very uſeful; but are they ſufficient to give any idea of the art of war? when the pupils leave theſe academies, do they bring with them any notion of pitching a tent, or encamping; mounting a guard; going the night patroles

troles between two armies; conſtructing redoubts; defending or attacking poſts? We cannot think it is poſſible; reaſonings and drawings are not ſufficient.

The art of war is much the ſame as our maſters the Romans taught it, only that gun-powder has ſupplanted the ſlower operations of the baliſta and catapulta. The Campus Martius was their military academy, where they learned the art of war by practice under the eyes of experienced officers; and, were the pupils of our academies ſhewn the manœuvres that occur moſt frequently in a campaign, which every military man ought to know, they would not leave the academies like ſimple ſcholars, but formed ſoldiers; capable of ſervice; of conducting parties; intrenching poſts and oppoſing the enemy; and a ſmall ſpot of ground would be ſufficient to ſhew the different operations neceſſary to render the ſcience familiar to the pupils;

pupils; and which it is hoped will be done in thoſe academies lately inſtituted, profeſſedly to qualify young gentlemen for the army.

A greater number of well-authenticated facts might have been collected and introduced to illuſtrate the different ſubjects; but this would have been inconſiſtent with the particular deſign of a work intended to comprize every neceſſary inſtruction within the compaſs of a pocket-volume, to be conſulted on any emergency; and probably would have ſwelled this little Eſſay to a ſize, which might run a riſk of diſguſting many of a profeſſion lying under the reproach of being too little informed, even in the knowledge of their own duties, and unfortunately little inclined to ſeek information from books; yet it will no doubt be generally allowed, that there cannot be a better method of conveying inſtruction, than by citing

citing examples of ſingular merit, which, while they convey the beſt information of the methods to ſucceed in the various enterprizes to which the profeſſion expoſes an officer, may likewiſe help to inſpire that ſpirit in the execution, which alone can make him riſe ſuperior to the ſenſe of danger, and emulate the faireſt characters that have been recorded.

I imagine that, if regimental records were introduced in the army, in which every inſtance of particular merit, either of the regiment or individuals, were properly diſplayed, it would have the beſt effects on the minds of young officers, who ſhould have the records of the regiment to peruſe, and might thereby become deſirous of having their names enrolled in that Book of Fame.

I am likewiſe perſuaded that, if a board was formed, to examine officers till they attained the rank of Major, whoſe teſtimony

mony ſhould be neceſſary to entitle them to preferment, as is the practice of the navy, it would have very good effects on the army.

Young gentlemen generally go into the army very early in life, for the ſake of obtaining rank, and by that means are deprived of the advantages which a longer courſe of education naturally promiſes. Being ſuddenly emancipated from the authority of tutors, and ſeduced by the novelty of freedom, they hearken perhaps too readily to the calls of pleaſure, which a maturer age would have reſiſted, and for ſome time, till the age of reflection approaches, they fail to derive thoſe advantages to which their profeſſion naturally leads them, in the very beſt ſchool for acquiring a knowledge of the world, of men, and of manners; which occaſions that diſinclination to reading ſo prevalent among young gentlemen of the army, and

has

has the worſt effects upon the happineſs of individuals, who have ſo much time lying a burthen upon their hands in time of peace; whereas the officer who has a taſte for books, in every quarter, in every ſituation, is independent of ſociety for his amuſement or entertainment: while he, who has no library but the Army Liſt and Court Kalendar (ironically called the Officer's Library), is under the neceſſity of pining away his time in painfully wiſhing for the dull routine of eating, drinking, and ſleeping, and paſſing away his life in liſtleſs idleneſs, the true ſource of the many evils which betide young officers who fail in life, and the certain cauſe of our ſeeing the better-informed part of ſociety ſo ready to turn their backs upon the moſt honourable of profeſſions.

He who could inſtruct the young gentlemen of the army to become amiable from their ſentiments, and reſpectable for their

their manners and morals, would do them ten times more eſſential ſervice than a million of treatiſes on the duties of either the Field or Garriſon: they would be good ſoldiers of courſe, and capable of acquitting themſelves with propriety in every ſituation to which their profeſſion expoſes them; when future writers might ſay of them as Tacitus ſays of Agricola: "Nor did Agricola lead a licentious life "like other young men who engage in "the ſervice only to indulge themſelves in "riot and debauchery. He did not aſ- "ſume the title, or enter upon the office "of Tribune, before he was poſſeſſed of "the proper qualifications, or waſte his "time in idleneſs, feats of pleaſure, and "abſence from duty; but made it his "buſineſs to become acquainted with the "Province, to be known to the army, to "derive inſtruction from the experienced, "to imitate the virtuous and brave, never

"ſeeking

"seeking occasion to distinguish himself
"from ostentation, nor refusing any service
"out of fear, and shewing equal zeal and
"activity in all his pursuits."

MILITARY

MILITARY INSTRUCTIONS FOR OFFICERS.

CHAP. I.

Of the Corps of a Partiſan.

A PARTISAN is an officer deſtined to command a detachment, whether draughted from the body of the army, or of a party to which he belongs, and for that reaſon has no other name than that of a partiſan.

The corps of a partiſan is a light party from one hundred to two thouſand men, ſeparated from the army, to ſecure the camp or a march; to reconnoitre the enemy or the country; to ſeize their poſts,

convoys, and eſcorts; to plant ambuſcades, and put in practice every ſtratagem for ſurpriſing or diſturbing the enemy; which is called carrying on the *Petite Guerre*. The practice of theſe days, and the operations of the laſt war, have placed the ſervice of ſuch a corps in a moſt reſpectable light, as it is more fatiguing, more dangerous, and more extenſive.

To form a corps capable of carrying on the *Petite Guerre* to advantage, prudence requires that it ſhould conſiſt of a thouſand men at leaſt, without which a partiſan cannot expect to ſupport the fatigues of a campaign, and ſeize the moſt important occaſions that every where offer, and which a too great inferiority muſt make him forego.

It is no leſs important that this corps ſhould be compoſed of infantry and cavalry; and as it is inconteſtable that the cavalry ought to be the moſt active in carrying on the *Petite Guerre*, it were to be wiſhed that they were likewiſe the ſtrongeſt, ſo as to have ſix hundred cavalry and four hunderd infantry in a corps of a thouſand men, making

making four companies of infantry and twelve troops of cavalry.

Each company of infantry to conſiſt of one captain, one firſt, and two ſecond lieutenants, four ſerjeants, and ninety-ſix men, including four corporals, four lance-corporals, and two drummers. Each troop of cavalry to conſiſt of one captain, one firſt and one ſecond lieutenant, a quarter-maſter, two ſerjeants and forty-eight horſemen, including four corporals, a trumpeter and farrier.

The commanding officer ſhould have the naming of the officers of this corps, or at leaſt have liberty to reject ſuch as he is convinced are not qualified for ſuch ſervice, as every officer who may be ambitious to ſerve in it, though poſſeſſed of great military merit, may not have the talents requiſite for the duties of the partiſan.

To ſupport the honour of this corps upon a ſolid and reſpectable footing, the ſtricteſt ſubordination muſt extend from the chief to all the officers, and the moſt rigid diſcipline inſpire vigilance, pati-

ence, bravery, and love of glory to the whole.

As to other corps of partiſans formed of one or more detachments, drawn from the different regiments of the army, and compoſed with a view to ſome particular expedition, their ſtrength and quality is regulated by the circumſtances of the affair they undertake, and are more or leſs numerous according to the exigency of the projected ſcheme. I ſhould not add any thing upon this ſubject, if I did not know how important it is for the officer that commands, to have the chooſing his men and officers whom he knows to be fitteſt for his enterprize, and thereby preventing many difficulties, contradictions, and dangers, which jealouſy and diſtruſt always occaſion among ſtrangers.

Prejudice ſtill divides our ſentiments about the ſize of a ſoldier; ſome requiring the talleſt ſize for horſe and foot, imagining that a proportionable ſtrength accompanies ſize, and that they can longer reſiſt the fatigue of the *Petite Guerre*. Others prefer a mid-

a middling ſize for this ſervice, expecting them to be more capable of fatigue than taller men. When we caſt our eyes on the regiments of the king of Pruſſia, compoſed of the talleſt men in Europe, who neither know eaſe nor reſt, we ſee none of other armies ſupporting the rudeſt fatigues of war better. Partiality to our own ſize prejudices the generality of men; but when we ſee the tall men with longer limbs marching at a greater rate with eaſe, I am for preferring the talleſt that are to be got, when well-limbed, ſtraight, and without any perſonal defect or corpulence, for a foot ſoldier.

The practice that prevails at preſent in the choice of men for the light dragoons, makes it unneceſſary to mention the advantage of preferring a low ſize for cavalry, that are to act with the greateſt ſwiftneſs, or the diſadvantage of horſes being incumbered with unwieldy riders. It is ſufficient to ſay, that none ſhould exceed five feet and five or ſix inches, for the cavalry of the partiſan.

No recruit for the corps of a partiſan, either cavalry or infantry, ſhould exceed

thirty years of age, but the younger they are, if they can carry arms, ſo much the better for ſuch a ſervice, to which youth are particularly inclined, and recruits may be met with every where; but when the neceſſities of war do not oblige officers to accept of indifferent men, they cannot ſerve the corps more eſſentially than in the chooſing good recruits. We learn from Vegetius, that the beſt ſervice is to be expected from men brought up to ſevere labour, and expoſed to the injuries of the weather; men accuſtomed to eaſe and plenty cannot endure fatigue and want, and they who have taſted feweſt of the ſweets of life are the leaſt ſubject to the fear of death. In the choice of recruits for the cavalry, it were not unworthy the attention of officers to prefer men that are lovers of horſes, and to recruit chiefly in thoſe countries where ſuch are moſtly to be expected. The excellent condition of the ſecond regiment of dragoons laſt war, while the other regiments were reduced to a very low condition every campaign, evidently

ſhews

ſhews that ſuch a fancy is not chimerical, as it has been always attributed to the inclinations of the men, and none of the officers were ever heard to aſſume to themſelves the leaſt merit on that ſcore.

As to arms, the firelock and bayonet is ſufficient for a foot ſoldier; but in the corps of the partiſan, I ſhould prefer barrels of thirty-ſix inches with a long bayonet, yet to have the caliber the ſame with the reſt of the army, which, for the ſake of having ammunition made up to ſuit the whole, ought to be invariably the ſame. For the more convenient method of carrying their ammunition, I would recommend the German manner, of having their cartridges placed horizontal, and covered with wax-cloth, inſtead of our wooden blocks; I would likewiſe prefer a helmet to our hats, as the ſword is almoſt the only thing to be dreaded from the enemy's cavalry. Four ſpades, and four pick-axes, ſhould be given to each company of infantry.

The preſent manner of equipping the light dragoons is ſo perfect, it is unneceſſary

to ſay any thing on that head; but no white horſe, ſtone-horſe, or mare, ſhould be ſuffered in the corps of the partiſan, as the leaſt neighing or perceivable colour may make enterprizes fail. No horſe ſhould be mounted for ſervice till ſix years old. The ſize of the light dragoons is very proper for the partiſan: and while they have firm ground to act upon, and plenty of forage, none can excell them; but when they come among moraſſes, and feel the ſeverity of want, perhaps the Hungarian huſſars may be found more equal to the duty: I ſhould therefore ſuppoſe, that, in forming the corps of the partiſan, two hundred horſe, ſuch as are bred in the mountains of Wales or Scotland, mounted by the lighteſt men, might be found of good ſervice.

The principal attention of an officer of cavalry ſhould be, to ſee that the men feed and dreſs their horſes well. Hay, ſtraw, and oats, are their common food; too much hay is not good, but when they find wheat-ſtraw newly threſhed, they may give them more of it, as it is excellent nouriſhment.

During

During the whole campaign they ſhould have dry food only, as green weakens them.

When the exigency of the ſervice requires the horſes to be kept ſaddled day and night, every horſeman ſhould ſeize ſome moment to turn the ſaddle-cloth, which greatly comforts a horſe, keeps him at eaſe, and makes him leſs apt to gall; care ſhould be taken to keep the cloth ſoft, and clean from ſweat and duſt.

CHAP II.

Of the Qualifications neceſſary in a Partiſan.

OF all military employments, there is none which requires more extraordinary qualities than that of the partiſan. Without entering into too minute a detail, I ſhall only mention the more indiſpenſable, whether on the ſide of favours from nature, or habits acquired by his own particular attention.

A good partiſan ought to have an imagination fertile in projects, ſchemes, and

reſources; a penetrating ſpirit, capable of combining all the circumſtances of an action; a heart intrepid againſt every appearance of danger; a ſteady countenance, always aſſured, which no ſigns of diſquiet can alter; a happy memory, that can call every one by his name; a diſpoſition alert, robuſt, and indefatigable, to carry him through every thing, and give a ſoul to the whole; a piercing rapid eye, which inſtantly catches faults or advantages, obſtacles and dangers of ſituation, of country, and every object as it paſſes; his ſentiments ſuch, as to fix the reſpect, confidence, and attachment, of the whole corps. Without theſe diſpoſitions, it is impoſſible to ſucceed.

A partiſan ought to underſtand Latin, German, and French, to converſe with all nations. He ought to have a perfect knowledge of the ſervice, eſpecially light troops, without being ignorant of the enemy's. He ſhould have the exacteſt map of the theatre of the war, examine it well, and become perfect maſter of it. It would be very advantageous to have ſome good geographers

graphers under his command, capable of drawing plans, routes of armies, ſituation of camps, and wherever they may have occaſion to reconnoitre.

He ought to ſpare nothing to be aſſured by his ſpies of the march, force, deſigns, and poſition, of the enemy. Theſe diſcoveries will enable him to ſerve his general eſſentially, and muſt contribute infinitely to the ſafety of the army, the ſupport, happineſs, and glory, of his own corps. His honour and intereſt requires that he ſhould keep a ſecretary, to make a journal of the campaign, to write down all orders which he either receives or gives; and, in general, every action or march of the corps, ſo as to be able at all times to give an account of his conduct, and to juſtify himſelf againſt the attacks of criticiſm, which are never ſpared to a partiſan.

As chief, he owes to his corps the example of an irreproachable conduct, circumſpect in his cares like the affection of a parent, by which he will inſpire reſpect, love, zeal, and vigilance, and gain the hearts

of the whole to his ſervice. It is extremely dangerous for ſuch an officer to contract the leaſt attachment to women, wine, or riches. The firſt makes him neglect his duty, and frequently occaſions the moſt ruinous treacheries: the ſecond leads to dangerous indiſcretions, and is ſure to draw down contempt: the third leads to guilt, and deſtroys every ſentiment of honour. The partiſan muſt be content without the delicacies of the table, as he may be often expoſed to want proviſion. His bed muſt be the ſame with that of the men, a cloak and ſtraw, never ſtripping but to change linen. Nothing animates ſoldiers ſo much, as the preſence and vigilance of a commanding officer ſharing with them the fatigues of the ſervice; the officers follow his example, the men are aſſured, encouraged, and content.

Nothing can be ſo dangerous to the ſafety of a corps, as a commander of a delicate indolent habit, for when officers are ſeen at their eaſe paſſing day and night at table, abandoning the ſafety of the poſt to the vigilance

vigilance of the guard, who (not being reſponſible for the commiſſions of their officers) inſenſibly neglect their duty, and expoſe themſelves to be eaſily ſurpriſed; when the blow is ſtruck, then they lament, complain, and throw the blame on one another, but the general will make it fall upon the commanding officer.

CHAP. III.

Of the Exerciſe.

THE exerciſe is the firſt part of the military art, and the more it is conſidered, the more eſſential it will appear. It frees the body from the ruſticity of ſimple nature, and forms men and horſes to all the evolutions of war; upon it depends the honour, merit, appearance, ſtrength, and ſucceſs, of a corps. While we ſee the greateſt corps for want of being exerciſed inſtantly diſordered, and the diſorder increaſing in ſpite of command; the confuſion

ſion overſets the art of the ſkilfulleſt maſters, and the valour of the men only ſerves to precipitate the defeat; for which reaſon, it is the duty of every officer to take care that the recruits be drilled as ſoon as they join their corps.

It would be very uſeleſs to enlarge on the words of command, and the motions practiſed in the exerciſe; I will neither criticiſe upon them, nor enlarge this volume by filling it up with what is to be found in ſo many military books of diſcipline; though I would recommend to every officer, to make himſelf perfectly maſter of the manœuvres of the ſoldier, without which it is impoſſible that he can form the men, or diſtinguiſh himſelf in his profeſſion.

The greateſt advantage derived from the exerciſe, is the expertneſs with which men become capable of loading and firing, and teaching them an attention to act in conformity with thoſe around them. It has always been lamented, that men have been brought on ſervice, without being informed of the uſes of the different manœuvres they have

have been practiſing; and, having no idea of any thing but the uniformity of the parade, inſtantly fall into diſorder and confuſion when they loſe the ſtep, or ſee a deviation from the ſtraight lines they have been accuſtomed to at exerciſe. It is a pity to ſee ſo much attention confined to ſhow, and ſo little given to inſtruct the troops in what may be of uſe to them on ſervice. Though the parade is the place to form the characters of ſoldiers, and teach them uniformity, yet being confined to that alone is too limited and mechanical for a true military genius.

Great induſtry and patience is neceſſary to form the habits of horſes for the calvary ſervice; and were they accuſtomed conſtantly to hear all the noiſes of war, and to ſee fire and ſmoke immediately before feeding, they would not only be ſooner reconciled, but from the hopes of feeding would be eaſily led into action. To the uſual exerciſes, the cavalry of the partiſan ſhould be accuſtomed to galloping, leaping ditches, and ſwimming rivers.

The

The men of every corps ſhould be accuſtomed to breaking, running, rallying, and forming quickly; but above all things, to know, that though they may be a little diſordered and huddled together from the preſſure of the enemy, that they are not therefore broken and to run away; but while they keep with their company and corps are ſtill in a condition to act.

CHAP. IV.

Of Subordination.

EVERY military man knows, that ſubordination conſiſts in a perfect ſubmiſſion to the orders of ſuperiors; in an entire dependence, regulated by the rights and duties of every military man, from the private ſoldier to the general. Subordination ought to ſhew the ſpirit of the chief in all the members; and this ſingle idea, which diſplays itſelf to the leaſt attention, ſuffices to ſhew its importance.

Without

Without ſubordination it is impoſſible that a corps can ſupport itſelf; its motions be directed, order eſtabliſhed, or the duties of the ſervice performed. In effect, it is ſubordination that gives a ſoul and harmony to the ſervice; it gives ſtrength to authority, and merit to obedience; it ſupports the ſtaff of the marechal as the ſword of the ſoldier, which ſecures the efficacy of the command, and the honour of the execution; it is ſubordination which prevents every diſorder, and procures every advantage to an army. But, if it ſecures the rights of ſuperiors, it likewiſe makes them anſwerable for the conſequences; and if it reduces inferiors to blind ſubjection, it at the ſame time ſecures them from all reproach: ſo true it is, that, in the failure of all enterprizes, the fault is laid on the commander alone, obedience juſtifying the reſt.

To have ſubordination perfect, there are conceſſions to be made, as well on the ſide of the ſuperiors who command, as of the ſubalterns who obey; and the confidence with

with which a ſovereign honours an officer is the only title required to authorize him in ſupporting the rights of his rank, therefore it were great imprudence to oppoſe it.

The voices of the officers, the waving of the colours and ſtandards, the ſound of trumpets, and the noiſe of drums, are ſo many echoes which explain and extend the orders of authority, to which every inferior owes a ready, reſpectful, and implicit ſubmiſſion. Such a ſolid obedience is always the fruit of the confidence, reſpect, and affection, which a corps has for its chief; it is then very important for him, and all his officers, to endeavour to inſpire the men with theſe ſentiments, and to fix them by a reciprocal attention to the character and wants of every individual.

Nevertheleſs, in ſpite of neceſſity, and all the advantages of ſubordination, in ſpite of the merit and good conduct of ſuperiors, a thouſand occaſions happen where ambition, intereſt, libertiniſm, or fear, ſeek to violate it. There are dangerous characters, reſtleſs, jealous, turbulent ſpirits, vain, pre-

preſumptuous, criticiſing ſouls, whom a ſuperior ought to obſerve with care, to check their arrogance, and prevent their mutiny, by remedies which prudence ſuggeſts, and authority allows. He will employ promiſes and good offices to cure the timidity of the weak, to excite their hope, raiſe their courage, and form their valour: he will equally put a ſtop to all the diſorders of libertiniſm, and all the plunderings of a criminal avidity, by threatenings and chaſtiſements regulated by equity, and the neceſſity of making examples.—An excellent divine, acknowledged by the whole corps as a man of probity and reſpectable zeal, who both by his conduct and diſcourſe excites and ſupports the moſt ſolid ſentiments of religion, upon which alone true honour is founded, would be of great uſe to ſupport union, juſtice, and dependence in the corps.

The moſt dangerous and common ſource from whence the very poiſon of ſubordination inſenſibly diſtills, is the violent impatience, or inſupportable brutality, of thoſe who command, which excites reſentment, revenge,

revenge, and deſpair. Licentious and criticiſing diſcourſes tend to murmurs, complaints, and mutiny: mean complaiſance or low familiarities debaſe and deſtroy every conſideration of eſſential reſpect. The inſtant an officer deſcends to be familiar with the men, all authority is ſubverted, obedience is not to be expected; on the contrary, the firſt urgent occaſion he will find them mutiny and reſiſt his commands; he cannot be too attentive in keeping them at a proper diſtance, and preſerving the ſtricteſt ſubordination. The relaxation of diſcipline is at all times the deſtruction of ſoldiers, and ſhame of officers, who are leſs diſhonoured by want of courage than want of application in their profeſſion. Marſhal Saxe ſays, that we ought not to believe that ſubordination and ſervile obedience debaſes courage, for it has always been ſeen, that, where the diſcipline has been moſt ſevere, the greateſt actions have been performed by the troops where it has been moſt eſtabliſhed.

Next to the attention of an officer in preſerving ſubordination, he ſhould take care not

not to loſe courage on the defection of a few mutineers. The ſpirit of rebellion never lays hold of a whole party at once, it is by the ſeditious diſcourſe of two or three, that this ſpirit is infuſed into the reſt. An officer who perceives it ſhould inſtantly command them to be ſilent; and, if they continue, he ſhould lay hold of the firſt firelock, and break the heads of the chief mutineers without mercy, threatening to hang all who fail in ſubordination. Several reaſons could be given for this conduct; and examples cited to prove that this method, however ſevere it may ſeem, is the only one either to reſtrain a party of ſoldiers or the populace; but this is foreign to the preſent ſubject.

CHAP.

CHAP. V.

Of the practical Geometry neceſſary for an Officer.

AS the ſmalleſt detachments of an army may have occaſion in the courſe of their ſervice to conſtruct ſome works of defence, it is the duty of every officer to acquire ſuch a knowledge of geometry as will enable him to direct the execution of them; and as many officers may have neglected that branch of education before their coming to the army, it may be neceſſary and agreeable to be informed of the method of executing them with eaſe and preciſion, when they may not have either inclination or opportunity to ſtudy; and therefore we imagine it will be proper to give ſome inſtructions in the practical geometry neceſſary for officers.

Geometry, which is the moſt agreeable part of the mathematics, is the ſcience of meaſuring, and the knowledge of it in all its parts is indiſpenſably neceſſary to en-

gineers; but to the officers of the army, who never have occaſion to direct the conſtruction of large fortifications, the geometry neceſſary for them may be reduced to a ſmall compaſs.

The works in the field, which they may cauſe to be made, are ſo ſimple, that they have only to mark out ſtraight lines, horizontals, parallels, perpendiculars, and curves, knowing the relation they bear to one another for the execution. But as the drawing of theſe figures with rules and compaſſes upon paper is very different from tracing them out upon the ground, we ſhall ſhew how that is practiſed, ſo as not only to ſatisfy the ſcholar who has been taught the theory of geometry, but ſerve likewiſe to guide the officer, who is unacquainted with the ſubject, in marking out the intrenchments, with which he may fortify poſts that are entruſted to his care.

The inſtruments neceſſary for engineers might be deſcribed, their uſes ſhewn, and likewiſe what officers may ſubſtitute in place of thoſe that are not portable; but, that

that the memories and perſons of officers on ſervice may be encumbered as little as poſſible, a piece of whipcord, twenty yards long, may be made to anſwer every purpoſe that an officer on detachment has occaſion for. At one end it ſhould have a loop large enough to paſs over the head of a tent-pin or picket, and at every ſix feet (which is a toiſe) it ſhould be marked with a knot tied hard.

This is ſufficient for tracing out intrenchments; but the detachment muſt have ſpades, pick-axes, hatchets, and woodbills, for removing earth and cutting wood; and no party however ſmall ſhould march to a poſt without one or two of each kind. We come now to the manner of tracing.

Plate I. Fig. 1. To trace a right line from A to B, plant a picket at the point A, and, paſſing the loop of the cord over it, ſtretch it tight to B, with a ſecond picket; this done, draw a line along the ground with the point of a third picket, touching the cord lightly all along.

To

To raiſe a perpendicular line at the point C of the line DE, plant a picket at the point C as center, putting the loop of the cord over it, then with the point of another picket tied to the cord at a toiſe diſtance, deſcribe the ſemicircle FG; then from the points F and G, where pickets ſhould be planted, trace at the diſtance of two or three toiſes the arches H and I; then put the loop again over the picket C, which ſtretch tightly towards L in paſſing through the ſection of the arches H and I, and trace the line CL, which will be perpendicular to the line DE. Fig. 2.

If the perpendicular M is to be raiſed at one of the extremities of the line NO, you muſt continue the line to P, and trace the ſemicircle QR, finiſhing as above. Fig. 3.

But if the point S, from whence you would let fall a perpendicular line, is out of the line TV, you muſt plant a picket at the point S, and paſſing over the loop of the cord, draw the portion of the circle XY; then from the points X and Y, Fig. 4.

where pickets are planted, trace with the cord at one length the arches at *Z*, and paſſing a line from where they cut at Z to the given point S, it will be perpendicular to the line TV.

Fig. 5. This is the manner of tracing a perpendicular with preciſion: however, as the operation is a little complex, and you may not always have time to do it, it will be ſufficient to attend to the cord being ſtretched from *a* to *b*, to trace it by making two right angles with the line *cd*, by your eye.

Fig. 6. To trace two parallel lines, you muſt, after having deſcribed the firſt line *eh*, meaſure the diſtance at which you would trace the parallel, which ſuppoſe at *g*. Place a picket at the point *g*, as center, and deſcribe the indefinite arch *hi*; from the point *h*, as center, deſcribe the arch *eg*; then take upon the firſt arch the part *hi*, equal to *eg*, and draw the line *gi*, which will be parallel to the line *eh*.

But as the works which officers have occaſion to raiſe are but of little extent, and they


Fig. 1.
A
B

L
H
I
Fig. 2.
F
G
D
C
E

M
Fig. 3.
P
Q
R
N
O


S
Fig. 4.
T
X
Y
V
Z


a
Fig. 5.
c
b
d


Fig. 6.
g
I
e
h

they may neglect ſuch preciſion, the operation may be abridged by meaſuring, with the cord at the two ends of the line *eh*, two equal diſtances, *eg* and *hi*, as perpendicular as poſſible by the eye, and from the marked points trace the line *gi*, which will be parallel to the line *eh*.

We ſhall give the manner of tracing a triangle, a perfect ſquare, and a circle, when we come to tell how to trace redoubts; but we ſhall not mention any figures which are uſed only in the conſtruction of great works.

As right lines, perpendiculars, parallels, and angles, are what moſtly occur in field-fortifications, the young officers would do well to practiſe them often. The time they ſometimes remain in camp, their leiſure hours during peace and in garriſon, may be employed in theſe amuſements, at which the ſoldiers will chearfully aſſiſt for a ſmall recompence, which will have the additional advantage of making the men expert, when they come upon ſervice.

CHAP. VI.

Of the different Works with which Poſts may be fortified.

POSTS are generally ſuch places as bodies of troops can fix in when detached from the army, to cover and ſecure the frontiers, and upon the vigilance and reſiſtance of the parties that are detached there depends the ſafety of the army. Whatever the abilities of a general may be, it is ſcarce poſſible that he can have an eye to every detail that contributes to his defence; it is ſufficient if he knows that the guards are properly placed, and the line that they make properly eſtabliſhed. It is then the buſineſs of the particular officers who command them, to make the beſt diſpoſition for a vigorous defence, and anſwering the views of the general.

An officer who is detached to a poſt is either to relieve a party, or take poſſeſſion for the firſt time. In the firſt caſe, if the guard which he relieves happens to be intrenched,

trenched, as ſoon as he arrives at the poſt, and has taken his inſtructions from the officer who commands, he ſhould prepare himſelf for his defence, as ſhall be mentioned in that article. In the ſecond, if an officer who is detached is to intrench himſelf, he muſt examine if the place is advantageous for the execution of his projects, the defence of his people, and the ſecuring a retreat.

He muſt conſult, 1ſt, whether the ſituation be convenient for ſending parties to diſcover the enemy; to give intelligence of their ſituation and march, or to diſturb and ſurpriſe them. 2d, If it has ſome natural defence on its front or flanks, ſuch as a river, rivulet, moraſs or ſmall wood that can be eaſily penetrated. 3d, If he can preſerve his communication with the army, and if there are ſome covered places to favour his retreat. 4th, If he can diſcover all the approaches, becauſe if the enemy can come within a ſmall diſtance of the poſt without being ſeen, he will place himſelf under cover there, and reſt while

the beſieged are obliged to remain continually under arms, and will watch the moment for making an attack. If then he finds hollow roads, clumps of wood, or any place where the enemy can ſecure himſelf in the neighbourhood of his poſt, he muſt fill them up, or guard them with detachments of ſix or ſeven men. 5th, He muſt take care not to be commanded by any neighbouring heights, or to prevent the enemy from profiting by that advantage, becauſe if they can take his ſoldiers in the rear, it will be impoſſible for them to defend themſelves. He will ſee afterwards how to ward off this inconvenience, when he cannot prevent being expoſed to theſe heights. 6th, The extent of the work muſt be proportioned to the number of men that are to defend it. Good ſenſe and numberleſs examples prove, that too large intrenchments (ſuch as are commonly conſtructed) can only be defended by conſiderable bodies. Exceſſes of this kind are extremely reprehenſible, and it were much more eligible to give in to the oppoſite, by making

making them ſmaller. 7th, He ſhould take care to have all the parts of his intrenchment nearly of an equal ſtrength, ſo as to be able to make an equal reſiſtance every where; and, laſtly, he will take care to fulfill exactly the intention of the general in poſting a guard in that place.

There are ſome places ſo advantageouſly poſted by nature, that, though they are not fortified, they may in a ſhort time and with little charge be made ſo ſtrong, that it will require as much art to beſiege them as many others that are perfect fortifications; ſuch as iſlands, peninſulas, and places ſeated on eminences of difficult acceſs, or in moraſſes.

If the poſt is in a level country, or upon a height that may be ſurrounded, as happens almoſt always to ſmall detachments, a redoubt or ſmall ſquare fort ſhould be conſtructed, compoſed of a parapet with its banquette and ditch.

The ground being choſen, trace a ſtraight line AE, [Plate II.] and raiſe the perpendicular BC, as directed in the practical

geometry, obſerving to give to each of theſe lines, which mark the interior ſide of the parapet, but two toiſes or two and a half for thirty men, four toiſes for fifty, and eight for a hundred, which will leave a ſpace of two feet at leaſt againſt the parapet for each man.

Having traced the two firſt lines A, B, put the cord over the picket C of the perpendicular B, and with the ſame length trace the arch D; then put the cord over the picket E of the line A, and trace the arch F. The point where the arches interſect each other is the point to end the lines EH and CG. Theſe four lines mark the interior ſide of the parapet.

Then trace four other lines at the diſtance of two or three feet parallel to the firſt, as I, L, M, N, to mark the ſize of the banquette, which ſhould be greater or leſs, according to the number of ſoldiers you would place in a file. Then trace a third parallel ſquare on the outſide of the firſt, as O, P, Q, R, to mark the exterior ſide of the parapet, and to determine its thickneſs,

thickneſs, which is uſually eight or nine feet, or eighteen if it is to reſiſt cannon, for which you ſhould always be prepared.

Then trace a fourth and laſt ſquare ST VX, to determine the width of the ditch, which is the ſame or two feet more than the thickneſs of the parapet, leaving a picket planted at all the angles, as likewiſe at the lines already traced, ſo as not to loſe the points from whence the lines were drawn.

While employed with two or three men in tracing, five or ſix ſhould be ordered to cut down the trees that are in the neighbourhood of the poſt, not only to open the approaches, but to ſerve for conſtructing the intrenchments. The ſmalleſt branches ſerve to make faſcines, which are a ſort of faggots about ſix feet long, two feet thick, and of the ſame ſize all over, tied in the middle and at the two ends, to ſerve for ſupporting the earth, which would tumble down without that ſupport. The middling branches ſerve to make pickets proper for mixing with the faſcines, and fixing them in the ground, or one above another, to

raiſe the parapet. The trunks to which the large branches are left ſerve to increaſe the ſtrength of a poſt, as ſhall be mentioned afterwards.

Having traced all in the manner directed, fix a row of faſcines upon the ſmall ſquare ILMN, to ſupport the earth of the banquette; then fix a ſecond row upon the ſquare ABGH, to ſupport the interior ſide of the parapet; then a third row on the third ſquare OPQR, to ſupport the exterior ſide of the parapet. You ſhould obſerve, in beginning to picket the faſcines, to leave a paſſage of three feet PB on the ſide leaſt expoſed to the enemy, to ſerve for an entry to the redoubt; but if this paſſage can be taken in a ſtraight line, it ſhould be made like a mortiſe as at Y.

After having picketed the three rows of faſcines as directed, dig the ditch AB, as in the profile of Plate II, a foot diſtant from the exterior ſide of the parapet. This diſtance or breadth is called *berme*, and ſerves to ſupport the earth, or receive what falls from the parapet by the enemy's cannon.

non. This *berme* is more or leſs according to the ſolidity of the earth; the earth to be thrown into the intervals C, D, E, marked for the parapet and banquette, taking care to make the men tread it well down, and obſerving to leave a *talus* or *ſlope* on the two ſides of the ditch FG more or leſs, according to the conſiſtence of the earth, ſo that it may not tumble down. The ſlope F, which is on the ſide of the redour, is called *the ſcarp*, and the oppoſite ſlope which is next the country is called *the counterſcarp*. Care muſt be taken, in picketing the faſcines with which the parapet is raiſed, to bring them nearer one another by degrees in raiſing it as at H, ſo as to leave the ſame ſlope on each ſide. The diſtance DE mark the banquette; the diſtance DC the thickneſs of the parapet at the bottom; the diſtance IL the thickneſs of the parapet at the top; MN the width of the ditch at bottom; AB the width of the ditch at top.

If the ground is level, the banquette of this work muſt be raiſed two feet, but in

low places two banquettes are neceſſary, the one above the other, like ſteps; but if this banquette is raiſed on account of ſome neighbouring heights from whence you may be taken in the rear, the parapet muſt be raiſed to ſuch a height that the enemy's ſhot can no longer plunge down upon the men. A ſlope muſt be left on the top of the parapet, as IL, ſo that the ſoldiers may ſee round the poſt, and fire eaſily towards the country at O.

Though the ſquare form of a redoubt, which we have given the method of conſtructing, is almoſt the only one uſed in the field; yet it has its faults, which ought to make it be rejected, at leaſt for theſe poſts which ought to defend the environs equally. Experience ſhews us that we ought never to depend on the oblique firing of muſquetry, as the ſoldiers almoſt always fire right forwards as at A, [Plate III. fig. 2.] and often even without taking aim. This being the caſe, there are large ſpaces oppoſite to the angles of the redoubt at B that are not defended, and where

where we may ſay that the enemy remain in ſafety. The Chevalier Clairac propoſes an excellent method to prevent this inconvenience, by conſtructing the interior edge of the parapet, like the edge of a ſaw, in form of ſmall *redans*, to hold a man or two in each ſide, [Plate IV.] which by the croſs fire takes the enemy on the two flanks, ſo that there are no approaches but what are defended; but the conſtruction of this redoubt is too tedious and complex to be executed by ſmall detachments.

The ſame author prefers conſtructing circular redoubts as at C, [Plate III. fig. 2.] becauſe, all the points of the circumference being equally diſpoſed, the ſoldier poſts himſelf indifferently over all, and the exterior ſpaces D, which are defended, varying every moment, the enemy is no where in ſafety.

The circular redoubt then is the moſt perfect that can be conſtructed; but where a road or the edge of a river is to be defended, the ſquare, or long, or triangular redoubt is preferable, becauſe they ought

to

to oppoſe the faces of the intrenchment as parallel as poſſible to the places they are to fire at, obſerving always to round the angles.

To trace a circular redoubt, after fixing the central point of the poſt, let a picket be fixed in that point, and draw from it as center the circle EE, with a length of cord in proportion to the number of the party *, to mark the interior ſide of the parapet; then trace another within the firſt, at the diſtance already given, to mark the banquette; then trace a third FF, to mark the exterior edge of the parapet; then trace a fourth GG, to mark the width of the ditch; which being done, picket the faſcines, and make them take the bend of the circle, finiſhing as in a ſquare redoubt.

If an officer is poſted with a detachment on a paſſage or before a bridge, in a defile, or oppoſite to a ford, he may make a pa-

* If there are thirty men, a toiſe and a half of the cord; if fifty men, two toiſes; if for a hundred, double the proportions, unleſs you would place the men two or three deep.

rapet

rapet either bending or ſtraight, with a banquette or ditch, which ſhould ſhut up the whole entry; or he may make a *redan*, which is a work with two faces, and in ſuch a ſituation ſhould be made with a re-entrant angle, (that is, the angle pointing from the enemy,) taking care, when he is to guard a ford, to conſtruct it ſo near the river that the enemy cannot have room to form after they have paſſed. A deep ditch may be dug oppoſite to the ford, into which the water of the river ſhould be made to paſs; they may likewiſe make the banks ſteep, throw trees acroſs, and ſcatter chauſſe-traps, which are inſtruments of iron with four ſpikes made ſo as to have always one point erect.

The ſtrength of a redoubt or any other work may be augmented by blocking up the paſſages that lead to it; in a mountainous country, by cutting large ditches perpendicularly down acroſs the roads; by placing carts above one another in the defiles, with ſome ſoldiers behind them, and by throwing, wherever it is neceſſary, large branches

branches of trees half buried in the ground; taking care not to break the way by which you muſt retire, ſo as to prevent your making a retreat; but on the contrary to leave an eaſy paſſage made in form of a draw-bridge, or any other way defended by ſeven or eight ſoldiers.

If derached into a level country, very deep ditches ſhould be dug in the avenues and approaches of the poſt; or deep pits covered over with ſmall branches and a little earth over them, taking care to ſcatter the earth that is dug out all round, ſo that the enemy may not be able to diſcover whereabout they are; and chauſſe-traps may likewiſe be ſcattered in the avenues and on the glacis. Laſtly, pickets may be planted all round the poſt near to one another, inclining a little outwards, ſix feet out of the ground, and the points made ſharp after being driven.

But the moſt formidable obſtacle, and which is preferred by Monſieur Folard, is to ſhut up the defiles, to block up the roads, to ſurround the poſt with felled trees, ſinking

Fig.

Fig. 2.



Fig. 1.





Plate III.





ing their trunks three or four feet deep in the earth, which muſt be dug on purpoſe, leaving a number of large branches which muſt be ſharpened at the ends, and the leaves taken away, then placed as near to one another as poſſible, ſo that the branches may mix, taking care that they incline towards the enemy. Two or three rows may be made in this manner, but they ſhould be at leaſt two toiſes diſtant from each other, that the enemy may not burn them all at once, to approach the intrenchments. Marſhal Saxe in his Reveries ſays, that redoubts are proportionably advantageous as they take leſs time in conſtructing; and are proper for numberleſs circumſtances, where one often may ſerve to ſtop an army in a cloſe country, hinder them from troubling you on a critical march, or to occupy a large ſpace of country when you have but few troops.

Intrenchments are ſometimes made with felled trees alone, when there is no deſign, or time is wanting, to raiſe an intrenchment of earth. The trunks ſhould be placed

placed towards you, and very close upon one another, with the branches sharpened and pointing to the enemy. This makes a very formidable parapet when rounded, so as to prevent the enemy getting sight of your people. There is no need to mention large works, which require engineers to construct, and great bodies to defend them; but a redoubt, such as A, [Plate V.] may be strengthened by filling the ditch with water, by turning a rivulet, or cutting a river or pond. If the ground is uneven, so that the water cannot be conveyed equally in all parts of the ditch, dams should be left in digging at C; or little traverses of earth, to form banks proper for keeping the water in the upper part of the ditch D, from whence it may be let run into the lower E. These banks should have but half a foot in thickness at the height D, which should be raised sharp, but a good deal more left below at E, by sloping the two sides. Dams likewise are made of planks or boards, as at F; but they must be strong, and supported by large

A.
B.
C.D.
F.
G.
H.
I.
L
M.
N.
O
P
Q

View of a Redoubt



Explanation.

A. The Ground within the Redoubt.
B. The bottom of the Ditch.
C.D.E. Dam of Earth.
F. Dam of Planks, Boards, or fascines.
G. Upper part of the Redoubt constructed of fascines & the Earth dug out of the Ditch.
H. The lower part of the Redoubt dug in the Earth.
I. The Berme or space left at the Bottom of y^e^ Parapet to support the Earth.
L. The Entry of the Redoubt.
M. The inside of the Parapet.
N. The upper part of the Parapet.
O. The Banquette.
P. The Glacis.
Q. Rivulet from whence Water may be let into the Ditch of the Redoubt.

large ſtakes, ſo that the body of water above may not overturn them, and then they are reckoned preferable to thoſe of earth.

CHAP. VII.

The manner of fortifying Churches, Mills, and other detached Buildings.

IT is not only with ſuch works as are mentioned in the preceding chapter that an officer may fortify a poſt, but there are likewiſe an infinity of ways to ſtop an enemy, to tire him, and even to repulſe him, with which it is neceſſary he ſhould be acquainted.

All the ſchemes for oppoſing the enemy, of which we have given a detail, ſerve only to add to the exterior ſtrength of poſts; there are others which have ſome natural fortifications, ſuch as churches, church-yards, mills, or farm-houſes, &c. An officer who is ſent to a poſt of this kind, which

which is detached from other buildings, ought to obſerve, before he begins to work, to make the inhabitants go out, and the magiſtrates of the neareſt place to receive and lodge them. He ſhould then intrench the houſe with a turning parapet, if he has people enough to defend it; but, if he has only a few, he ſhould make a breaſt-work of felled trees round the houſe, eſpecially oppoſite to the angles, to prevent the enemy from undermining it. He muſt likewiſe take off the tiles and ſlates, leſt the enemy get up by ladders, and cruſh his people that are within. If the houſe is covered with thatch, it ſhould be pulled off and burnt, as well as every thing combuſtible that can be found in the neighbourhood, leſt the enemy make uſe of it againſt the houſe.

Though the houſe is ſurrounded with a parapet of felled trees, he ſhould not fail to pierce the walls with loop holes, about a foot from the ground, ſo as to diſcover the enemies legs, that they may not get footing on the outſide. Theſe loop holes

ſhould

ſhould be four inches wide, and three feet diſtant from one another; and a little ditch ſhould be made a foot and a half from the wall within the houſe, in which the ſoldiers ſhould be placed who are to defend it. Other loop-holes ſhould likewiſe be pierced ſeven or eight feet from the ground, oppoſite to the interſtices of the lower ones, and of the ſame width, placing the ſoldiers that are to defend them upon tables, planks, or ladders; and taking care to pierce a greater number oppoſite to the avenues, before, and at the ſides of the gate, and the angles of the houſe, becauſe theſe are the places where the enemy uſually make the greateſt efforts. If the houſe has an inner court, the walls ſhould be pierced which incloſe it, ſo as to fire upon the enemy after he has made himſelf maſter of it.

If there are ſeveral gates, they ſhould all be blocked up except one to be left for an entrance to the poſt, which ſhould be made ſo as to admit but one man at a time.

If

If there are low windows which are not grated, they ſhould be ſhut up with dung, planks, ſtones, earth, or trees. If there are any out-houſes, ſuch as ſtables, cellars, &c. ſeveral trees ſhould be buried up to the branches before them, to prevent the enemy from forming, if they are about to penetrate into the houſe; and one or two trees ſhould be put three or four feet within the entry, to prevent the enemy from penetrating right forward.

If there is a broad ſtaircaſe to the firſt floor, it ſhould be broke down, or blocked up with ſtones or caſks filled with earth. If it is a winding ſtair, the wall ſhould be pierced in different places with loop-holes, to fire upon the enemy that are already entered, keeping ladders to get up to the firſt floor, which ſhould have the boards pierced with a number of holes about four inches diameter, to fire down upon the enemy, obſerving to pierce them only where there are no trees below, but to have a greater number over the door, and other weak places which the enemy can force.

Loop-holes ſhould be pierced breaſt-high in the wall of the firſt floor, with about ten inches opening, and oppoſite to the interſtices of thoſe immediately below. If there are not people enough to defend the windows of the firſt floor, they ſhould be barricadoed, to prevent the enemy from firing upon thoſe within; and a large opening ſhould be made in the pavement oppoſite to each window a little longer than the width of the window, which is to ſerve by way of ditch, into which you may tumble thoſe who penetrate that way.

The ſame may be done with the ſecond and third floors, ſo as to make an equal reſiſtance over all; but, inſtead of piercing loop-holes in the higheſt floor, the tiles and ſlates being taken away, the wall may be taken down to breaſt-high for the men to fire over, the ſtones kept to throw upon the enemy, and the rafters to throw upon the ladders which happen to be placed againſt the houſe. A poſt intrenched in this manner may reſiſt a great while, and even tire out the beſiegers, if defended by reſolute men.

Captain

Captain d'Enfernay of a French regiment with a company of volunteers, in the campaign of 1748, took poſt in the church of Bevera, two miles from Ventimiglia. It is detached from other buildings, and he fortified it with a parapet and ditch full of water; but his intrenchment was commanded by ſome houſes in the village, ſo that the enemy could fire down upon his party. He remedied this defect by covering the commanded part with a kind of *blind* made with rafters leaning one end on the wall of the church, and the other upon poſts raiſed a foot higher than the top of the parapet, which left room to fire through. This *blind*, covered with faſcines and earth, prevented the enemy's fire from piercing, and did not prevent his firing upon them, ſo that they durſt not attack him.

This example is mentioned to ſhew how to ſecure a poſt that is commanded by a height. When there is no redoubt or intrenchments of earth, the interior ſide of the parapet which is commanded ſhould be raiſed, or a ſort of penthouſe made with rafters,

rafters, placed perpendicularly againſt the inner ſide of the parapet, upon which, planks or faſcines are nailed, taking care to leave room between the bottom of the penthouſe and the top of the parapet, for the men to fire through.

If an officer has not time to oppoſe all the ſchemes which have been mentioned to the enemy, when the general wants to make a forage, and throws infantry into the houſe to form a line, he ſhould immediately place a couple of trees acroſs before the door, pierce the boards, ſhut the windows, and prepare for his defence; which gives time to the foragers to retire, and the ſupporting parties to advance.

CHAP. VIII.

Of the manner of fortifying Villages.

THE manner of intrenching which has been mentioned, is only for poſts that are detached from any building; but

if an officer has a village to defend, he may cut out a much harder piece of work for the enemy. When we ſpeak of intrenching a village, it is meant only of ſuch as have the houſes collected, and ſometimes ſurrounded with a wall. An officer detached to a poſt of this nature ought to go ſeveral times round it, and obſerve the adjacent houſes before he begins to intrench, and cauſe loop-holes to be pierced in them: the entries of thoſe that have paſſages leading to the country ſhould be blocked up with trees, and, if he has time, he ſhould make a good parapet of felled trees, and intrench the entries of the ſtreets.

An officer who would fortify a poſt of ſome extent ought to make a kind of plan of the village, and the intrenchments which he intends, which will often furniſh ideas of defence, that eſcape on viewing the country. A ſtreet is to be defended like a ford or bridge with a *redan*, as in chapter ſecond, or with a ſimple parapet in a ſemicircle with a ditch; making loop-holes in the

the houſes at the entrance, and deep ditches acroſs the ſtreets, with *chauſſe-traps* thrown into the bottom of them. The ſtreets ſhould be blocked up with trees, carts, and caſks; ſeveral paſſages in the back parts of the houſes ſhould likewiſe be opened, to keep up a communication with the different ſtreets: but above all, if there are but few men, the middle of every open place or ſquare muſt be filled with felled trees, to prevent the enemy from forming if he penetrates.

As cannon or fire are moſt to be dreaded in the defence of a village, an officer ought to break up the roads by which cannon can paſs, which is an eaſy matter in a mountainous country; but if the village happens to be in a plain, large ditches ſhould be cut acroſs the avenues, at every little interval placing trees acroſs that take up the whole breadth. If there is time, the joiſts of the houſes ſhould be propped up with trunks of trees, or large pieces of wood, put like bricklayers horſes, to prevent their tumbling down and cruſhing the

beſieged. The beſt ſecurity againſt fire is to burn all the materials that an enemy can make uſe of for that purpoſe; but if there is a quantity of wood, ſtraw, or hay, the general ſhould be aſked whether he chooſes to have it burnt, or carried off to ſupply the army.

Another eſſential thing for an officer to attend to, who is detached to a village, is to ſecure his retreat in caſe he is forced at the entry of the ſtreet, or in his firſt intrenchments; he ſhould therefore chooſe a church or large houſe ſeparate from the reſt, after having diſlodged the inhabitants. When ſoldiers who defend a poſt know that they have a place to retreat to, they do not think of ſurrendering while they ſee themſelves in a ſtate of obtaining an honourable capitulation. But if the houſes of a village are ſcattered, and there are gardens or courts in the center, they muſt be content with intrenching a ſingle houſe, church, or church-yard, where they may be covered with an intrenchment of earth, and employ all the ſchemes which I have

have already given in the preceding chapter.

If the works with which poſts, eſpecially villages, are fortified, were to be executed by the ſoldiers of the detachments, who ought never to be fatigued, it would be too laborious and tedious; therefore an officer ſhould cauſe a number of peaſants by the appointment of the magiſtrates to work alone, or jointly with a third of the party, while two thirds remain under arms to prevent ſurpriſes. The ſoldiers and peaſants ſhould be relieved every three hours by freſh men, taking care that they have no concealed arms, and work without interruption till the work is compleated.

CHAP. IX.

Of going on Detachment and ſecret Marches.

DETACHMENTS are particular bodies of ſoldiers ſeparated from a greater body, to guard a poſt, or to go an expedition.

When an officer is ordered on a detachment, he ſhould provide himſelf with a cord regularly divided, in caſe he has occaſion to intrench, and be at the parade betimes, to get information from the brigade-major, whether he is deſtined to relieve a detachment, or to occupy a poſt for the firſt time. If to relieve a party, he is only to know where the guide is, who is to conduct him; the guide is a ſoldier ſent by the officer who is to be relieved, as orderly-man to the major general, who, by having been at the poſt before, can conduct the new detachment.

If it is a poſt that is to be occupied for the firſt time, the officer ſhould aſk the brigade-major for inſtructions relating to its defence; which being got, he muſt inſpect his party, and take care that every ſoldier is properly equipped; his firelock loaded, freſh primed, and a good flint well fixed; his cartouch-box filled with cartridges; and that he carries proviſion for twenty-four hours, which is the time that detachments commonly continue, and

are

are not allowed to go away to eat. Care muſt be taken to have ſpades, pick-axes, hatchets, and wood-bills, one or two of each kind; and, if any thing is wanted, to apply to the brigade-major, that they may have every thing neceſſary for intrenching. Perhaps ſome young officers may ſay that theſe are precautions of which no one need be informed; but are they ſo little eſſential that they ought to be omitted? I appeal to thoſe who know, whether it has not been the common practice for officers to march their detachments as ſoon as they have been told off, without any previous examination.

Is it reaſonable to expect a ſoldier, who wants any of the things that have been mentioned, can ſerve in the defence of a poſt as he ought? Let it not be ſaid, that it is the cuſtom during the campaign to ſee the ſoldiers provided with every thing that is neceſſary; for there are many inſtances of their coming unprovided, and being not only uſeleſs, but an incumbrance in a poſt. Mr. Vauban ſays, the cauſe of ſuc-

ceeding ſo badly in theſe defences, is for the moſt part owing to the officers who do not provide utenſils neceſſary for expeditions of this nature; and the ſource of this neglect, beſide ignorance and imprudence, is too commonly owing to people's treating this article as trifling, though in effect they are the chief things to which they ought to attend. It is better to take a hundred uſeleſs precautions, than to be wanting in any neceſſary one, becauſe the ſmalleſt negligence may defeat the beſt concerted projects; though, at the ſame time, they ſhould not be diſcouraged by ſuppoſing the enemy to be more vigilant than he truly is, or by ſtarting difficulties that never may happen. If they were to ſtop at every ſuppoſition that may occur to the imagination in time of war, nothing would be executed.

One general rule in military projects that depend upon us alone, ſhould be to omit nothing that can inſure the ſucceſs of our deſign; but to that which depends on the enemy, to truſt ſomething to hazard.

When

When an officer has inſpected his party, he ought to get information from his guide, whether the way is broad or narrow; open or incloſed; if the enemy's poſts are near; if they go on patroles, or ſee their parties in the day; and, laſtly, if he is to paſs mills, farms, manors, &c. and from theſe informations take the neceſſary precautions for his march.

Secret marches are ſuch as are to be made unknown to the enemy, to reconnoitre, to ſurpriſe, or to croſs a country which they occupy. It is here that a commander has need of all his prudence to ſucceed, and not to be betrayed. Before he ſets out, he ought ſecretly to have procured the beſt information of the different routes that can be taken; the ſituation of the enemy's poſts that are to be avoided; and the kind of country that is to be paſſed over. For better precaution, it will be advantageous for the commanding officer to be provided with a plan in the manner to be explained in Chap. X. [Plan VIII.] It is likewiſe neceſſary to take one or two

ſure intelligent guides, of whoſe capacity you are taught to form a judgment in the ſame chapter. When there are too many of theſe people, ſome of them eaſily eſcape; they go to acquaint the enemy of your march; defeat your ſchemes; and expoſe you to be ſurpriſed.

When the whole are ready to march, the advanced guard A, [Plan VI.] which ſhould conſiſt of cavalry only, ought to ſet out. It is ſurpriſing that all the authors, who have written on this part of the art of war, have neglected to ſhew ſufficient attention to ſo eſſential a point: the greateſt part are ſilent; and the reſt, paſſing ſlightly over the different duties of this corps, are content that it ſhould be compoſed of infantry, though on the leaſt reflection in the moſt ordinary caſes of a ſecret march, reaſon muſt determine that none but cavalry ought to be placed there; whether it be to ſtop paſſengers who may diſcover your route; or ſuddenly to attack an advanced guard of the enemy whom they meet face to face; or to harraſs

raſs their corps, in order to gain time for your own to form: it is inconteſtable, that for all theſe purpoſes, cavalry has greatly the advantage of infantry; who are by no means capable of running here and there to ſeize paſſengers, or of pouring ſuddenly on an advanced guard of the enemy; or of reſiſting their cavalry a moment in caſe of a ſudden rencounter, when they muſt expect to be thrown down and trod under the horſes feet, and the corps attacked before the commanding officer has had a moment to prepare for his defence.

As examples ſerve beſt to illuſtrate opinions that have been ſeldom declared, the ſpirited behaviour of Cornet Nangle of the 15th regiment of light dragoons merits our particular notice, and will ſerve as a proof of the great advantage of having the advanced guard of cavalry. In the campaign of 1761, when the French army, under the command of Marſhal Broglio and the Prince of Soubiſe, were retiring towards Hoxter, where they paſſed the Weſer, Prince Ferdinand followed cloſe after them:

for ſeveral days; and on the evening before they gained the paſs over the river, one of Prince Ferdinand's German aid de camps deſired the grenadiers and Highlanders, who were in front, to puſh on and take ſome of the enemy's baggage which was a little way before them, and but weakly guarded. They were immediately formed, and marched in a hurry over a plain with a thick wood in front, which they were told was clear, and had got within four hundred paces of the enemy's baggage, when ſeveral ſquadrons of French dragoons ruſhed ſuddenly out upon them from the ſkirts of the wood on both flanks, and were hewing them down without mercy; when Cornet Nangle, with an advanced guard of twenty men coming up the hill, got ſight of the attack, and inſtantly ruſhing on, charged the French cavalry, who, ſtartled at the briſkneſs of an attack which they were not expecting, immediately reined back; the reſt of the regiment getting in view, came on, and attacking the French, drove them off, having killed and wounded a few, and

taken

taken ſome priſoners. The determined bravery of this young officer with his twenty men ſaved a great number of the grenadiers and Highlanders from being cut to pieces, and ſhews what may be effected by the ſudden attack of an advanced guard of cavalry.

An advanced guard by night ſhould be of double the force of one by day. In an open country, it is a matter of indifference at what diſtance they advance, provided they keep in view of the commanding officer, who ſhould continually obſerve them: but in covered places, and in the darkneſs of the night, they ſhould not be more than fifty paces diſtant.

This advanced guard ſhould have an advanced corporal B, with ſix horſemen divided into three pairs; one in the center B, the two others out of the road on the right and left at CC, to examine as wide as poſſible, ſilently and attentively ſearching all hollow and covered places, taking care that there is nobody lying on the ground, hid in dry ditches, or behind trees

or

or buſhes. At the ſame diſtance of fifty paces upon the flanks of the corps ſhould march two wings DD, conſiſting of eight or twelve horſemen each, according to the ſtrength of the corps, led by a non-commiſſioned officer. They can harraſs an enemy who may happen to ruſh ſuddenly out of an ambuſcade, and give time to the corps to form. Each wing to detach two men EE, keeping fifty paces wide from the others, and preſerving the ſame route as exactly as the face of the country will permit. At the entrance of the wood NN, the horſemen ſhould ſpread, and cloſe again at coming out, and do the ſame at meeting any little hills, to examine them on both ſides. When they perceive any traces of a party, they ſhould immediately communicate it from one to another, till the commanding officer is informed.

The advanced guard ought to march ſlowly, and the commanding officer at the head of the corps ſhould follow at the ſame rate, ſo that the rear of the detachment may not be obliged to gallop. As

the

the rear guard H is only eſtabliſhed for form, there is no need of its being numerous. The officers and quarter-maſters ſhould be careful to keep the men from ſleeping, as a horſe is eaſily hurt under the irregular motions of a ſleeping rider, which retards the march. The whole corps ſhould be forbid to ſmoke or ſpeak; and if any one is obliged to cough or ſpit, let him cover his mouth ſo as to make no noiſe.

When the corps is numerous, the cavalry ſhould march by ſquadrons, the infantry by platoons, to follow alternately, ſo that each platoon of infantry FFF, may march at the head of a ſquadron of cavalry GGG; which diſpoſition will preſerve the whole at an equal pace, and keep them readier to form in caſe of meeting the enemy, or being ſuddenly attacked, as we are about to mention.

When the advanced guard perceives an enemy at a diſtance, whether it is day or night, they ſhould not purſue them for fear of falling ſtupidly into ſome ambuſcade, if it is not in a country that has been

been well examined; but, if they meet ſuddenly face to face, as may happen at the entrance of a hollow way I, opening obliquely upon yours, then your advanced guard, without deliberating about their ſtrength, ſhould inſtantly ruſh upon them. This manoeuvre cannot fail againſt infantry, and gives a great advantage in a rencounter with cavalry; but, if your advanced guard falls back, they expoſe the whole body to be defeated.

When the commanding officer ſees the action of his advanced guard, he will inſtantly turn the infantry on the ſide of the road moſt proper to protect them from the enemy's cavalry, and will form them quickly at the ſide LLL, or on ſome neighbouring height MM. If it is day, they ought to face the cavalry, ſtooping down till the inſtant of the attack, while the firſt ſquadron advances to ſuſtain the advanced guard. If the enemy appear deſirous to renew the charge, and obſtinate in diſputing the paſſage, you may make uſe of a feint, and by falling back bring


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
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them oppoſite to your infantry, who will have them in flank, and by a well-placed fire put them inſtantly in diſorder. Your cavalry profiting by this muſt immediately face about, and fall upon them with all poſſible violence, which cannot fail to compleat their defeat.

All villages, hamlets, and houſes, ſhould be avoided, eſpecially by night (which is the moſt common time for the partiſan), to avoid being diſcovered by the barking of dogs, or ſeen by peaſants who can inform the enemy. You will ſee equally how dangerous it is to keep the great roads by day, or to croſs places that are too open in an enemy's country.

If you cannot avoid paſſing through a village, it ſhould be done in a hurry, marching confuſedly, very cloſe, and filling up the whole breadth, by which you will conceal your ſtrength from the peaſants; ſome officers ſhould remain at coming in, and in the rear, till the whole are paſſed, taking care that no one ſtops or withdraws. The ſame care ſhould be taken at every road

road that opens upon your route. At the approach of every place that is covered or hollow, ſuch as houſe, wood, gully, &c. they ſhould halt till it is well examined, and continue attentive in paſſing.

At the paſſage of defiles, bridges, or fords, the advanced guard ſhould ſtop a hundred paces ſhort of it, and form till the whole corps is paſſed and in order. The antients employed dogs to diſcover the enemy in ambuſcade; but it will be well to diſtruſt ſuch ſpies, and to ſuffer none with the corps, as there is nothing more dangerous; their diſpoſition leading them to bark at meeting every animal will furniſh the enemy with a thouſand opportunities of obſerving you, before you can know where they are.

You ſhould always detain the guides that were taken at ſetting out; but, if neceſſity requires another, the quarter-maſter ſhould go and take one without making a noiſe, and lead him a round-about way, that none of the peaſants may diſcover either your party or route. If any of the party

party diſcover paſſengers in ſight of the march, they ſhould be ſtopped and brought to the corps, and care taken to prevent their eſcape.

The party ſhould never refreſh in a village, but in a wood by day, and open country by night, cauſing every neceſſary to be brought from places in the neighbourhood, which ought to be received from the peaſants at a diſtance, ſo that they can neither diſcover the number nor quality of your corps. During the whole time of ſtopping, you ſhould not be ſparing of centries, and have always ſix horſemen ready to ſecure any perſon by whom you imagine you are perceived; when their number becomes conſiderable, they ſhould be tied together, and great care taken that none eſcape till the ſtroke is ſtruck. The officers ſhould be equally attentive that no ſoldiers get out of ſight; and, if they meet a deſerter from the enemy, he ſhould be conducted immediately to the corps, and then to the army, under the care of a non-commiſſioned officer.

When

When neceſſity obliges you to ſtop in the neighbourhood of ſome farm or hamlet, you muſt take poſſeſſion of it, and carry off the farmer or chief of the place at going away, threatening to kill him and ſet his houſe on fire, if any one ſtirs from the place before he is releaſed. Every horſeman ſhould take care to have a ſpare foreſhoe, and a peck of oats.

The beſt ſeaſon for ſecret marches, is the cold time of winter, when neither peaſants nor their dogs ſtir abroad, and the enemy are quiet, only thinking how to preſerve themſelves from the cold, from which your people are guarded by marching. When you find yourſelf in the night in ſome ſtony place near a poſt of the enemy, and you are afraid of their hearing the noiſe of your horſes feet, it may be deadened by ſtretching the mens cloaks on the ground, which was an expedient of great uſe to Mr. Jeney in Italy.

If an officer of the infantry marches a detachment to relieve a poſt at a diſtance, he ſhould not mount his horſe till out of ſight

ſight of the camp, and ſhould diſmount on coming in ſight of the poſt; but, if it is only about a league diſtant from the army, and near the enemy, it is better to go on foot, ſo as to be leſs encumbered in caſe of engaging with any parties of the enemy. The men ſhould not be preſſed too much for fear of lagging in the rear, but ſhould march cloſe without ſtopping, and in as many files as the roads will permit, keeping profound ſilence, that they may hear any orders that are given.

In a little work attributed to Marſhal Saxe, *Traité des Legions ou Memoires ſur l'Infanterie*, printed in 1753, it may be ſeen of what conſequence it is for a whole army, or the detachment of an officer, to keep good order; for which reaſon I ſhall give the paſſage. "All the armies which the king has ſent into Bohemia, Weſtphalia, and Bavaria, have gone down finely equipped and very compleat; they have returned ruined, exhauſted, and have loſt a prodigious number of men and officers; nevertheleſs we have had no general actions,

tions, and the only one which has been any thing conſiderable was favourable for us; ſo it has been in detail that we have ſeen our armies ruined. In effect, the greateſt part of the detachments ſent in the courſe of the war; the detached poſts; the eſcorts which have been attacked by the enemy have either been beaten by ſurpriſe, by want of diſcipline in the ſoldier, or negligence in the officers. They are yet to learn to march an eſcort in good order; the ſoldiers are continually employed in pillaging, or withdrawing from the ſight of their officers, or in the conſtant practice of keeping at a diſtance from the beginning of the march; and there is ſcarcely an officer who gives any attention to his duty. It is the ſame with parties, poſts, and detachments, where the ſoldiers keep at a diſtance; or, if they remain with the party, it is to march in bad order, to ſtop every moment, to ſpeak when they are bid to be ſilent, and murmur when they ſhould obey. If the enemy appears, he neither knows nor hears any thing; they cannot form nor defend them-

themſelves; there is nothing but confuſion; and if by chance an order is given, which happens but rarely, you ſpeak to the deaf and motionleſs, little accuſtomed to military exerciſes and obedience, or to the reſpect that is due to officers: they throw away their fire in the air, and of courſe are beaten, becauſe the ſoldiers are unacquainted with command, and chaſtiſement is never ready enough with us; but chiefly becauſe young officers do not know how to command, nor to make themſelves obeyed; and thoſe who do know frequently dare not do it, for fear of the hatred of their companions, or believing that puniſhment will make the ſoldiers deſert."

Such are the ſentiments of this great officer, founded on experience and perfect knowledge, which will furniſh excellent leſſons to thoſe officers who chooſe to reflect on it. An officer who marches at the head of a party, ought to keep exact order and profound ſilence, that they may be in a ſtate to execute whatever he may order for their defence; but in giving his orders,

ders, he ſhould take care to do it with a firm and determined countenance, ſo as to make the ſoldiers think that he is ſure of what he is about, and that nothing better can be done. When the men ſee their officer hoſitating, or varying in his orders, they imagine he does not know what to do, and ſeeing him diſordered, they become ſo. It is upon ſuch occaſions that an officer ſhould be ſteady to reſtrain his party, and make them inſtantly obey. The danger is greater on a march than in an attack; here the ſoldiers have their arms in their hands, and ſeeing the enemy before them are ready to engage; it is otherwiſe on a march, they are leſs upon their guard, and have not their arms in readineſs; then, ſays Vegetius, an attack confounds them, an ambuſcade diſorders them. An officer ought therefore to take every precaution in examining by his advanced guard all places that may conceal any of the enemy.

As it is difficult, or rather impoſſible, to examine all the villages where it is neceſſary to paſs, and where the inhabitants are often

ten to be dreaded more than the enemy, an officer had better avoid them if poſſible, by making a circuit at ſome diſtance, and coming to the road afterwards. The moſt experienced ſoldiers ſhould be employed to make diſcoveries, with orders not to ſtop to drink or amuſe themſelves, to talk with the peaſants, or loſe ſight of the detachment; but to ſtop every perſon that would paſs before them, and come quickly to tell the commanding officer what they have perceived.

But as the greateſt precaution cannot prevent an officer on a march from being attacked, it is neceſſary, as ſoon as he perceives the enemy, to obſerve if the party is ſuperior to his detachment; whether it conſiſts of cavalry or infantry, or both together. If it is cavalry, and ſuperior, there is no neceſſity for being diſcouraged, but on the contrary he ſhould profit by every advantage that offers, by gliding into land that is furrowed, uneven, cut, and difficult or inacceſſible to cavalry; or if the country is incloſed, he ſhould line the hedges, and

cheer up his ſoldiers by ſome encouraging language, while he diſpatches a truſty fellow with advice of his ſituation to the general. If the enemy march up to him in this ſituation, he muſt do all that he can to ſuſtain the attack, by ordering his party not to preſs upon one another, to keep up their fire, and not to diſcharge their pieces till the enemy are at the muzzles.

Every country preſents ſome natural fortifications, which, however deſpicable they may ſeem to be, there are brave people who have defended them with extraordinary valour. The Duke de Rohan in his Memoirs makes mention of ſeven ſoldiers in a wretched cottage of earth near Carlat, who ſtopped the army of the Marſhal de Themines for two days, though of ſeven thouſand foot and five hundred horſe.

When you have the advantage of rocks or other obſtacles to the acting of cavalry, continue the route as near as poſſible, keeping the party cloſe, and always ready to receive the enemy. If the number of the enemy's cavalry do not exceed your party,

you

you may continue your route, and, keeping your men close together and prepared, they will not venture to attack you. If the men could be depended on, and you could scatter them so as to leave no particular object for a body of cavalry to charge, they would have a still greater advantage; but this manoeuvre is only for a small detachment, and would require particular instruction for the execution of it, which is impracticable with an occasional detachment.

If an officer sees no means of possessing an advantageous post, or of getting to the post to which he was detached, he can do nothing better than retreat to the camp, along some river or wood, to prevent being broken; but if he is so closely pursued that he cannot avoid being beaten or taken, there is no better manoeuvre to imitate than that of the *Barbets* *, who scatter themselves, and retire from tree to tree,

* They are peasants subject to the king of Sardinia, who abandon their dwellings when the enemy take possession, and are formed into bodies to defend the Alps which are in his dominions.

from rock to rock, and deſtroy a party, who can neither beat them, nor take one of them.

The moment of taking poſſeſſion of a poſt is the moſt critical that a detachment can have; officers have been frequently attacked at the very time they thought they had nothing to do, but quietly take the neceſſary meaſures for remaining in ſafety.

If the party which arrives at a poſt is to relieve another, the officer that is to be relieved gets under arms as ſoon as his centries give notice of the approach of the relief. The detachment being known, they are permitted to enter and occupy the poſt in the room of thoſe that are to depart; at the ſame time, the corporals go to relieve the centries, and the officers and ſerjeants give the counter-ſign, with the detail of all that is to be done at the poſt by day or night. He ought likewiſe to get information from the officer he relieves, if the enemy make incurſions in the neighbourhood; if their guards are diſtant, whether

cavalry

cavalry or infantry, and where placed. After theſe precautions, let him guard againſt his poſt being ſurpriſed.

The centries being relieved, the officer that is to go out muſt form his detachment, and return to camp with the ſame precautions as in coming. The new detachment remain under arms till the other is gone fifty paces; then the officer is to make them lay down their arms againſt the parapet, putting their havreſacks againſt the gun-locks, to prevent duſt from ſpoiling them, or the dew of the night from wetting the powder. In an open country without fortification, the men muſt not go to any diſtance from their arms when they lay them down in the day, and keep them between their knees when they ſit round their fires in the night, with the locks inward, to prevent accidents.

CHAP. X.

Of Reconnoitring.

PARTIES ordered to reconnoitre are to obſerve the country or the enemy; to remark the routes, conveniencies and inconveniencies of the firſt; the poſition, march, or forces of the ſecond. In either caſe, they ſhould have an expert geographer, capable of taking plans readily: he ſhould be the beſt mounted of the whole, in caſe the enemy happen to ſcatter the eſcort, that he may ſave himſelf more eaſily with his works and ideas.

All parties that go for reconnoitring only ought to be but few in number. I would never chooſe more than twelve or twenty men. An officer, be his rank what it will, cannot decline going with ſo few people under his orders; the honour is amply made up by the importance of the expedition, frequently of the moſt intereſting conſequence, and the propereſt to recommend the prudence, bravery, and addreſs

dreſs of any officer that has the fortune to ſucceed.

It muſt be evident that the ſucceſs of ſuch a commiſſion depends upon ſecrecy, and that it is impoſſible to fulfil the intention without keeping out of ſight of the enemy. It is inconteſtable, that a numerous party cannot glide along ſo imperceptibly as a ſmall handful of men. As theſe detachments muſt finiſh their courſe quickly, it is neceſſary that they ſhould conſiſt of cavalry only; but if they are to go far, they may increaſe each with thirty foot, to remain in ambuſh about half way, in a wood or covered place, with whom the cavalry can leave their proviſion. As to the precautions neceſſary to be taken on the march, I refer to the preceding chapter, with this difference, that a party ought to detach only two men on each ſide the road, obſerving to keep within view of the commanding officer.

An officer charged to reconnoitre in front ſhould take his inſtructions in writing, and ſet out at ſuch time as to arrive

at the place proper for beginning his obſervations at day-break. Every time that he has occaſion to ſtop, the party ſhould face towards the enemy, and ſend a non-commiſſioned officer with two horſemen to run over the neighbouring heights, and cloſely examine the environs. When near the enemy, avoid ſtopping in a village.

The officer and geographer, who is ſuppoſed to be preſent, ſhould remark every intereſting particular; the heights, woods, ponds, moraſſes, rivulets, rivers, fords, bridges, roads, croſſings, difficult and dangerous paſſages, by-ways, meadows, fields, heaths, gullies, hills, and mountains; the diſtance and ſtrength of villages, hamlets, houſes, farms, and mills; what ſovereign the country belongs to, and what are its productions.

If the enemy comes in ſight, the officer ſhould quickly aſſemble his party, though his reconnoitring is not finiſhed, and let him retire to his infantry, if he placed any; but, if not, let him gain ſome other place that he has choſen for a retreat. After being

being refreſhed, let him go back with the cavalry to finiſh the reconnoitring; but if he was obliged to return quite to the poſt, he ſhould not go back till next day. Mid-day is the time of being leaſt incommoded, as detachments are leſs frequent at that hour. The commanding officer ought always to avoid coming to blows, even though he thinks himſelf ſecure of ſucceſs, unleſs he happen to be on his return, and near to his poſt, ſo that he foreſees the grand guard, hearing the firing, cannot fail to run to his aſſiſtance. If obliged to engage with a party who are cutting off your retreat, and that no other means is left of turning them; you muſt riſk all without heſitating, by ruſhing on, and try to ſave the geographer with the fruits of his commiſſion, eſpecially if the reconnoitring was of importance to the general of the army, and merits the ſacrificing a dozen men, which they can eaſily retrieve on another occaſion.

When they go to procure news of the enemy, they ought to approach as near as

poſſible, but cautiouſly: day-break is not the time proper for ſuch a purpoſe, becauſe at that time the enemy ſend their different parties and patroles to make diſcoveries; you ſhould therefore prevent them by approaching in the night. You may eaſily reconnoitre their poſition and extent by their fires, which they never extinguiſh at the head of the guards and piquets; and you may eaſily remark if they are about to change their poſition, by hearing a more than ordinary noiſe; beſides, as it is eaſy to approach by night, you may diſcover a number of things by the light of the fires.

The officer and geographer muſt take care to remark every thing, and let nothing eſcape their memory; but the beſt time for the geographer is by day in a mountainous country, where he may ſlip along from one mountain to another, from mid-day till three o'clock, which is the moſt favourable time to ſhun parties, who ſeldom ſtir from the army at that time of the day. They muſt ſtop all who paſs in ſight

of

of the party, and releaſe none till the retreat is ſecure.

A partiſan ought not to neglect to reconnoitre every place round his poſt for two or three leagues, or farther if it is poſſible, on the ſide of the enemy; and for that purpoſe employ the method of Mr. Jeney for getting intelligence without approaching, and taking plans and obſervations, ſo that, if the enemy come to poſſeſs the country, you may have every neceſſary inſtruction for making approaches to ſurpriſe them, without having recourſe to the peaſants.

During the campaigns that Mr. Jeney made, he often examined the enemy's poſts without approaching, in the following manner, which he recommends as infallible, he having always ſucceeded.

I ſuppoſe myſelf, ſays he, with my party at Soeſt in Weſtphalia A, [Plate VIII.] and the enemy poſted at Bervick B, two leagues from me. To know the ſituation of this place without ſtirring from Soeſt, I take the map of the country; and from

Soeſt as center I draw a circle whoſe circumference paſſes half a league beyond Bervick. I draw a circle of the ſame ſize upon a leaf of paper, to make my plan as in Plate VIII. and then place Soeſt in the center A; and I mark all the villages which I find in the map near the circumference upon my plan, with the diſtances and bearings as they are repreſented in the map, making uſe of a pencil to mark the places DDD, ſo as to correct the errors more eaſily which the map may have led me to make.

Having thus formed my plan, with a ſcale of two leagues (which is the diſtance I ſuppoſe Bervick), I go to the burgomaſter of the town of Soeſt, where I cauſe ſome of the moſt intelligent inhabitants to come, ſpeaking to them freely, and openly induce them to communicate all the information I have occaſion for.

The better to conceal my deſigns, I begin my reconnoitring by Brokhuſen, a village diſtant from the enemy. I aſk the diſtance from Soeſt to Brokhuſen; if they ſay it is

ſeven

ſeven quarters of a league, I correct the diſtance of my plan which made it two leagues: then I inform myſelf of all that is to be found on the road from Soeſt to Brokhuſen; chapels, houſes, woods, fields, orchards, rivers, rivulets, bridges, mills, &c. If they ſay that at a half league from Soeſt they paſs the village of Hinderking, I mark that place upon my plan. I aſk if the road from Soeſt to Hinderking is croſſed by any other roads; if there is any moraſs or heath; if the road is incloſed, paved, or ſtraight; if there is any bridge to paſs, and at what diſtance. I take care to mark every thing in my plan, forgetting nothing, even to mills, buſhes, gibbets, gullies, fords, and every thing that can be got from their informations, which will probably be perfect, becauſe one always knows more than another.

I continue my queſtions from Hinderking to Brokhuſen, and advancing by little and little obſerve the ſame method on the roads of the other villages round, marked DDD. In this manner I cannot fail to acquire

quire an entire knowledge of all the places; beſides, I find myſelf imperceptibly inſtructed in the poſition of the enemy, by ſeeing the different routes by which I can approach moſt ſecretly.

It is plain that ſuch a plan muſt be very uſeful to regulate ſecret expeditions. It is chiefly uſeful, not to ſay neceſſary, for a commander of a party, who can give more ample and preciſe inſtructions to his officers, by accompanying them with a copy of the routes marked out, which they can conſult even in the night, if it happens to be clear; by which they will be guarded againſt being deceived by ignorant or treacherous guides, which occaſion the miſtakes of ſo many who go unprovided with ſuch helps. This enables me to diſcern which of the aſſembly is moſt capable of being a guide in caſe of need.

There is ſtill another means to ſecure a reconnoitring party, which is to compoſe them of people who ſpeak the language of the enemy, and give them ſurtouts of the colour of a regiment of the enemy, and the

ſame

ſame cockades. This ſcheme may be carried ſo far as to line the ſurtouts with the colour of another regiment of the enemy, provided that, by turning the ſurtouts, they appear to be a different corps, and deceive guards, ſpies, and peaſants, and confound their reports.

An officer, who goes to reconnoitre a poſt which he intends to attack, ſhould ſet out the beginning of a dark night, and give particular inſtructions upon the ſubject to thoſe he takes with him to aſſiſt in making diſcoveries: ſuch as examining the places by which they paſs, to approach the poſt; ſounding with long ſticks if there are any traps or covered ditches into which they can tumble; to leave branches of trees with their leaves on, to ſerve for a mark, where they find any, againſt they come to make the attack; to obſerve exactly where the centries are poſted, how many there are, and how far diſtant from one another; to advance even to the ditch of the intrenchment, and ſound with a ſtick or plummet to know the depth of water; to examine

examine if the poſt is fraiſed or paliſſadoed, made with earth or faſcines, or covered with maſonry; in which laſt caſe, they muſt obſerve its height, to proportion the ladders accordingly. They ought likewiſe to know how many men are to defend it; in what they are negligent; if they are near aſſiſtance, and have cannon. On all theſe heads you can go and examine yourſelf, or be informed by the reports of deſerters or peaſants, ſo that you may form your ſcheme of an attack. If you are only inſtructed by information of others, be careful how you believe people too readily who may wiſh to betray you, or come only in hope of a recompence. They ſhould be queſtioned ſeparately, writing down what they ſay, and by comparing their informations judge of what is true or falſe.

CHAP.

D
D
Bueike
D Berlingsen
Rupe
D
Bergede
SOEST
Opmunde
Heringen
D
Altengesek
Asche River
Asche River
Broklhus
D Östinghaus


D
Teiningsen
Bueike
D
Vestönnen
Rupelo
Meyercke
D
A
Soesterbeck Rivulet
Asche River
Scvanemuhl
D
Nellius
C
Hinderking
B
Bervick
Toningsen
D
Krevinckel
Landscron
D
Brokhusen
D
Ostingen

CHAP. XI.

Of the Defence of Poſts.

WHEN a partiſan has taken every precaution that prudence ſuggeſts in reconnoitring a place where he would fix a poſt, he is to take poſſeſſion in the following manner. The infantry remain under arms in the middle of the place, the cavalry to patrole without, while the commanding officer, eſcorted by a dozen horſemen, goes to examine the environs to make his arrangements; having ſent ſeveral ſmall detachments before, to cover him in time of reconnoitring.

Having remarked the places proper for his guard, defence, and retreat, as well as the dangerous ones by which the enemy can make approaches ſecretly to ſurpriſe him, he ſhould chooſe the moſt convenient in the front of his poſt to fix his grand guard D, [Plate VII.] which muſt face the enemy. He muſt mark the heights for this guard to place their vedettes EEEE, and

and regulate the number according to the exigencies of the ſituation. In a covered country you muſt not be ſparing of them, and muſt reinforce every guard. At fifty paces before the front of the grand guard, a ſubaltern or non-commiſſioned officer with eight horſemen ſhould be always ready to ſet out at K, to go and reconnoitre, when the vedettes have obſerved any party.

The grand guard being fixed, you ſhould form another in the middle of the village, called the ordinary guard, compoſed of cavalry and infantry, placing centries at the entries, and vedettes all round; the laſt at ſuch diſtance as to ſee one another. A piquet ſhould likewiſe be fixed before the quarters of the commanding officer, which ſhould be near the ordinary guard and the whole corps. In the day, half the cavalry of the picquet muſt keep their horſes bridled and ready to mount; but, if the enemy is near, they muſt remain on horſeback, the other half to unbridle till the hour of relief.

According

According to the arrangement we have given for compoſing the corps of a partiſan, the grand guard may conſiſt of a captain, a firſt and ſecond lieutenant, a quarter-maſter, two ſerjeants, four corporals, a trumpeter, farrier, and fifty-two private horſemen. The ordinary guard to have cavalry equal to the grand guard, with a captain, a firſt and ſecond lieutenant of infantry, two ſerjeants, and ſixty men, including four corporals, two lance-coporals, and a drummer: the picquet to conſiſt of the ſame number of cavalry and infantry as the ordinary guard.

If there is any dangerous place capable of covering the approaches of the enemy in the environs of the poſt, and out of the circuit of the patroles, a guard ſhould be placed there, more or leſs ſtrong according to the importance of the place, and care ſhould be taken to preſerve the communication. The guards and picquets being placed, the detachments that were ſent out on the roads muſt be called in, and ther go to work to lodge the party in the gar-

dens

dens that open upon the country, and the commanding officer's quarters; beating down hedges, filling up ditches, and levelling a piece of ground large enough to draw up the whole corps. The horſes to be put under cover in barns contiguous to the gardens; but, in caſe there are no barns, they may ſubſtitute ſheds open on one ſide, that the horſes may go out all together in caſe of an alarm.

The officers ſhould occupy the houſes in the neighbourhood of the ſheds, and one of each company remain day and night with the company, to prevent any of the men from entering the village without leave, upon any pretence. The commanding officer muſt acquaint the officers of his having choſen the place M for the rendezvous in caſe of a retreat; which ought to be at ſome diſtance from the village, and on the ſide he judges moſt convenient for retiring to the army. At ſun-ſet the grand guard to return to the poſt and join the picquet, the one half of each to mount alternately till day-break, and then the grand guard to return

return to the place they poſſeſſed the day before. The centries and vedettes ſhould be doubled, and all the paſſages ſhut up with waggons placed in two rows, except one for ſallying out at, in caſe of a retreat, made wide enough for the paſſage of the patroles, or the whole cavalry.

The corporals of the ordinary guard ſhould lead the relief of the vedettes every hour, ſetting off together, but when they come to the paſſage of the poſt A, [Plate VII.] they muſt ſeparate into two parties, the one to the right to relieve the vedettes BBB, the other to the left for the vedettes CCC, then each of them with the parties they have relieved ſhould go on at their head a quarter of a league, by the two routes pointed out in the plan, to examine the environs, ſuppoſing an hour to each. Beſides this reconnoitring, the captain of the grand guard ſhould ſend two patroles in the night. To fill up the intervals, they ſhould ſet out about half an hour after the corporals, and make the ſame round. At returning to the poſt, the corporals to make their re-

port to the officer of the ordinary guard; the conductors of the patroles to the captain of the grand guard.

A little before ſun-riſe or ſun-ſet, a grand patrole detached from the corps ſhould be ſent under the conduct of an officer to ſearch the whole environs of the poſt minutely, eſpecially the dangerous places, becauſe at theſe times the enemy are moſt likely to attempt a ſurprize. If the patroles diſcover them, they will be in a ſtate to repulſe them, or at leaſt to harraſs them till the commanding officer, upon the firſt notice, draws up the whole corps. The officers ſhould take great care to inſtruct the centries in their duty, explaining it to them every time of their mounting, and forbid them to ſmoke, as the leaſt fire can be eaſily perceived in the dark, and ſerve to direct the approaches of the enemy. No centry to move more than fifty paces to the right, and as many to the left of his poſt; and, however bad the weather may be, he muſt not get under cover. No one to be allowed to go out of the poſt without leave

leave of the commanding officer; and, to prevent deſertion or marauding, the centries and vedettes muſt be charged to let no ſoldier paſs.

The vedettes muſt ſtop all paſſengers, and take them to the next centry, who muſt call a corporal to conduct them to the commanding officer. If there are a great number paſſing at once, the vedette at the challenge muſt haſten to ſtop them at a hundred paces, till the officer has ſent to reconnoitre them,; but if he finds them to be a party of the enemy, he muſt fire upon them and retire. At the firſt alarm, the grand guard and picquet ought to mount, and each of them to detach a ſubaltern officer immediately at the head of the beſt mounted horſemen, to go quickly to encounter the enemy. The reſt of the grand guard and cavalry of the picquet to follow immediately, led by their captains to ſuſtain the firſt detachments, to repulſe or keep back the enemy as long as it is poſſible, and give time to the commanding officer to form the whole corps.

If

If the commanding officer obſerves that the enemy are of no very extraordinary force, he muſt without heſitating put himſelf at the head of his cavalry, and inſtantly charge them, pouring upon them with his whole force, which is the beſt way to ſucceed; and, in the mean time, the infantry ſhould form to ſuſtain the cavalry. One eſſential circumſtance ſhould not be forgotten here, which is, that, at the going of the detachments of the grand guard and picquet, all the infantry of the picquet ſhould march immediately to the place appointed for the rendezvous in caſe of a retreat, and a ſtrong detachment of cavalry follow to occupy the place. If it is at the entrance of a wood or ſome covered place which the enemy may occupy, and thereby cut off your retreat, you muſt prevent it by fixing the infantry of the picquet in the poſt, to remain day and night, with a lieutenant at the head of twenty horſemen to clear all round it. If the enemy is ſuperior, and ſeems to intend an attack on that ſide, the commanding officer ſhould get there before

before with all his force to oppoſe them, till all his detachments join, and then regulate his retreat, as will be ſeen in the chapter of the Retreat.

To be better ſecured in a poſt which you expect to remain in for ſome time, and where you find that the enemy will not fail to diſturb you, it will be proper immediately to employ ſome of your people with the peaſants, to form ſome intrenchments in a hurry in the moſt dangerous places, to have breaſt-works of felled trees in the woods; herſes placed in the fords; pits dug at the entries; and plains without defence; ſo that the cavalry, coming full ſpeed to charge you, may tumble into them. If there happen to be a bridge either in the front or on the flanks of the poſt as at N, by which the enemy can facilitate their approach or retreat, it muſt be inſtantly deſtroyed, unleſs you find it may be of uſe, and neceſſary to fix a good guard on it.

To regulate the attack and defence moſt advantageouſly, you ſhould take care to

obſerve the places by which the enemy can approach, and form a plan of operations for cutting off, or taking in flank the different routes which he can attempt. You ſhould inform your officers, and not fail to hearken to the advice of thoſe whoſe talents, genius, and experience, render them competent judges of your deſigns. Theſe arrangements will be of great uſe in ſurpriſing the enemy's parties, who will come from time to time to reconnoitre the poſt. If the enemy approaches in the night, take care how you attack him; you cannot reconnoitre his force, and you ought to ſuppoſe that he is informed of yours.

Do not ſuffer any ſuſpected woman to approach the ſoldiers; their viſits are dangerous in debauching your people, and the enemy frequently employ them to diſcover your ſtrength. Let no deſerter ſtop in your poſt; and, if he comes in the night, keep him till day-break is near, and then ſend him to the army. Every party that approaches your poſt will profeſs belonging to you; but, if they are not provided with

B
B
Retreat
M

Plate VII

with a proper paſſport from the general, or if you do not know any of the officers, truſt neither to their word nor uniform; deſire them politely to return the way they came, telling them, that, if they do not, you will treat them as enemies, and take care that your party remain under arms till they are out of ſight of all your guards. This conduct will make other detachments attentive. The commanding officer muſt oblige all the officers to remain near their command, and to regulate their meals ſo as to have a part to obſerve the men, while the others are at table.

A true partiſan is well convinced that he cannot be too cautious of the ſchemes of the enemy, who frequently cauſe falſe alarms, to lead you to relax in your care, and into deceitful ſecurity, of which you ſooner or later become the dupe. I am by no means of their opinion who deſpiſe falſe alarms, and who to ſpare their people are ſo infatuated as not to take arms till they are ſure of the coming of the enemy: on the contrary, I think myſelf authorized

by experience to inſiſt on preparing at the leaſt noiſe of the vedettes. Even if it is another party of your army approaching your poſt, as ſoon as you are acquainted with it, you ought to reconnoitre them, and follow or receive them with all the attention which war requires. I am very far from fearing that the ſervice, ſuch as I have directed for the ſafety of a poſt, can fatigue a corps too much; ſo far from it, it will contribute much to harden them againſt fatigue, augment their courage, vigilance, and addreſs; while inaction benumbs the body, fatigues the mind, and ſoftens the heart.

When a partiſan has taken all the precautions which I have mentioned, he may reckon himſelf ſecure of never being ſurpriſed. If in a country the moſt expoſed, or the moſt covered, by executing every point of the ſervice as has been mentioned, the enemy cannot approach your poſt nearer than a quarter of a league without your being informed by the noiſe of the vedettes and patroles, who cover your poſt day and

night more than a quarter of a league round, which is ſufficient to guard againſt ſurpriſe, five minutes being ſufficient to form, and ten being ſtill left to deliberate upon the part that is to be taken, whether to attack, defend, or retire.

When a partiſan happens to eſtabliſh his poſt in an enemy's country, it is then his duty to take care of the ſubſiſtence of his corps, and to take every proper meaſure to provide his people with neceſſaries: for which reaſon he ſhould ſend ſome parties as far as poſſible towards the enemy, to ſummon the chiefs of the villages to deliver forage and proviſions in proportion to their abilities, taking care to be ſparing of the neareſt places, and more particularly of the poſt itſelf, which ought not to be touched but in the greateſt extremity. A partiſan cannot be too diligent in giving the general an account of his poſition, projects, ſucceſs, and all his operations, and therefore will take care to preſerve his communication with the army.

Theſe inſtructions may ſerve for the corps of a partiſan according to the propoſed arrangements; but partiſans of leſs force muſt regulate their precautions according to their ſtrength; and detachments of thirty, fifty, or a hundred men, will ſeek to poſt themſelves in redoubts proportioned to their number, or in mills, farms, hamlets, detached houſes, churches, churchyards, &c. obſerving that the more a poſt is extended, the more care and fatigue it requires.

The principal object for an officer that is detached, ſays Monſieur Vauban, is to foreſee every troubleſome event. The want of exactneſs, and the ſmalleſt relaxation in the ſervice of out-poſts, may have the moſt fatal conſequences; and hiſtory furniſhes a thouſand examples of camps being ſurpriſed, and armies cut in pieces, by the negligence of detachments that ought to have watched for their preſervation.

The manner of relieving detached poſts has been mentioned; but if an officer is detached to a mill or houſe, let him draw

up

up his party about fifteen or twenty paces from the poſt, and ſend a ſerjeant or corporal with five or ſix men to ſearch the chambers, cellars, and barns; which being done, the centries muſt be placed, the poſt taken poſſeſſion of, the arms ranged ſo that every one can find his own without confuſion, the inhabitants lodged in ſome other houſe, and then intrench himſelf according to the rules given.

If an officer is to fix in a village where it is difficult to examine every place where the enemy may lie in ambuſh, he ſhould ſend for the magiſtrates to come and ſpeak with him, while his party remain drawn up at the end of the village, that they may declare if they know whether there are any of the enemy's parties, ſuſpected perſons, or concealed arms, in the place; which being done, the centries to be placed, the party to take poſſeſſion, putting ſmall detachments of five or ſix men, more or leſs, according to the ſtrength of the party, at the avenues; and examining the church, or any detached houſe, to make the principal

poſt in caſe the advanced poſts are forced. The men beſt acquainted with the duty ſhould be planted on the moſt expoſed and diſtant places, ſo as to ſee all the approaches; and ſometimes in trees, that they may ſee at a diſtance, and remain concealed from the enemy.

If he finds any place near him where the enemy can lie concealed, he ſhould place a corporal with ſix or ſeven men there, with orders to fall back upon his poſt if attacked, or remain till they find themſelves diſengaged. The ſoldiers of this inferior poſt ſhould take care to make no fires, becauſe it would ſerve for a guide to the enemy to avoid them when they want to fall upon the principal poſt; but fires may be lighted in the places where they have no guards, to make the enemy think they have them every where, at the ſame time placing ſoldiers in ambuſh where there are none lighted. This ſcheme may ſerve for all poſts in a level country, where two or three ſoldiers ſhould be kept going all night to ſtir up the fires.

The

The exterior arrangements being made, and centries placed on the avenues, bridges, and ſteeples, the works for fortifying the poſt ſhould be marked out, and executed by the workmen, and the magiſtrates ordered to ſend ſtraw to the neareſt houſes for lodging the ſoldiers, who muſt never abſent themſelves. The officer muſt always be in readineſs to go where his preſence may be wanted, and make his ſerjeants and corporals frequently go the rounds.

Monſieur Vauban ſays, that if an officer is to remain but four hours in a poſt, he ought to intrench; and he ſhould cauſe the works which are to be conſtructed to be well executed, ſo as to defend every place where the enemy can come. Monſieur Folard gives an excellent maxim, to attack an imaginary poſt, that we may be able to defend a real one. And the Baron de Travers ſays, that with regard to the ſtrength and means of reſiſtance in poſts, they ſhould be in proportion to the force the enemy can bring againſt them. If to

paſs only ſome hours in a poſt, it is a good way to make a parapet of felled trees; or if it is in a village, to intrench a detached houſe.

The way to guard againſt being ſurpriſed, betrayed, or made priſoner, is to take precautions againſt all that the enemy can undertake; and whatever diſtance he may be at, we ought not to found our ſecurity on probabilities, but extend them even to poſſibilities. Neither ſtranger nor ſoldier of any other party ſhould be admitted into the poſt, and the roll called three or four times a day, that the men may not abſent themſelves; he ſhould likewiſe examine the centries, to ſee whether they are acquainted with the detail of their duty, and ſhould ſhew them how to defend themſelves in caſe of being attacked; obſerving to them, that, if the enemy make ſuch a manoeuvre, they ſhould oppoſe ſuch another; if they try one ſcheme, to reſiſt with another, and deceive them at every ſtep. He may make ſome of them try to ſcale the intrenchment, to ſhew the dif-

ficulty of mounting it; and by exerciſing them in this manner, will eaſily prepare them to reſiſt the enemy; it will flatter their vanity, and give them a confidence in him; but let him take care not to be too familiar, leſt, in a briſk attack, he order ſomething not to their mind, when, inſtead of obeying, they will reſiſt his orders, and mutiny: but when he has ſhewn his ſoldiers the advantage of a party that are intrenched, over thoſe who are expoſed in the attack, he muſt take care to preſerve ſubordination, and not allow himſelf to fall into the ſnares of the enemy.

An hour or two before day, the men ſhould be kept alert, ſitting on the banquette near their arms; and the patroles ſent at that time, rather than in the night, to march ſlowly, to liſten attentively, and examine every place round the poſt where a man can conceal himſelf.

It happens frequently that two armies are encamped oppoſite to one another, and have ſeveral poſts on the ſame line, and two patroles meet in the night. As it is

impoſſible to diſtinguiſh whether they are friends or enemies, they who firſt diſcover the others ſhould conceal themſelves on the ſides of the road, behind buſhes, or in a ditch, to examine if they are ſtronger, and in that caſe to let them paſs in ſilence, and return another way to the poſt to tell what they have ſeen; but if they find them weaker, he who commands the patrole ſhould make the ſignal which is ordered for the patroles of the night, which is commonly a ſtroke or two on the cartouch-box, or butt-end of the firelock, which is anſwered by an appointed number; but I would recommend a word as the ſafeſt. If the patrole does not anſwer, they ſhould advance upon them with fixed bayonets, fire upon them if they ſee them retiring, and make them ſurrender. In the war of 1745 in Italy, there were old ſoldiers who uſed to beg for this employment, and took pleaſure in it.

If detached oppoſite to the enemy, it is to be preſumed that you may be attacked; therefore ſmall detachments ſhould be advanced

advanced between the centries in the night, about thirty or forty paces from the poſt, with their bellies on the ground, in thoſe places where they imagine the enemy may come; with orders to thoſe who command theſe detachments to make a ſoldier reconnoitre any parties that are ſeen, ſo as not to confound their own patroles with the enemy's parties, and to retire to the poſt on the firſt firing.

In villages there ſhould be great care taken of ſuſpected perſons, or of the peaſants revolting; and for this purpoſe you ſhould make the magiſtrates order two peaſants, the beſt known in the place, to be put on duty with the centries of the party, at the paſſages. Theſe peaſants, whom the magiſtrates muſt cauſe to be relieved every two hours, ſhould be charged to recollect all who paſs out or into the village; and both one and the other muſt be told, that they ſhall be anſwerable for all the accidents that may happen from the treachery or negligence of theſe centries who have let enemies in diſguiſe enter the village.

They

They muſt likewiſe order the ſoldiers who guard the intrenchments to let no peaſant approach, and to ſhut up the paſſages with two trees acroſs in the night, and not to open them till day, except for the paſſing of the patroles. They muſt examine with iron ſpits, or their ſwords, all carts that paſs loaded with hay, ſtraw, or caſks, or any thing that can conceal men, arms, or ammunition.

The inhabitants ſhould be prevented from making proceſſions, holding fairs or markets; becauſe, under favour of theſe aſſemblies, the enemy often enter and ſeize poſts. Polybius gives a leſſon that will not be miſplaced here. There are hundreds of proofs how fatal theſe indulgences have been, ſays the tranſlator, yet ſtill they remain uncorrected; truly it is wrong that man ſhould paſs for the moſt artful of all animals, ſince there is no one ſo eaſy to ſurpriſe; how many camps, garriſons, and poſts, have been ſurpriſed by giving this liberty, and it is a misfortune that has happened to numbers; yet theſe ſurpriſes are always

always new. An officer cannot watch too carefully to prevent ſchemes that may be contrived againſt him; and the attempt on Briſac, in the month of November, 1704, is ſo much to the purpoſe, that it ought not to be paſſed in ſilence. The governor of Fribourg having formed the deſign of ſurpriſing Briſac, ſet out in the night of the 9th or 10th of November, with two thouſand men, and a great number of waggons loaded with arms, grenades, pitch, &c. and ſome choſen ſoldiers: all theſe waggons were driven by officers diſguiſed like waggoners, and were covered with perches, which had hay placed over them, ſo that they appeared like waggons loaded with hay coming in contribution. They arrived at the new gate by eight o'clock in the morning, under the favour of a thick fog: three waggons entered the town, two full of men, and one with arms, when an Iriſhman, an overſeer of workmen, obſerving thirty men near the gate, who, though they had the dreſs, had not the manner of peaſants; he aſked them what they

they were, and why they did not go to work like other people. Upon their not anſwering, and appearing confounded, he ſtruck ſome of them with his cane; upon which the diſguiſed officers ran to the arms which were in the waggon next them, and fired fifteen or twenty ſhot at him within half a dozen paces, without wounding him. The Iriſhman leaped into the ditch, where they likewiſe fired ſeveral uſeleſs ſhot at him, while he called *To arms, to arms,* with all his might.

At this noiſe, the guards of the half-moon and the gate run to arms, and would have pulled up the drawbridge, but were prevented by the waggons which the enemy had placed upon it. The officers and ſoldiers, who were in the waggons, ruſhed out with their arms, and having joined the reſt, attacked the guard commanded by a captain of grenadiers; but being repulſed, and five of them killed, the reſt were diſmayed, and fled either into the town, or out into the country. The captain of the guard cauſed the firſt gate, which was a grate, to be

be ſhut, acroſs which, the enemy who were upon the bridge, fired at all who appeared; and having left the half of his guard, he mounted the rampart with the other half, and continued firing upon the aggreſſors. A lieutenant, who commanded twelve men of the advanced guard, was attacked at the ſame time by an officer who preſented a piſtol to his breaſt; but ſnatching it from him, he fired it at him, and killed him: this lieutenant defended himſelf to the end of the action; but having received ſeveral wounds, he died the ſame day.

Upon hearing the noiſe of the ſurpriſe, the commanding officer of the place diſtributed his garriſon to their proper poſts; and having made every diſpoſition neceſſary for his defence, the enemy ſaw that their deſign had failed, and retired in diſorder, leaving a number of waggons behind them, and more than forty ſoldiers who were killed or wounded. Such was the enterpriſe on Briſac, which failed by a trifling accident.

Another example will prove how neceſſary it is for officers in detached poſts to take

take every precaution. Captain Vedel being detached to a village where the curate of the pariſh had obtained leave from the commanding officer in the country to make a proceſſion of the Penitents of a neighbouring convent to a chapel in the village which he named, alleging that it was an annual cuſtom; but Captain Vedel, aſtoniſhed to ſee ſuch a numerous proceſſion compoſed of the peaſants, called to arms, and, having drawn up his party of fifty men, diſconcerted their ſcheme; many of the penitents whom he ſtopped were found armed with piſtols and ſwords, with which he acquainted the commanding officer, who immediately cauſed the curate and ſeveral of the penitents to be hanged.

This example, and many others which might be cited, ſhew that an officer who commands in a poſt cannot be too much on his guard to prevent his falling into the ſnares which the enemy prepare for him, as the ſeizing of a poſt, of however little importance it may ſeem, may be attended with the moſt troubleſome conſequences.

Henry

Henry IV. of France loſt Amiens in Picardy by a waggoner letting fall a ſack of nuts as if by accident, and when the ſoldiers of the guard were picking them up, the Spaniards, who had diſguiſed themſelves like peaſants on purpoſe, ruſhed out of a houſe near the gate where they had been in ambuſh, put them to the ſword, and carried the town.

Theſe inſtances, with many that could be mentioned, ſhew that we cannot be too diſtruſtful of the numberleſs ways there are of being ſurpriſed. If peaſants come to viſit their friends or relations in the village, the centries ſhould ſtop them, and acquaint their officer, who ſhould not allow them to enter till the magiſtrates, curate, or reſponſible inhabitants, anſwer for them; and this permiſſion to be granted only on working days, and not on Sundays or feſtivals, on account of their being unemployed theſe days.

In an enemy's country, the inhabitants are always ready to revolt and betray; therefore the commanding officer ought to take

take one or two of the magiſtrates children, or three or four of the moſt conſiderable families of the village, and keep them in the principal poſt as a pledge of the fidelity of the inhabitants. The children (to whom they ſhould take care to do no manner of hurt) ſhould only be kept half a day each, and changed for ſome others. The commanding officer ſhould forbid the inhabitants to aſſemble in taverns or public walks, or any place whatever, and cauſe theſe orders to be fixed up at the door of the church. If they are ſeen to ſtop and converſe at coming out of church, or in the market-place, let the patroles oblige them to retire. The tavern-keepers, and all the inhabitants, muſt be forbid to receive any ſtranger without acquainting the commanding officer. None to be permitted to ſtir abroad after retreat beating, on pain of being killed by the centries who ſee them, or ſtopped and conducted to dungeons by the patroles, who ought to march ſlowly, ſtop from time to time to hearken if they hear any noiſe, go over all the

the quarters that are marked out to them, and give an account of any thing they have diſcovered that can cauſe any alarm in the poſt.

If fire breaks out any where, or the inhabitants quarrel among themſelves, an officer ſhould take care how he ſends a party to their aſſiſtance, becauſe theſe are frequently ſnares of the enemy to divide the ſtrength of a detachment on purpoſe to attack them; he ſhould therefore ring the alarm bell, make all the different poſts get under arms, and order thoſe who command them to make the ſoldiers remain armed againſt the parapet, ſo as to obſerve what paſſes without the village. The ſoldiers of the principal poſt ſhould likewiſe get under arms, and the officer detach four or five men with a ſerjeant or corporal to part the fray, or ſet the inhabitants to work in extinguiſhing the fire.

As all the neceſſary precautions for the ſafety of a poſt are too many to have them executed by giving them verbally, the commanding officer ſhould give his orders

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in writing, and have them fixed up in all the inferior poſts. One thing to which officers who are detached to a village ſhould give particular attention, is, not to vex the inhabitants by making them furniſh too much: whatever they are allowed by the general to exact, ſuch as firing, forage, candle, &c. for the guards, ſhould be demanded in proportion to the abilities of the inhabitants; and an officer cannot be too delicate in preſerving the character of a gentleman in ordering contributions, and preſerving the inhabitants from being robbed, or treated ill by the ſoldiers; they have every thing to apprehend from people that are foured; and what deſpair will they not be drove to, who ſee their country ravaged, their effects pillaged, themſelves beaten and treated like ſlaves? I ſhall not ſay that humanity cries out againſt ſuch rigorous treatment, becauſe it is but too common to ſee war ſilencing the laws of humanity; but I ſhall ſay that it has been ſeen, that not only ſmall detachments, but even numerous garriſons, have had their throats

throats cut, or been driven out of the towns they defended, by the inhabitants whom they had reduced to deſpair.

Hiſtory furniſhes many examples of this ſort, but none that will afford a leſſon more fit for military men to reflect on than the affair of Genoa. On the 5th of December, 1745, when the Auſtrian army had poſſeſſion of Genoa, an Auſtrian officer ſtruck one of the Genoeſe with his cane, for refuſing to aſſiſt in dragging a mortar, or interrupting it; upon which the Genoeſe tore out his bowels with a knife; the uproar became general, the inhabitants ran to the arſenal, broke open the gates, took out arms, and repulſed the Auſtrians from ſtreet to ſtreet, and drove them out of the city, after having killed more than five thouſand men.

It is not ſufficient for the preſervation of a poſt, to raiſe intrenchments, nor to take every precaution againſt being ſurpriſed. As the enemy muſt attack with a ſuperior force, your diſpoſitions muſt be made in ſuch a manner as not to confuſe one another,

other, and every one being properly placed contributes to the common ſafety.

If it is a redoubt, or other intrenchment of earth that is to be defended, ſeven or eight trees with their branches ſhould be kept in reſerve, to throw into the breaches the enemy may make, and the parapet kept well lined with men, who ought not to fire till the enemy are on the glacis. Grenades have unaccountably ſunk into diſuſe; but I am perſuaded there is nothing more proper than to have grenades to throw in the midſt of the enemy who have jumped into the ditch; nay, even aſhes or quick-lime, whoſe burning duſt cannot fail to blind the enemy, ſhould be had if poſſible; and, however extraordinary it may appear, Monſieur Le Cointe pretends, after ſeveral trials, to anſwer for the ſucceſs of the lime. If the ſtrength of your detachment will admit of it, eight or ten ſoldiers ſhould be placed in the ditch (on the oppoſite ſide from the enemy), ſo divided as to take the enemy on the flanks, who have jumped into the ditch. This kind

kind of ſally, by running round upon the right and left at the ſame time, muſt aſtoniſh an enemy who could not dream of being attacked.

If there are heights from whence the enemy can cruſh your people with ſtones, they muſt be occupied with eight or ten men covered with a breaſt-work, to prevent the enemy from poſſeſſing them, or guard againſt them, as has been directed in Chap. III.

In the defence of houſes, mills, &c. as well as regular fortifications, the men ſhould be made acquainted with the different manœuvres they may employ for their defence, without which they do not foreſee the intentions of their officer, and may counteract one another by their being in diſorder.

The obſtinate defence of a poſt is the action where an officer detached ſingly can acquire the greateſt glory; the reſiſtance not proceeding from the number of ſoldiers deſtined to defend it, but from the talents of the officer who commands. It

is in him that the ſtrength of the intrenchment lies; and if he joins to determined bravery the abilities neceſſary on theſe occaſions, and can perſuade his ſoldiers that the lot the enemy prepares for them is a thouſand times worſe than death, he may be ſaid in ſome ſort to have rendered his poſt impregnable.

When an officer who is poſted in a redoubt is attacked by the enemy, he need not be employed in firing himſelf, but in ſeeing that the ſoldiers do their duty, and do not throw away their fire in the air. If he ſees their ardor ſlacken in the rage of the attack, he muſt encourage them; if he ſees the enemy making greater progreſs on one ſide than the other, he muſt weaken one to ſupport the other: this movement may be dangerous, and it were better to have a ſmall reſerve in caſe of need; but an officer with a ſmall detachment that can ſcarcely line the parapet, cannot ſpare men for a reſerve, but muſt employ every means for their defence, as directed above.

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In the defence of detached buildings, there are ſo many different retreats, that it becomes an arduous taſk to ſucceed, when brave people are to defend them. They have the loop-holes on the ground-floor to defend, when beat from the intrenchments without, and may reſiſt great numbers by retiring gradually to the different floors of the houſe, where they ſhould have large buckets of water provided to throw upon the enemy, which though it may appear trifling is one of the moſt diſagreeable that can be oppoſed to the aſſailants; for at the ſame time that it wets their powder, arms, and cloaths, it hinders them from ſeeing what is doing above, prevents every ſcheme for ſetting fire to the houſe, and may oblige them to deſiſt from the attack.

The Chevalier Folard in 1705 had a ſmall country houſe near Breſcia to defend with four companies of grenadiers againſt the choſen troops of Prince Eugene's army, who were obliged to retire after penetrating into the court.

The prince of Wirtemberg, ſays Monſieur Folard, believing that there were ſuccours coming to us, imagined that if he could get poſſeſſion of a pigeon-houſe, from whence a very hot fire was kept up, the poſt would ſoon ſurrender; he therefore cauſed it to be attacked, and our ſoldiers having taken away the door to light a fire within, the officer who commanded below being wounded, and not able to reſiſt the firing which was levelled through the door-way, was made priſoner. There were ſeven grenadiers on the top of the pigeon-houſe, who were ſummoned to ſurrender, but who thought themſelves too well poſted to ſubmit ſo ſoon; they therefore replied that they would not yield *till the pears were ripe* as they were capable enough of holding their poſt; and accordingly kept a conſtant fire upon the enemy, till the prince of Wirtenberg retired and left the place covered with dead.

The Chevalier Clairac mentions an affair which happened to him in 1742, no leſs worthy the attention of young officers. When

When he was travelling with ſome people in the upper palatinate of Bavaria, he perceived that he was followed by a party of huſſars and pandours who might attack him. Having examined the different avenues of the village of Vurz where he was, he blocked them up with trunks of trees, ladders, and waggons with one or two wheels taken off each of them: he likewiſe raiſed a banquette along the wall of the church-yard, where he placed his domeſtics and the people who followed him; looking upon the church, which he had pierced with loop-holes, as his citadel and the ſteeple as his laſt retreat. Two houſes almoſt touched this incloſure, and being built on low ground, the top of the wall was not higher than that which ſerved him for a parapet; he would not open theſe houſes, but, to preſerve a communication, prevent the enemy's fire from plunging down upon him, and to ſecure his flanks, he made a ſort of bridge from the top of his intrenchment to the roofs of the houſes, and having barricadoed the

doors and windows of the ground-floors, fixed his guards; but theſe precautions were uſeleſs, for the huſſars, tired with watching him, fell back upon their army, and Monſieur Clairac purſued his journey to Tirz-chen-rait.

Theſe examples ſhew what reſources men of genius can find in their courage, and to what length the defence of an intrenched houſe may be carried by people of determined bravery.

As I have recommended the having ſtones in heaps to throw from the walls upon the enemy, and have alleged that the defence of a poſt does not depend upon the ſoldiers who are deſtined for that ſervice, but upon the officer who commands, I ſhall give the following example in proof of my opinion.

In the month of September 1761, Captain-lieutenant Alexander Campbell of the 88th regiment, with 100 men under his command, was pitched on to defend the remarkable poſt near Caſſel in Heſſe, called the Hercules. Monſieur Roziere, the celebrated

brated partizan and engineer of Marſhal Broglio's army, with ſix hundred infantry and four ſquadrons of cavalry, arrived in the neighbourhood of the poſt the morning of the 22d, and, having beat a parley, ſurrounded and carried off the two men who were ſent out to receive the meſſage. After having examined them ſeparately, he cauſed a detachment, under cover of his muſquetry from a hill that was oppoſite to the principal paſſage, to advance and mount the ſtair, three men abreaſt, which they did ſo ſlowly and without any interruption, that the whole ſtair of about a hundred ſteps was full of men; when Captain Campbell (who had made an excellent diſpoſition for the defence of all the parts of his poſt), having ſome choſen men at each ſide of him, waited to receive thoſe who advanced firſt upon their bayonets, and, firing at the ſame time, gave the ſignal for the reſt to throw over large ſtones which he had collected and diſpoſed for that purpoſe, which made ſuch havoc, that Monſieur Roziere, ſtartled at the unex-

pected reception, and deſpairing of ſucceſs, wiſhed to get off his party. Captain Campbell, ſeeing the deſtruction of the enemy without a man of his being hurt, and that he could renew the reception as often as they choſe to repeat the attempt, was elated with ſucceſs, and encouraging his men, when he happened to move from the wall that covered him, and received a muſquet ſhot from the oppoſite hill, which entered a little below the left temple and came out at the ſame diſtance below the right, upon which he fell and the party beat the chamade and ſurrendered. After two hours poſſeſſion the French retired, carrying off the priſoners, and leaving Captain Campbell, whom they thought dead, to be ſaved by our troops, who ſoon took poſſeſſion again, and ſent him to be recovered, and to diſplay new merits in his profeſſion.

Vegetius very particularly recommends the collecting of ſtones to throw over the walls, and I am certain that nothing better can be done againſt an eſcalade; though

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the party ſhould have ſome long forked ſticks to paſs through the loop-holes to overſet the ladders, while they ſhower down tiles, ſlates, ſtones, aſhes, and lime, as well as the rafters from above.

If the enemy take cannon to force the poſt, I do not ſee how it can be reſiſted, unleſs the houſe is low, and they cannot range round the intrenchments, as every ſhot can make a large opening in bad built houſes, and may cruſh the beſieged. The only means then to ſhun being maſſacred is to capitulate, or to ruſh out briſkly upon the enemy when they leaſt expect it. The firſt is not reſolved upon but when the honours of war can be obtained, which is to march out with drums beating to return to the army with a proper eſcort. But if this capitulation cannot be obtained, the beſieged have nothing left conſiſtent with true bravery but to ruſh out ſword in hand, and cut their way through the enemy. The neceſſity of conquering changes the brave man into the determined ſoldier,

which gives him the means of retiring to the army or ſome neighbouring poſt.

It was by a manoeuvre of this kind, that Marſhal Saxe ſaved himſelf at Chrachnitz, a village in Poland, where a party of eight hundred horſe had a deſign to carry him off with eighteen men that were his attendants. The prince, after having reſiſted a long time in the chambers of the inn where he was, and ſeeing he could hold out no longer, ruſhed out upon them in the night ſword in hand, fell upon one of the guard who did not expect it, run him through the body, and retired to Sandomir where he had a Saxon garriſon.

If a poſt is to be abandoned when it can be no longer held, and you are going to make the ſally, you ſhould continue to fire with ſpirit, taking away the barricadoes from the door through which you are to paſs with as little noiſe as poſſible. When they are aſſembled, the whole party ſhould go out cloſe together, ruſhing with their bayonets to the place the officer thinks the leaſt guarded. You ought never, ſays Mr. Folard,

Folard, to wait for day to execute theſe ſallies, which cannot ſucceed but in a dark night, by which you eaſily conceal from the enemy the road you have taken, for which reaſon you ſhould not fire, but open to yourſelves a paſſage ſword in hand, leſt the enemy come where they hear the noiſe.

The Baron de Travers ſays, that not to be met by the enemy we ſhould take the contrary way to that he expects us to take, and which it appears we ought to take: a ſmall party can hide themſelves every where, and as it is not common to ſearch places on the enemy's ſide, there they are moſt ſecure, and may paſs the day, to take another road under favour of the night.

Officers ſhould be attentive to diſtinguiſh between true and falſe attacks, and not deſpair when beat from their firſt intrenchments. The defence of poſts are ſo eaſy, that I am ſurpriſed they do not hold out longer than they commonly do. There wants only reſolution and vigilance, taking every advantage of the ground, and perſuading the ſoldiers that nothing but the

moſt manifeſt baſeneſs can let the enemy penetrate. The example of Cremona, ſurpriſed by Prince Eugene in 1702, will remain a proof to poſterity of what determined bravery can do; and ſhew, that though an enemy is maſter of half the ramparts, and part of the town, he is not maſter of the whole.

Prince Eugene having formed the deſign of ſurpriſing this town, which was defended by a garriſon of French and Iriſh, got ſome thouſand Auſtrian ſoldiers admitted at a ſecret paſſage by a prieſt. Theſe troops ſeized the two gates, and a great part of the town; the garriſon buried in ſleep were waked by the aſſault, and obliged to fight in their ſhirts; but by the excellent manoeuvres of the officers, and reſolute bravery of the men, they repulſed the Imperialiſts from ſquare to ſquare, from ſtreet to ſtreet, and obliged Prince Eugene to abandon the part of the town and ramparts of which he had been in poſſeſſion.

What then can be the reaſon they do not defend poſts and villages as well now-a-days,

days, eſpecially when they have ſecured a retreat fit for making a good defence, or obtaining an honourable capitulation? It ſeems to proceed from their not applying enough to know the cauſes of the misfortunes they fall into, and being unacquainted with what has happened to thoſe who have gone before. The people who attack have nothing ſupernatural in them, and are not different from thoſe who are attacked.

They may judge from what I have ſaid, that nothing is more eaſy; and the officer who is determined and jealous of his reputation, who has learnt from ſtudy to make uſe of his talents, may, like LEONIDAS, defend the paſs of Thermopylae with three hundred men againſt a whole army, and chooſe rather (as a modern philoſopher ſays) to periſh nobly, than be guilty of cowardice. In every poſt, he can ſupply the want of force by ſtratagems.

Poſts have often reſiſted the firſt and greateſt efforts of the aſſailants, and have yielded or been abandoned to ſubſequent attacks,

attacks, though much leſs ſpirited. How comes this? It is owing to an officer's not daring to abandon his poſt at the firſt attack: he repulſes the enemy, becauſe, if forced, they will be put to the ſword with their whole party; but when the enemy comes back, he thinks he has nothing to reproach himſelf with, having defended it for ſome time, ſo retires, or ſurrenders. Since he could repulſe the enemy when in good order and quite freſh, how much more eaſy and leſs to be dreaded when they return harraſſed with fatigue?

Is not the great cauſe of miſconduct among military men the want of encouragement to excite emulation? An officer who is not protected, who is never ſure of the leaſt favour, neglects himſelf, and takes leſs trouble to acquire glory, rarely heard of, though merited by the braveſt actions, than to enjoy the tranquillity of an ordinary reputation.

It is not expected that an officer who is placed in a poſt ſhould ſeek to engage; but that he ſhould ſteadily reſiſt when he is

preſſed, and die rather than abandon his intrenchment.

Hiſtorians have been very ſilent about poſts being well defended, though the leſſons to be drawn from them may be more generally inſtructive, and as agreeable to read, as thoſe left us of the beſt fortified places of a ſtate. We are aſtoniſhed at the account of a hundred thouſand men periſhing before Oſtend in 1604; and their general, the Archduke Albert, with the ruins of his army, not making himſelf maſter of it till after a three years ſiege: nor is our wonder leſs to ſee Charles the XII. of Sweden in the year 1713, with ſeven or eight officers and ſome domeſtics, defend himſelf in a houſe of wood near Bender, againſt twenty thouſand Turks and Tartars.

Several hiſtorians mention the defence of this houſe becauſe it was done by a crowned head; but brave actions, whoever are the authors, ſhould never be buried in oblivion, as they excite emulation, and are full of inſtruction.

CHAP.

CHAP. XII.

Of the Attack of Poſts.

THOUGH the taking of a poſt is always difficult when you have to do with people who know how to defend it; nevertheleſs, you may ſucceed in attacking them by ſurpriſe and ſtratagem. We ought never to form a ſcheme for an attack upon ſimple ſpeculation, becauſe from reaſoning we often think things are feaſible, which we find impoſſible in the execution. When you intend to undertake an action of this kind, you ought to form a juſt idea of it, by examining all the branches ſeparately, and the different means you can uſe, ſo that by comparing them together, you may ſee if they concur, and anſwer to the general purpoſe; and, laſtly, you are to take ſuch meaſures as may in a manner render you certain of ſucceſs before you begin.

As it is not the practice of the army to chooſe a particular officer for the attack of an intrenched poſt if he does not offer himſelf,

himſelf, ſo an officer ſhould not embark in ſuch an enterpriſe, without having examined the means of ſucceeding, and being capable of ſhewing the general a plan of what he has projected, to ſee if he will conſent to the execution of it. If the general approves the plan, he muſt beg leave to go to reconnoitre the poſt with a man or two, that he may take his meaſures more juſtly for the execution. I ſay that he ought to aſk permiſſion to go and reconnoitre the poſt, that he may be owned and claimed in caſe he is taken priſoner.

When he has been to reconnoitre, as is directed in Chap. X. and has got every neceſſary information, he ſhould go to give the general an account of his diſcoveries, receive his laſt orders for the attack; for the ſoldiers of his party, and for thoſe who are to march to ſuſtain him.

The choice of men that are to go upon the attack of a poſt is ſo much the more eſſential, as the ſucceſs of the enterpriſe depends on it. None but volunteers of determined bravery ought to be taken,

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men who are not ſtupid, and have no colds upon them; becauſe he who does not attend to the orders of his officer, runs on with blind zeal; and he who coughs or ſpits may diſcover the party to the enemy's centries, and cauſe the beſt concerted ſcheme to fail. As to thoſe who are to ſupport them, they may be taken according to their rank in the guard or detachment, as the general judges proper.

The diſpoſition for an attack muſt depend on the diſcoveries that are made, ſo as not to be obliged to return in the midſt of the execution. The men being choſen, they muſt be inſpected, to ſee that nothing is wanted which can contribute to their ſucceſs; becauſe, if the poſt is fortified with an intrenchment of earth or faſcines, the two firſt ranks ſhould be provided with ſpades and pickaxes beſide their arms; if fraiſed or paliſſadoed, they muſt likewiſe have hatchets; and if covered with maſonry, they muſt have ladders.

The men ſhould be in their waiſtcoats, to be leſs conſtrained. If they propoſe to make

make one or two true, and as many falſe attacks, ſo many platoons muſt be formed of the choſen party, as they are to make true ones, and the ſuſtaining party to make the falſe attacks, ſo as to divide the enemy and ſhare their fire. A man muſt be placed at the head of each platoon, who is capable of commanding them, and if poſſible the ſame who had been employed before to make diſcoveries, as he may more eaſily guide the diviſion. The orders which ſhould be given to thoſe leaders, are to march together to the place where they are to ſeparate, and then each to go to the ſpot which is appointed for them in the neighbourhood of the poſt, and wait there, with their bellies on the ground, for the ſignal to jump into the ditch and ſcale the poſt.

If you are to be conducted by ſpies or guides, they ſhould be examined about every thing that can be of uſe before they are employed, eſpecially about the road by which they propoſe to conduct you. The reaſon of this is, becauſe we often ſee ſimple people, animated with the hope of gain, imagine

imagine they can eaſily lead a party, when they have only a great deal of good-will; but if you find in thoſe who offer all the neceſſary qualities, you muſt immediately ſecure them to you as much as poſſible, by making them dread the deſtruction of their houſes, and pillaging their goods, if they lead the party into a ſnare; you may likewiſe aſk their wives and children as pledges of their fidelity, and the moment of ſetting out place them between the corporals of the firſt rank, tied with a ſmall chain; which precaution is the more eſſential, as traitors have often been known, on pretence of conducting a party to ſeize a poſt, to have led them where they have had their throats cut in the middle of the night, and have diſappeared at the very moment of its execution. If you make your guides hope for a recompence proportioned to their ſervices on one ſide; on the other, you muſt make them fear the cruelleſt puniſhment if they do amiſs.

The night being the moſt proper time to march to the attack of a poſt, you ſhould

ſhould ſet out ſoon enough to be ready to make the attack an hour or two before day. Care muſt be taken that it is not moonlight when you propoſe making the attack; the ſoldiers ought to march two and two, with the leaſt noiſe poſſible, eſpecially when paſſing between the enemies centries: you muſt likewiſe recommend to them neither to ſpeak, ſpit, or ſmoke. The detachments muſt get as oppoſite as poſſible to the ſalient angles of the intrenchment, as it is probable that they will be the leaſt defended by the enemy's muſketry. If a patrole of the enemy comes while you are on your march, or ambuſhed in the environs, you need not be alarmed, nor make the leaſt motion which may make the enterpriſe fail, but remain concealed in the profoundeſt ſilence, that the patroles may paſs without perceiving any thing, and afterwards purſue your deſign.

If the poſt which you want to carry is a redoubt with a dry ditch and parapet of earth, your two firſt ranks muſt have ſpades and pick-axes, with their arms ſlung, and

and on the ſignal being given, jump into the ditch together; I ſay together, becauſe it ought to be a general maxim in attacking a poſt, to ſtrike all at once. When the firſt rank have jumped down, the ſecond muſt ſtop a moment, that they may not fall upon the ſhoulders or bayonets of the firſt. The two firſt ranks having got into the ditch, they ſhould immediately run to ſap the angles of the ſcarp, and the parapet of the redoubt, to facilitate the mounting of the reſt of the party; the leaders of each diviſion ſhould obſerve, at the ſame time, that the ſoldiers who remain armed with their firelocks, and who have likewiſe leaped into the ditch, do not interrupt thoſe who are demoliſhing the ſcarp of the redoubt, but protect them by preſenting their bayonets to the right and left, and be ready to repulſe any of the enemy that happen to be placed in the ditch.

If the parapet is fraiſed, they ſhould break as many of the fraiſes with hatchets as is neceſſary to let the men paſs. When the breach is made, the workers ſhould drop

drop their working-tools, and taking their arms from the ſlings mount up with fixed bayonets, and ruſh upon the enemy huzzaing.

When you march to attack a redoubt, or ſuch poſt where the enemy have a connection with more conſiderable poſts, the commanding officer ſhould charge on that ſide, ſo as to cut off the communication. People who ſee themſelves briſkly attacked without hope of ſuccour or retreat, will very ſoon beg for quarter.

When the ſcarps and parapets are of ſtone, they can only be carried by ſcaling, but you may ſucceed by being briſk in ſurrounding and ſuſtaining the attack. An officer who is to attack a poſt of this kind ſhould take care that his ladders are rather too long than too ſhort, and to give them in charge only to the ſtouteſt of the detachment. The ſoldiers ſhould carry theſe ladders with the left arm paſſed through the ſecond ſtep, taking care to hold them upright at their ſides, and very ſhort below, that they may not diſlocate

cate their ſhoulders in leaping into the ditch.

The firſt ranks of each diviſion provided with ladders ſhould ſet out with the reſt at the ſignal, marching reſolutely with their firelocks ſlung at their backs to jump into the ditch. When they are arrived, they ſhould apply their ladders againſt the parapet, obſerving to place them towards the ſalient angles rather than the middle of the curtain, becauſe the enemy have leſs force there. They muſt take care to place the ladders within a foot of each other, and not to give them too much nor too little ſlope, ſo as they may be overturned or broke with the weight of ſoldiers mounting upon them.

The ladders being applied, they who have carried them, and they who come after, ſhould mount up and ruſh upon the enemy ſword in hand. If he who goes firſt happens to be overturned, the next ſhould take care not to be drawn down by his comrade; but, on the contrary, help him to paſs between two ladders, and im-

mediately mount himſelf, ſo as not to give the enemy time to load his piece.

As the ſoldiers who mount the firſt may be eaſily tumbled over, and their fall may cauſe the attack to fail, it would perhaps be right to protect their breaſts with the fore-parts of light cuiraſſes, becauſe if they can penetrate, the reſt may eaſily follow. Some people may perhaps treat this as an unneceſſary precaution; but is it better to leave the whole to be knocked on the head in the ditch, or to carry it with ſafety and the leaſt danger?

The ſucceſs of an attack by ſcaling is infallible, if they mount the four ſides at once, and take care to ſhower a number of grenades among the enemy, eſpecially when ſupported by ſome grenadiers and piquets, who ſhare the attention and fire of the enemy.

During the ſiege of Caſſel, under the Count de la Lippe, in the campaign of 1762, a young engineer undertook to carry one of the outworks, with a much ſmaller detachment than one which had been re-

pulſed, and ſucceeded with eaſe, from the uſe of grenades; which is a proof that grenades ought not to be neglected, either in the attack or defence of poſts.

If the ditch of a poſt is filled with water, and but middle deep, that ſhould not hinder you from jumping into the ditch to attack in the manner that has been mentioned; but if there is a greater quantity, and you cannot paſs, the ſoldiers of each platoon ſhould carry faſcines, or faggots of ſmall branches well bound, and made as large as poſſible, to fill up the ditch, and make a kind of ford, ſo as to get at the parapet, either to demoliſh or ſcale it.

Many ways of filling up the ditch, recommended by different authors, might be mentioned; but the faſcines are preferable to them all, as the ſoldiers can eaſily carry them before them, march quicker, and make uſe of them as a defence againſt muſketry, and reaching them from hand to hand ſoon make a ford.

If the approaches of the poſt are defended by chevaux de friſe, the firſt and ſecond

ſecond rank of each platoon muſt break them down with hatchets, or with iron graplings tied to ropes, they may pull them down, and ſeparate them. If it is a breaſt-work of felled trees, you muſt have faſcines thrown againſt the points, or upon the branches, upon which the ſoldiers can eaſily paſs. If there are two or three rows, you may burn them with dry faſcines lighted at one end, and thrown in the middle row. In caſe of trying this laſt ſcheme, the ſoldiers muſt retire to a little diſtance after throwing the faſcines, that the enemy may not ſee to fire at them by the light of the fire, but place themſelves ſo that they can fire upon any who may attempt to extinguiſh it. If there are chauſſe-traps, they muſt be ſwept away, by dragging a tree or two over the ground where they are ſcattered.

In the attack of detached buildings, you muſt ſeize the approaches, and ſtrive to ſcale them; and get on the top, to cruſh the people who are below, with the tiles or ſlates; but if the enemy has uncovered

the houſe, you muſt throw as many grenades as you can in at the windows and doors; or dry faſcines, with lighted faggots dipped in roſin; or fire-balls, to endeavour to ſet fire to them, and ſmoke them out. If the weather is windy, you ſhould profit by it to ſet fire to the houſe, and try to ſhut up the loop-holes, which the enemy have pierced near the ground, with bags of earth, ſo as to ſap the corners. If you have ſome cannon, you may ſhorten the ceremony, by planting them againſt the angles of the poſt. If you have none, you may ſucceſsfully ſuſpend a large beam by a rope to three bars placed in a triangle, in imitation of the Roman battering ram: this beam puſhed violently againſt the walls will ſoon make a breach; but you muſt obſerve, in ſuſpending it, to do it in a dark night, ſo that the enemy cannot prevent it by firing at the ſoldiers who are employed in the work. If it is glorious to get out with honour on ſuch an attack, it is not leſs ſo to make it ſuch as to coſt but few people. The blood of the

ſoldier

ſoldier is precious, and cannot be too much prized, and an able chief will neglect no means that can contribute to his preſervation. The comparing of two examples will ſhow the importance of what is advanced.

During the two ſieges of Barcelona, by Monſieur de Vendome in 1697, and Monſieur de Berwick in 1713; the firſt of theſe generals cauſed the convent of Capuchins, ſituated out of the place, to be attacked ſword in hand by ſeveral detachments of infantry, and carried it in three hours, with the loſs of ſeventeen hundred men. Marſhal Berwick cauſed the ſame convent to be attacked in the year 1713. They were equally intrenched, and reckoning to make him pay as dear as Monſieur de Vendome had done; but this general having opened a ſort of trench before the convent, they not expecting to be attacked in form, ſurrendered at diſcretion, after having held it twenty four hours. The reader is left to judge which example to follow.

You ſhould prepare for the attack of a village, or ſuch like poſt of large extent, as has been directed in the chapter for detached poſts; but as theſe ſort of attacks are always more difficult than others, on account of the multiplicity of ſchemes they have to encounter at every ſtep, an officer ſhould not march there till he is acquainted with the ſtrength of the intrenchments; the ſituation of the ſmaller poſts; the obſtacles to be met with in every ſtreet or ſquare; and even what terms the inhabitants are on with the ſoldiers of the garriſon.

If an officer takes his information from country people, he ſhould enquire in ſuch a ſeemingly careleſs manner, that they may not diſcover his deſign to the enemy, and they take meaſures to prevent him: he muſt likewiſe endeavour to be well aſſured of the reports of the peaſants, by comparing them with thoſe of the deſerters, and with what he has diſcovered himſelf. When he is well informed of the ſituation of the enemy, he ſhould then make his diſpoſi-

tions

tions for the attack, and obſerve to mention to thoſe who are to command the different platoons, all that they ought to do, either in real or falſe attacks. The real attacks ſhould be made in places that appear inacceſſible, becauſe the enemy, truſting to the difficulty of acceſs, are always leſs guarded there. He may likewiſe attack the houſes ſituated at the entrance of ſtreets, becauſe when they are once gained, it is eaſy to pierce the walls that ſeparate the houſes, from whence they can eaſily cruſh the enemy with ſtones, and force them to fly to their laſt intrenchment.

In an enemy's country whom you would not ſpare, it is eaſy, by ſetting fire to the four corners of the village, to force the beſieged to ſurrender; but, beſide its being inhuman to uſe means which tend to the devaſtation of a country, it is very dangerous to drive the inhabitants to deſpair, becauſe they then fly into the woods, gather in parties, ſcatter themſelves every where, murder the ſoldiers who ſtray, aſſaſſinate the ſutlers, hinder every peaſant

from carrying proviſions to camp, and deſtroy an army. We have ſeen, ſays Monſieur Folard, during the war of 1688, that fifteen hundred *Barbets*, of the valley of St. Martin, kept forty battalions of our troops in awe in the valley of Pragelas, where the Ciſone runs in the bottom between two very high mountains of very difficult acceſs, which each party guarded on their ſide. Theſe mountaineers deſcended ſometimes when they believed our convoys were in the country, and attacked them. They were ſcarcely ten or twelve men, while we had entire corps.

It is very evident, from this example, what may be the effects of gaining conſiderable poſts by ſetting fire to them, and how much better it is to carry them by briſk attacks. An officer who commands an expedition of this nature ought to take care how he confines himſelf to a ſingle attack; the falſe frequently becoming true ones, he ſhould know the ſucceſs of each, ſo as not to have people killed uſeleſsly to gain

gain a paſſage on one ſide, while it is open on the other.

When the aſſailants have penetrated into the village, the commanders of each diviſion ought to take care to leave ſmall detachments at all the churches and ſquares; to ſtand firm and ſuſtain the main body in caſe they are repulſed. You muſt watch very carefully that the ſoldiers do not withdraw to pillage the houſes of the inhabitants, as whole detachments have been driven from towns and villages where they had penetrated, by having neglected this precaution.

Three days after the ſurpriſe of Cremona in 1702, ſome Germans were found in the cellars where they had got drunk, and were aſtoniſhed when they were told that they muſt quit theſe agreeable retreats. An officer who would ſhun a diſorder ſo fatal ſhould forbid his ſoldiers to ſtir from his party on pain of death, and by placing a ſerjeant in the rear of each diviſion take care that no one lags behind.

If you find cavalry drawn up in the ſquares, or open places, the aſſailants ſhould remain firm at the entrance of the ſtreets that meet there, while ſome go up to the houſes that are at the corners, and fire upon them from the windows: if this cauſes any diſorder among them, they ſhould be charged with fixed bayonets to make them ſurrender. If the interior part of the village is defended with cannon, you ſhould march quickly to the place where they are, and take them, or nail them up, or turn them againſt the enemy or principal poſt of the village.

It may be judged by what has been ſaid on the taking of poſts, that though theſe actions are difficult, they are not impoſſible, when the means that are to be employed are properly connected. The methods are eaſy to imagine, and yet we rarely ſee examples of theſe actions, becauſe there is not ſufficient application given to this part of war, which to ſucceed in requires great ſenſe and courage, a quick and ſubtle fancy,

fancy, much boldneſs, readineſs in executing, and cautious foreſight.

Polybius in his ſeventh book gives an account of an attack full of inſtruction for officers, for which reaſon the detail of the whole circumſtances ſhall be taken from that work. The blockade of Sardis by Antiochus the Great, ſays he, had laſted two years, when Lagoras of Crete, a man of extenſive knowledge in war, put an end to it in the following manner. He conſidered that the ſtrongeſt places are often taken with the greateſt eaſe, from the negligence of the beſieged, who, truſting to the natural or artificial fortifications of their town, are at no pains to guard it. He knew likewiſe that towns are often taken at the ſtrongeſt places, from their being perſuaded that the enemy will not attempt to attack in that place. Upon theſe conſiderations, though he knew that Sardis was looked on as a place that could not be taken by aſſault, and that hunger only could make them open their gates, yet he hoped to ſucceed. The greatneſs of the dif-

ficulties only increaſed his zeal to contrive a means of carrying the town.

Having perceived that a part of the wall which joined the citadel to the town was not guarded, he formed the deſign of ſurpriſing it at that place: he obſerved that this wall was built on the top of a rock which was extremely high and ſteep, at the foot of which, as into an abyſs, the people of the town threw down the carcaſſes of their dead horſes and other beaſts of burthen, where great numbers of vultures and other carnivorous birds aſſembled daily to feed, and after having filled themſelves, they never failed to reſt upon the top of the rock or wall, which made our Cretan imagine that this place was neglected, and without any guard upon it.

On this thought, he went thither at night, and examined with care how he could approach it, and where he ought to place his ladders. Having found a place proper for his purpoſe, he acquainted the king with his diſcovery and deſign; and the king, delighted with the project, ad-

viſed Lagoras to purſue it, and granted him two other officers whom he aſked for, and who appeared to him to have all the neceſſary qualities for aſſiſting him in his ſcheme.

The three having conſulted together, they only waited one night, at the end of which there was no moon; which being come, they choſe fifteen of the ſtouteſt and braveſt men of the army to carry the ladders, to ſcale the walls, and run the ſame riſk that they did. They likewiſe took thirty others to place in ambuſh in the ditch, and to aſſiſt thoſe who ſcaled the wall to break down a gate into which they were to enter. The king ordered two thouſand men to follow them, and favoured the enterpriſe by marching the reſt of the army to the oppoſite ſide of the town. Every thing being prepared for the execution, Lagoras and his people approached ſoftly with their ladders, and, having ſcaled the rock, came to the gate which was next them, and having broke it let in the two thouſand men, who cut the throats of all they

they met, and ſet fire to the houſes, ſo that the town was pillaged and ruined in an inſtant.

Young officers who read this account ought to reflect on this attack. The attention of Lagoras, who went himſelf to examine the places proper for fixing the ladders; his diſcernment in the choice of the officers and ſoldiers who were to ſupport him; and the harmony of the whole means that were employed on the occaſion, afford very excellent leſſons for any officers who may attempt ſuch an attack.

Though ſuch ſtupendous rocks may be thought inacceſſible by the beſieged, yet this is a proof that no place is inacceſſible when they have to do with ſuch penetrating geniuſes as Antiochus's engineer Lagoras.

That part of the military ſcience which comprehends the taking of poſts is little capable of being treated methodically. The underſtanding of every officer, and the occaſions which chance produces, is what commonly gives room for the execution of theſe

theſe ſort of actions. War is a buſineſs of ſchemes and projects, and there are numberleſs precautions which eſcape the foreſight of men who carry it on, which a ſkilful enemy can obſerve, and which furniſh occaſions of making fine ſtrokes. Hiſtory contains many ſuch examples, which are only rare now-a-days, becauſe they do not ſtudy this part ſufficiently, for which an elevated genius, and a combination of means, depending on a knowledge of the true ſituation of the enemy, whom we ſhould always reconnoitre ourſelves, are neceſſary.

CHAP. XIII.

Of Surprizes and Stratagems for ſeizing Poſts.

A SURPRIZE in war is an unexpected attack by ſuddenly aſſaulting the enemy when he leaſt expects it. The ways of practiſing them are infinite, for all the ſchemes

ſchemes that imagination has invented to make the enemy fall into ſome ſnare are ſo many ſurprizes, with ſuch an extenſive variety of circumſtances, that it has never been poſſible to give a compleat detail of them, notwithſtanding all the lights that have been thrown on the ſubject by many excellent authors who have undertaken to treat this matter fundamentally.

We may refer all ſorts of ſurprizes to two kinds; the one is, by means of ambuſcades to attack the enemy on his march, which we ſhall treat of in the next chapter; the other, by making ſudden irruptions into the poſts of the enemy and ſeizing them by open force, which we ſhall treat of at preſent; but that I may not exceed the bounds I have preſcribed to myſelf, I ſhall only ſtop to mention the moſt advantageous circumſtances which ought to be taken, and the ſureſt means that can be employed to ſucceed; eſtabliſhing for a general maxim, that we ought never to attempt to ſurprize a poſt of the enemy, without being well informed of his ſituation, ſtrength, and

and manner of doing duty, three eſſential points the knowledge of which is indiſpenſable.

All the environs that have any relation to the place the enemy occupies muſt be known; on what ſide lie the avenues, moraſſes, rivers, bridges, heights, woods, and all covered places that are in the neighbourhood; without which it is ſcarce poſſible to regulate approaches prudently. It is equally neceſſary to know nearly the number and kind of troops with which he poſſeſſes the poſt, that you may not attack him with inſufficient force. It is likewiſe neceſſary to know if the enemy is careful or remiſs in carrying on his duty. The knowledge of theſe circumſtances contributes infinitely to form a project of ſurprize well, and to conduct the whole expertly.

I ſhall ſpeak firſt of ſuch as may be executed by ſmall parties, and where they need not have recourſe to very extenſive means for ſucceſs, and then proceed with ſuch as may be executed by the corps of a partiſan,

partiſan, according to the arrangement we have given.

Monſieur Folard, in ſpeaking of ſtratagems, ſays every general has his own; they are ſuch as time and place produce, and which ought not to be neglected. There are many people who pretend that every thing is lawful in war, and that we are to ſucceed by what means we can; but this is not agreeable to thoſe authors who treat of the rights of nations. If all ſchemes are thought equally moral in ſome that he relates, there are others where good faith and a greatneſs of ſoul ſhine forth with luſtre, and ſome where the moſt remarkable treachery and the cruelleſt means have been looked upon as the fineſſes of a ſkilful enemy.

I hope it is unneceſſary for me to make any remarks on this head, as I truſt that the pleas of honour and humanity will always have their full force with every officer in the Britiſh army.

The ſame author ſays, that this part of war (ſtratagems) has not been treated fundamen-

fundamentally, though it were to be wiſhed that theſe works were often read and meditated on by people of the profeſſion. This ſort of reading appears the more neceſſary, that, beſide being amuſing, it is the more inſtructive, as, by not being ignorant of ſtratagems, they know how to defeat them, or to make uſe of them upon occaſion. To which I ſhall add, that we are not to imagine that theſe occaſions are very ſcarce; they preſent themſelves daily, though they are not perceived, becauſe they are not attended to, or thought of after they are paſſed. Nothing however contributes more to the reputation of an officer than theſe ſort of actions; but, as Vegetius ſays, we ſhould reach out our hands to fortune, and profit by the occaſions that offer.

Among the ſurpriſals of poſts which may be executed by ſmall parties under one officer, there are ſome to which they are invited by the eaſe in the execution, others by the cloſeſt attention in obſerving the enemy. It is unneceſſary to repeat what has been ſaid already of the precau-

tions

tions to be taken when going to attack a poſt; it is ſufficient to know, that as the diſordering one wheel renders the whole machine uſeleſs, ſo we ought to examine with all poſſible attention every means that is to be employed for ſucceeding in our ſchemes. However brave the officers of our army are, we are not to expect them all equally capable of embarking in ſuch enterprizes; for, beſide being of impenetrable ſecrecy and great diſcernment in the choice of ſoldiers, they muſt have a perfect knowledge of the country, and be able to ſpeak the language. Few officers poſſeſs all theſe requiſites.

As to the manner of ſurprizing a poſt, it is impoſſible to eſtabliſh certain rules on the ſubject, becauſe among a thouſand means which chance offers there are rarely two alike. The quickneſs of a concealed march upon a diſtant poſt negligently guarded; a thick fog which prevents being ſeen; a river where there is a ford the enemy is ignorant of; an aqueduct; a ſubterranean paſſage; a hollow road which

which is not guarded; a frozen rivulet; a blocked-up paſſage; a ſecret correſpondence; a fair or market day; and diſguiſes of every kind; give room for the different ſtratagems that may be uſed as occaſion offers, and by which we may promiſe ourſelves ſucceſs, though they have been frequently employed.

It muſt be obſerved, that there are ſtratagems with which it is impoſſible to ſucceed without a proper force to ſuſtain them. A town or village, for example, where we are introduced by a ſecret correſpondence, cannot be carried without being well ſeconded. The only means of managing the ſurprize of poſts well, is to have for a maxim to divide your force inſtantly, to ſeize the caſtle, church, churchyard, or public ſquares. It has been ſaid, that troops ſo divided can act but weakly, and run a riſk of being defeated ſeparately; but by making as many detachments as the enemy has poſts, in the diſmay cauſed by ſurprize, it is eaſy to carry theſe poſts before they who defend them have time to diſpute

diſpute them, or even look round them. The enemy being likewiſe obliged to divide, and not knowing what ſide to prefer, there is almoſt a moral certainty, that, ſtupified with noiſe which they hear all round, they are ready to let their arms drop out of their hands; beſide, the horrors of a dark night, and the dread that cannot fail to ſeize a party who are ſurprized, repreſents objects much greater than what they are, ſo that they imagine they have to do with a whole army.

The bad ſucceſs of the affair at Cremona makes nothing againſt my opinion. If, inſtead of ſtopping to make priſoners, a detachment had gone directly to the citadel, which ſhould be the way in all theſe kind of actions, it would have been impoſſible for theſe brave officers, who drove out the Imperialiſts, to have made ſo glorious a defence.

M. de Schower did otherwiſe when he ſurprized Benevar in Spain in 1708, and did not fail. He learnt that the Spaniards neglected the guard of an old caſtle which

was

was at the entrance of the place, and marching in the night he took it, and detached ſeveral parties to attack the town. Surprized with ſuch a viſit, they ſought for ſafety in flight, and ran to take ſhelter in the citadel, but were ſcarcely entered when they were made priſoners. The enemy did not think of the attack being begun where they were ſtrongeſt; but it is the beſt way, as it is to be preſumed they have divided their forces to be able to defend every part.

If theſe events are ſo rare now-a-days, it is becauſe they ſink almoſt always into oblivion, and the authors do not obtain any reward; yet what does not the man deſerve, who is determined on an action of this nature at the hazard of his life?

M. Menard, in his hiſtory of Niſmes, gives an account of the ſurprize of that town, which merits our attention. Nicholas Calviere, called Captain St. Coſme, having reſolved to make himſelf maſter of this place, engaged a miller, whoſe mill was ſituated within the walls at the ſide of the gate, to file the bars of a grate which ſhut

up

up the entry of an aqueduct, through which the water paſſed into the town, to put wax on the filed places to conceal them in the day, and to receive a hundred armed men into his mill, while a more conſiderable body of cavalry and infantry ſhould arrive from different places to ſuſtain the enterprize.

The day for the execution of his project being fixed for the 16th of November, 1569, and proper orders given for the rendezvous of the troops, St. Coſme came out of the mill with his party at three o'clock in the morning, and, advancing to the guard at the gate, put them to the ſword, and opening the gate let in two hundred horſemen with each a foot ſoldier behind him. Theſe troops, having entered the town, formed ſeveral detachments immediately; and one went to block up the citadel, while the reſt ſcattering over the ſquares of the place, and ſounding their trumpets, inſtantly made themſelves maſters of the town.

There

There are a number of circumſtances mentioned in this ſurprize, which convey a great deal of uſeful inſtruction. Captain St. Coſme knew how to profit by the negligence of the governor, who omitted to guard the entrance of the aqueduct; to make a proper choice of cavalry for advancing ſo readily with the infantry from different quarters; the juſtneſs of the orders to give the troops which brought them fifteen leagues from Niſmes at the hour and place appointed for the rendezvous; the precaution with which he inveſted the citadel, to prevent his having to do with the garriſon in the ſtreets; his attention in dividing his troops into the different quarters of the town and making them ſound their trumpets, that the inhabitants ſhould imagine they were very numerous; are ſo many circumſtances which contain the moſt uſeful leſſons for officers who may be induced to attempt ſuch an enterprize.

There are inſtances of ſurprizes ſucceeding from ſingular addreſs. Captain Brachia wanting to make himſelf maſter of a

tower in the territory of Amberſa, cauſed one of his ſoldiers to diſguiſe himſelf like a woman, and gave him a baſket in his hand with a ſickle. This man ſo diſguiſed ran as faſt as he could to the tower, pretending to have fled from a party of the enemy: the guard let him enter and mount a ladder to the top of the tower to ſhew the centry where the enemy was; but he was ſcarcely got up, when he clove the centry's head with the ſickle, ſeized his arms, and obliged thoſe who were below to abandon the poſt.

It is in this manner that the impoſſibility of ſucceeding ſometimes by force ſhould make us attentive to profit by the leaſt omiſſion of the enemy; and neceſſity is found to be the mother of invention in war as well as elſewhere, when there is a ſpirit not to be diſcouraged. The diſproportion of forces, ſays Monſieur Folard, is not always in the number, but frequently the capacity of the one, oppoſed to the ignorance or negligence of the other.

It is only they who have a great love of glory, and whoſe valour is never daunted by danger, who know how to reduce the enemy by ſtratagem, and ſeize the occaſions which fortune preſents. Guſtavus Vaſa, ſeeing the ſea frozen, made his ſoldiers paſs in the middle of the night, to reduce the Daniſh navy to aſhes which was near Stockholm, going to increaſe the power of tyrants, and deſpair of the people. It were endleſs to ſeek to give the detail of the many ſtratagems that have ſucceeded; but the inſtances that have been given, with what has been ſaid leading to it, may ſerve to give hints to detached officers.

The active corps of the partiſan, without truſting to the ſtratagems that others have ſucceeded by, muſt find other reſources than thoſe againſt which people are ſo prepared now-a-days; and as the ſurprizing of the enemy is the great buſineſs of the partiſan in carrying on the *Petite Guerre*, he muſt ſee what can be effected by his hardineſs and activity.

The expedient which appears to be the moſt proper for an officer who has four hundred infantry under his command, and is certain that the garriſon is only two hundred, (for ſurprizes ſhould be always attempted with a double force) is to chooſe very bad weather; the ſtrong winds, for example, and fogs in winter, or the ſtorms and tempeſts in ſummer, when after exceſſive heats violent winds riſe ſuddenly and agitate the air.

When you have meditated ſuch a ſcheme, then is the time to put a part of your infantry in covered waggons, which ſhould be kept ready for the purpoſe. The whole party to be provided with dog-ſkin covers for their gun-locks and cartouch-boxes, to take off readily when there is occaſion; and the reſt of the infantry to be mounted behind part of the cavalry. Both parties to aſſemble at ſome place a league diſtant from that which you would ſurprize, and there to ſtop; when, if you ſee the bad weather diſſipating, you muſt retire till another occaſion. If you renew it ten times,

times, you need not deſpair; a ſtrong place deſerves this trouble; the blow is too honourable and too important to loſe courage, and ſucceſs will over-pay every fatigue.

But, on the contrary, if the ſtorm forms, and the wind increaſes, direct your approaches in ſuch a manner, that you may always have the wind on your back, becauſe if you have it in your face, the enemy's centries can look forward and diſcover you; and likewiſe if it is in your face, your horſes cannot be made to advance without a great deal of trouble. Theſe precautions being taken, you advance more quickly as the ſtorm increaſes, the horſes and waggons going with great ſpeed before the wind. You need be in no uneaſineſs about the enemy's centries ſeeing you, or hearing the noiſe of your march, becauſe the ſeverity of the weather obliges them to enter their boxes, and turn their backs to the wind, to ſave their eyes from the duſt and ſharpneſs of the air.

At 300 paces from the place, the foot and part of the cavalry ſhould diſmount

and fix their bayonets, the reſt of the cavalry to remain with the waggons near ſome trees or houſes, the waggons turned for a retreat. Divide your infantry into five detachments, and inſtantly run at a great rate, keeping your men as cloſe as poſſible, and paſſing the barrier and gates, ſeize all the centries and the guard without firing or making the leaſt noiſe, which may be executed with an extreme quickneſs, to be acquired by practice. While the firſt detachment ſeize the gate and all the centries of its environs, the reſt muſt run rapidly into the town. One muſt go quickly to ſeize the main guard; another to ſeize the governor or commanding officer; the fourth, which ſhould be the ſtrongeſt, ſhould fly to the caſerns or men's barracks, to ſeize their arms; the fifth to remain in the ſtreet near the gate for a corps de reſerve.

Every detachment muſt be conducted by priſoners made at entering, and orders ſent with all ſpeed to cauſe half the cavalry

to

to advance and patrole the ſtreets as the infantry get forward.

As this kind of ſurprize can ſucceed only under favour of a ſtorm, which rarely continues any time, it is evident that the march and execution muſt be conducted with inexpreſſible ſwiftneſs, and the orders be perfectly underſtood. It is true that rain is inconvenient for the infantry, whoſe feet ſlip on clay-ground; but they muſt do their beſt, and frequently it is found that the roads which are moſt uſed are not therefore the moſt ſlippery.

If it happens that you are perceived in taking poſſeſſion of the gate, and they take the alarm, you muſt quickly divide your party into two wings, mounting them on the rampart, the one to the right, the other to the left, and ſeizing the loaded cannon turn them upon the town, and at the ſame time ſummon the garriſon to ſurrender. If you happen to fail, and are obliged to retire, you do not riſk much while the garriſon are fewer in number, as they will not care to moleſt your retreat.

There may be a reluctance in attempting ſuch a ſurprize; it may appear to be hazardous and raſh, and a conduct too nice not to deſpair of ſucceſs; but Mr. Jeney ſays, that experience convinces him of the validity of the means propoſed, and relates what happened to him upon two occaſions, to prove that the cold eaſt winds or ſtorms are the moſt proper times for attempting ſurprizes.

Being at the head of thirty huſſars, ſays he, and willing to ſhun a ſtorm which was gathering behind us, I puſhed to get to a place which was well fortified and occupied by a numerous garriſon: the wind was ſtrong, and I paſſed the barrier and all the gates with my horſes, which made a great noiſe, without any centry either ſeeing or hearing; and though I called to the firſt guard to declare myſelf, no one perceived me. I croſſed the whole town without ſeeing a ſoul in the ſtreet; and, hurrying to an inn in the other ſuburbs, I went out at the gallop, and ſaw only the centry at the laſt barrier, to whom I anſwered

ſwered without our comprehending one another; nevertheleſs the rain had not begun to fall, but the wind was violent. I experienced the ſame during the winter, when the eaſt wind was very proper to facilitate the ſurprize of a fortified town or poſt. On Chriſtmas night, 1757, I paſſed through the country of Hanover, with eighty horſe, between two guards of the enemy, without being perceived. I marched over the middle of a plain when the night was clear, with a violent eaſt wind, which prevented any centry from turning his head to look at me, and I went quietly to carry off horſes in the rear of their army. The following night at my return, I paſſed two different poſts of our army; the one guarded by a party of huſſars, the other by a regiment of dragoons, without being ſeen but by one centry in the middle of the dragoon poſt, who durſt not challenge, becauſe it was no longer time, having paſſed the firſt guards.

You may likewiſe take the advantage of bad weather to ſcale all ſorts of poſts ſur-

rounded with walls, as towns, abbeys, caſtles, &c. to do which, you muſt approach in the dark, and ſeize the moment of a great ſquall, or when a cold eaſt wind obliges the garriſon to take ſhelter from the rigour of the ſeaſon: then there is no one upon the ramparts, and the centries turn their backs to the wind, or remain in their boxes, while your people are warm with marching, and animated with the hopes of ſucceſs. You need not be apprehenſive of the enemy ſeeing you, if you advance on the ſide next the wind to place your ladders, becauſe the centries will cover their faces, and bend down their heads to ſave them from cold.

The time of a thick fog is not leſs favourable for approaching and forcing an intrenched poſt. When the fog is low, the infantry ſhould creep on all fours, the better to conceal them from the enemy's centries. Theſe ſort of ſurprizes are the leaſt dangerous, you run ſcarcely any riſk; but, if you cauſe ſome falſe attacks, the garriſon will not fail to run to arms,

and

and ſometimes make you pay dear for failing.

When you would ſurprize the enemy in a village, farm, monaſtery, or ſome place detached from the army, you ſhould divide your party into two bodies, each compoſed of cavalry and infantry; the one to take the enemy in the rear, the other in front, taking care to cauſe ſome waggons to follow, which may carry off the wounded in caſe of need. You muſt calculate exactly the time it will take the firſt detachment to go round the enemy. The two commanders ſhould agree on a word for rallying, and the time of making the attack, which ſhould be in the night, eſpecially if the poſt is ſo diſtant from the army that they can receive no aſſiſtance, for in that caſe the time is favourable till day-break. They muſt regulate their departure according to the diſtance they have to go; and the detachment which goes round the enemy ought to take no more infantry than can be carried behind the horſemen. This detachment, having got

round, ſhould form about a quarter of a league from the poſt, and a hundred paces out of the road.

When the other detachment has arrived within a quarter of a league of the poſt, your cavalry ſhould form out of the road with the waggons and drums near them, who are not to advance till ten minutes after the departure of the infantry, who muſt advance towards the fires of the enemy, ſtooping as much as poſſible. They muſt take care to conceal themſelves from patroles, as has been directed; and when they ſee them paſſed or entered the poſt, the infantry muſt hurry on to gain the village, and clear the entry by which the cavalry muſt paſs, in caſe it has been barricadoed with waggons. You muſt run rapidly to the place where you ſee the fires lighted, and make as many detachments as you ſee fires, in order to ſurprize the whole at once.

The cavalry, who followed ſlowly, muſt inſtantly join to the noiſe of your arms and cries their trumpets and drums, advancing

ing with all ſpeed, and leaving only a non-commiſſioned officer, with ſome horſemen, near the waggons. The detachment which is advanced on the other ſide of the village to turn the enemy, on hearing the alarm, muſt immediately advance, ſounding trumpets, beating drums, and attacking all who would ſave themſelves on that ſide. You may rely on it as certain, that the enemy ſeeing all his guards ſurrounded by your infantry ſcattered in the village, and hearing the march of different bodies of foot and horſe who arrive on all ſides, will not delay to ſurrender, or ſeek to ſave himſelf by a diſorderly flight; it will be eaſy then for your cavalry to fall upon the flying, and ſtop them. The party ſhould be forbid to purſue the enemy more than a quarter of a league in the night; but no purſuit at all ſhould be attempted, if it is in an incloſed country.

The poſt being taken, the booty and priſoners ſhould be ſent off immediately under the care of the infantry, putting the wounded in waggons, or on the horſes that

are

are taken, the cavalry making both the front and rear guard, and taking care to have the laſt the ſtrongeſt. When the enemy's poſt is ten leagues or more diſtant from yours, it is certain that they will have leſs diſtruſt, and be more eaſily ſurprized. In that caſe the infantry, with a lieutenant and twenty horſemen, ſhould ſtop at half way, concealed in a wood or farm, keeping conſtant guard.

The commanding officer ſhould leave this place at the head of the reſt of the cavalry; and if he finds that he cannot arrive that night, he muſt cauſe them to carry refreſhments. He muſt likewiſe take an intelligent guide from thence, to whom he muſt not communicate his deſign till they have gone ſome way on the road towards the enemy. He muſt accompany his declaration with promiſes and threats, aſſuring him that he will generouſly reward his zeal and fidelity; but will kill him, or ſet his village on fire, if he attempts to deceive or run away.

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At ſome little diſtance from the place, you muſt quit the road on the right or left, and be conducted to another which leads to ſome height the moſt convenient for paſſing a league on one ſide of the enemy's poſt. In bad winter weather you need not keep at ſuch a diſtance, becauſe there is leſs riſk of meeting any one in the country.

When you get as far as the poſt, you muſt move obliquely to the road which leads from the enemy's army, and by which you muſt advance to attack the poſt. If it happens that for want of roads the guide muſt conduct you over fields and meadows, it is of little conſequence, provided that the route is conformable to the deſign.

A genius for war has ſometimes puſhed boldneſs ſo far as to ſurprize the wings of an army, encamped in a level country, on a plain uncovered on all ſides. This ſort of ſurprize is a temerity that is ſcarce to be imitated. The danger is great, and the retreat of ſo ſmall a corps as that of a partiſan

tiſan runs always the riſk of a total defeat, unleſs it happens in the middle of a dark night, which can conceal your approach or your flight; but it likewiſe expoſes you to take ſome very dangerous ſteps in the dark; to wander from your route, and to diſperſe your people; for which reaſons I would never adviſe any one to try ſuch fortune.

The caſe is very different when the enemy's camp extends into a mountainous country, covered with woods to ſecure your retreat; for then, with the aſſiſtance of a good guide gained by money or promiſes, you may be conducted in the night into woods, and ſecure your approaches by gullies and by-ways.

You muſt take great care in coming out of the wood that you do not come upon ſome poſt in the front of the wing you want to ſurprize; becauſe, in that caſe, you muſt leave a detachment of infantry at the paſſage. While your cavalry advance to get round their advanced poſt, another detachment of cavalry and infantry muſt place

place themſelves oppoſite to the flanks of the poſt. You muſt then fall briſkly upon the wing of the camp with cavalry alone, and at the ſame inſtant the detachment left on the flanks muſt attack the poſt with the infantry, ſtooping as they advance; and in the attack both ſhould ſet up a moſt frightful cry to alarm the whole army.

As it is certain that the piquet of the army will not delay to run to their aſſiſtance, you muſt inſtantly ſeize and carry off whomſoever you meet, officers, ſoldiers, or their horſes, and every thing you can take away, making haſte to regain the paſſage. The cavalry ſhould go firſt with the booty and priſoners, the infantry making the rear guard till they are out of the wood, and then take the front. You muſt endeavour to make at leaſt half the retreat that night, and be ſure that the enemy does not follow you in the night, leſt you be taken in flank.

There is no time more precious for a partiſan, or that merits ſo much attention, as that of a battle, when every one is attentive

tentive to the great firing which they hear on all ſides; to the manœuvres of the armies that are engaging; to the deciſion of an affair of the greateſt importance, upon which the fate of each depends. It is then that he can employ his ſkill to the greateſt advantage; ſtrike the ſevereſt blow that is poſſible; cauſe the ruin of the enemy; pillage the quarters of their generals; carry off their equipages; defeat their guards; ſet fire to their camp; and ſpread an alarm over all, which may contribute to the defeat of the army.

But meaſures muſt be taken to execute ſo great, ſo brilliant a project with ſucceſs; and it ſhould not be engaged in, till after having prudently regulated the deſign on three principal circumſtances; viz. the ſituation of the enemy's camp; the means of approaching it; and the hour of engaging. When the enemy's camp is in the middle of a great plain, or on a height with an extenſive view on all ſides, it is certain that one cannot approach without being ſeen at a diſtance; and in that caſe prudence

prudence will put a ſtop to zeal, and prevent raſhneſs from attempting impoſſibilities; but when their poſition extends over a country covered with mountains, woods, or villages, the occaſion is more favourable, and may almoſt inſure ſucceſs.

It is then very advantageous for a partiſan to be perfectly acquainted with the ſituation of places that are in front of his army; eſpecially when he foreſees that the enemy will ſooner or later come to encamp there. What aſſiſtance would it not give for the direction of his project, if he knew how to take a plan of that part of the country which he propoſes to invade before hand? Then, without the weak and dangerous aſſiſtance of ſpies and deſerters, he can by his own proper knowledge think of every means for executing a deſign, which ought to be regulated and conducted with impenetrable ſecrecy.

When he perceives by the motions of the armies that they are on the eve of an action, he muſt not delay to acquaint the general with his project. If he conſents,

ſents, he will regulate the reſt, and the time of departure, according to the advices which he receives.

As theſe ſort of expeditions cannot be made but by long circuits, they muſt take the time neceſſary for the march. In the campaign of 1757, the Duke of Richlieu cauſed his army to advance near Zell to attack our army, and ſent a partiſan with a hundred horſe to the rear of the camp the day before, who, having made a march of twenty-two leagues, arrived without any accident; but the prudence of the prince of Brunſwick defeated his deſign, and left him to admire his retreat; nevertheleſs, they picked up ſome ſtragglers, horſes, and waggons.

Among the meaſures that ought to be taken to ſecure the blow, and ſtrike it more effectually, it ſhould not be forgot to diſtribute cockades like the enemy's to all the cavalry, and to give a ſtick of ſix feet long to twenty of each deteachment, with a bit of torch fixed on the end, and co-

vered

vered with a little dry ſtraw or hemp, to kindle inſtantly.

The whole party to ſet out from the camp A, (Plate IX.) marching under the conduct of a good guide by covered ways, at a diſtance from the enemy. Being come to the place C, which ought to be in the environs, and as high as the field of battle, the infantry ſhould be concealed out of the road far from the ſight of paſſengers. This muſt be the center of correſpondence with the army; the rendezvous of the booty; and ſupport the retreat of all the cavalry, of which there ſhould be as many detachments formed as you propoſe to make attacks. We ſhall ſuppoſe ſix of a hundred men each, and they muſt go ſecretly by particular routes to their reſpective poſts E, D, F, G, H, I. Neither trouble nor expence ſhould be ſpared to procure good guides. Each detachment ſhould lie in ambuſh half a league, if neceſſary, from the object of the attack, BKKKK.

The noiſe of the muſquetry of the armies to be the ſignal for their irruption; and

and then bravery, intrepidity, and courage, will give wings to your people. The ſecond detachment D will glance imperceptibly between the villages, and fall like thunder upon the camp B; and while eighty attack all whom they meet, the other twenty ſhould light their torches at the fires that are to be found every where, and ſpread the flames rapidly to the ſtraw of the tents. As they cannot fail to have the picquet of the camp ſoon at their heels, they muſt ſtrike their blow with all poſſible quickneſs without ſtopping to plunder; being content with the glory of having excited a general alarm, capable of confounding the whole army, and contributing to the gaining of a battle.

At the ſame time that the detachment D attacks the camp B, the others E, F, G, H, muſt with equal violence attack the villages K, K, K, K, which they have in front, doing the ſame the firſt did in camp, except that they may plunder every thing which they can eaſily carry off of the generals' equipages, with which theſe villages are commonly

commonly filled; ſeizing the beſt horſes, hamſtringing others with the ſtroke of a ſword, and ſetting fire to all the places which contain the enemy's baggage. Each detachment ſhould cauſe ſome horſemen to advance beyond the village, to obſerve the motion of the troops that will not fail to run to their aſſiſtance. As ſoon as they perceive them, they muſt make their retreat as faſt as poſſible by the routes which the commanding officer has premeditated, and which are propoſed to be repreſented by the coarſer hatched lines. The ſixth detachment I, in ambuſh on the ſide of the road leading from the camp, ſhould remain there, to ſeize all the enemy who think of ſaving themſelves by flight.

There is no danger to be apprehended in theſe expeditions during the critical inſtant while the armies are engaged, and all the troops a great way in front of the camp; you meet none but ſutlers, ſervants, lame people, and ſome piquet guards ſcattered here and there, whom you may eaſily defeat as they advance. The commanding

ing officer ought to have an eye over all, and as ſoon as he perceives ſome bodies of troops advancing upon him, he ought to retreat quickly, and at leaſt gain the entrance of the wood.

I believe it is eaſy for every partiſan to regulate his operations conformable to the ſtrength of his corps, and the environs of the camp which he propoſes to attack, upon the plan which has been given. The chief care ſhould be to determine properly the ambuſcades of the cavalry, to place them ſo as to ruſh at once on the camp and the quarters of the generals.

Each detachment having rejoined the infantry muſt there wait the fate of the battle; ſo that, if it is decided in favour of their army, they may ſpeedily regain the propereſt places for harraſſing the enemy on his retreat. Theſe moments are the more favourable, as diſorder, dread, and noiſe, render all defence impracticable. But all theſe ſort of ſurprizes require places proper to cover approaches and retreats.

Having

C
E
K
D
F


A
Field of Battle.
B
K
K
K
G
H
I

Having mentioned the neceſſity of a partiſan's being maſter of the languages, and the advantage derived from addreſs in carrying a poſt by ſurprize, the following inſtance may ſerve as an illuſtration of it.

In the campaign of 1760, that excellent general and true genius of a partiſan, the prince of Brunſwick, was ſituated at ſome diſtance from Zerenberg, at that time in the poſſeſſion of the French; and being informed by two Hanoverian officers, who had been in the town diſguiſed like peaſants, that the garriſon, truſting to the vicinity of their army, and the diſtance of ours, were very remiſs in their duty, the prince was reſolved to ſurprize them, and, after appointing a corps to ſuſtain him, advanced in the night with Major Maclean of the 88th regiment, and two hundred Highlanders, with bayonets fixed and their arms not loaded, following at a little diſtance. Upon the firſt centry's challenging, the prince anſwered in French; and the centry ſeeing but two perſons advancing (whom he believed to be French), he

had no diſtruſt, ſo that the major getting up to him, ſtabbed him, and prevented his giving the alarm. The Highlanders immediately ruſhed in and attacked the guard with their bayonets, and carried the town, having killed or taken the whole garriſon of eight hundred men.

The French officer, who commanded at that time in Zerenberg, concerted a ſcheme for being amply revenged, which failed only by a moſt trivial accident. When almoſt every houſe in Bremen was filled with corn, being the grand magazine, and grand hoſpital of our army, this officer held a ſecret correſpondence in the town, which informed him of the ſtate of the garriſon, and that there was a general order to let couriers going to the army paſs out at all hours. He diſpatched about twenty huſſars to ſcamper over the country, who were all that were heard of his party, while he marched fifteen hundred infantry from Duſſeldorp to Bremen (about two hundred miles), concealing them in woods by day, and marching in the night. He arrived at the

the gate at the appointed hour, when a perſon on horſeback blowing a horn came along the ſtreet, and deſired to paſs out to the army. The officer of the guard, who had the keys, happened to be out of the way, and while a meſſenger went for him, the people without, growing impatient, began to break down the outer-barrier, which made the centry fire at the place where he heard the noiſe; and the guard, taking the alarm, got upon the rampart and likewiſe fired at the ſame place, upon which the pretended courier galloped back, and the French, believing that they were diſcovered, relinquiſhed their ſcheme and retired.

This example proves that no diſtance is a ſecurity from ſurprizes, and that very conſiderable parties may paſs over a great extent of country without being diſcovered. I cannot omit giving an inſtance of that preſence of mind ſo much the happineſs of all who poſſeſs it, and more particularly of a military man ſo expoſed to ſurprizes.

In the month of February 1761, when Prince Ferdinand beat up the quarters of the French, they were obliged to retire a great way without being able to reſiſt; however, when they came to collect their force, and to recoil upon our army, Sir William Erſkine, with the 15th regiment of light dragoons, was in a village in our front. In a very foggy morning, ſoon after the patroles reported that all was well, Sir William was alarmed by his vedettes having ſeen a large body of cavalry coming to ſurprize him. He inſtantly mounted his horſe, and ſallied out at the head of the picquet of fifty men, leaving orders for the regiment to follow as faſt as they could mount, without beating a drum or making any noiſe. He attacked their advanced guard in the curſory manner of the light cavalry, and continued to do ſo, while his men were joining him by tens and twenties, and the French cavalry forming to reſiſt an attack, till he collected the whole, and then retired; the ſurgeon of the regiment

ment (Mr. Elliot) having in the mean time carried off the baggage.

Strokes of this kind diſplay a ſuperiority of genius, and to that alone was the preſervation of the regiment owing. Had a drum beat to arms, the enemy muſt have known that they were unprepared, and probably would have ruſhed in and deſtroyed them; but the attack convinced them that they were diſcovered, and made them think only of their own preſervation.

Among many inſtances in the courſe of the war, the ſucceſs of this officer, on another occaſion where he diſplayed the moſt ſingular addreſs, likewiſe merits our attention. After a repulſe, and a march of ſeventy-two miles in one day, when the men were fatigued and ſcarcely a horſe able to trot, he ſaw a regiment of French infantry drawn up with a moraſs in their rear. He left his own corps, and advancing to the French deſired to ſpeak with the commanding officer, whom he entreated to ſurrender to prevent their being cut to pieces by a large body of cavalry that

were advancing. The French officer deſired leave to conſult with his officers, which having done, they refuſed to ſubmit; but upon Sir William telling them that their blood muſt be on their own heads, and turning to move off to his own corps, they called to him, and laying down their arms ſurrendered to his harraſſed troops.

Such ſtratagems overleap the bounds of inſtruction, and no author will preſume to propoſe them for imitation. Here was the reaching out the hand to fortune which Vegetius recommends; but there are few who have the requiſite talents from nature, and we may as properly ſay of the ſoldier, as the poet, *naſcitur non fit.*

To ſurprize and carry off ſome general officer, or other conſiderable perſon in ſome diſtant place in the rear of the enemy's army, you ſhould take only a detachment of twelve horſemen, known to be worthy the confidence of the commanding officer, and who you are certain will not deſert to betray you. Each horſeman ſhould have a double ſurtout with the two

ſides

ſides like two different regiments of the enemy, ſo that, being perceived under one colour, they may quickly turn them, and appear again under another. This diſguiſe will hinder the country people from making a juſt report, and agreeing in the route the party have taken. They muſt take great care to keep at a diſtance from all roads, and not to ſtop but under cover. The quarter-maſter muſt take care to procure refreſhments from ſome place in the neighbourhood, where they muſt pay ready money, and not fail to do ſo till the blow is ſtruck.

I ſhall only add one word more on the ſubject of ſurprizes and ſtratagems for the ſeizing of poſts, upon which volumes may be written; which is, that, after having formed the deſign and examined it in all its branches, it is not neceſſary to ſtop in the middle of the execution on diſcovering an unforeſeen obſtacle.

After the battle of Cannae, Hannibal advanced to the gates of Rome with a deſign to beſiege it; but he was prevented

by a great noiſe which he heard in the night like people laughing very loud: the Romans, aſtoniſhed next day at his retreat, built a temple which they dedicated *Deo ridiculo*.

I ſhall not puſh my reflections on the taking poſts by ſtratagems any farther, becauſe it is eaſy to ſee, by the examples that have been mentioned, that they are not ſo difficult as is generally imagined. Timorous people who are ſtopped by the ſmalleſt difficulties may look upon them as impoſſible, and imagine there is ſomething ſupernatural in thoſe who ſucceed; but it is not for them, it is for men of genius, courage, and application, to judge of the methods propoſed.

CHAP. XIV.

Of Ambuſcades.

AN ambuſcade may be formed in any place covered by art or nature in which a party may be concealed to ſurprize

prize the enemy in paſſing; and the proper uſe of them is, of all the ſtratagems in war, the beſt calculated to diſplay the genius, ſkill, ſpirit, and addreſs of a partiſan. They are eaſily carried into execution in woods, buildings, and hollow places; but require a more fertile imagination, and greater trouble, in a level country. Both ought to be regulated by the knowledge of the enemy's march, and the extraordinary means that may be employed to ſurprize them.

When a partiſan has information that can be depended on of the march of ſome part of the enemy; whether a convoy of artillery, baggage, or proviſions; a body of recruits, or horſes to remount the cavalry; an eſcort of a general officer going to rejoin, or reconnoitre ſome country; he ought to apply directly to procure a ſufficient knowledge of the route that the enemy is to take, the ſituation of the places he is to paſs, and of the poſt to which he goes. The better to cover his deſign, he muſt get information of the roads that lead

to oppoſite places, which he muſt pretend to be attentive about, as has been mentioned in the chapter of reconnoitring.

Having perfectly concerted his plan, he ſhould ſet out at the head of his detachment if poſſible, and leaving his poſt on the ſide oppoſite to his true route, the better to conceal his deſign. If the place where he intends to plant his ambuſcade is not diſtant, he ſhould come into his true route about half way, and there place half his infantry in ambuſh to favour his retreat. But when the country where he propoſes going is diſtant, and the march requires at leaſt two nights, he muſt conduct his party by meandring from wood to wood, if there are any. He muſt not forget to provide neceſſary refreſhments for the day, which muſt be paſſed in ſome concealed place where he may not be perceived, and muſt cauſe three rations of oats to be carried for each horſe.

The firſt night he muſt make to ſome wood or other place proper for paſſing the day near ſome rivulet, and, if poſſible, on

on the road of his retreat to leave a part of the infantry in ambuſh, in caſe there is no other water to paſs till he come to the place of his principal ambuſcade; for when there is ſtill a river or canal to paſs, he muſt conduct the infantry to the paſſage, and chooſe the moſt convenient place to fix them in ambuſcade.

If there is no bridge or ford, the cavalry muſt ſwim over, in which we ſuppoſe the horſes are practiſed. When there is a ford, half the infantry ſhould paſs behind the cavalry, to go along with them. In caſe there is a bridge to paſs near the village, the officer who is left in this poſt with ſome infantry ſhould be enjoined to allow no one, peaſant or ſoldier, to leave the place; and for greater ſecurity a ſmall detachment of cavalry ſhould remain with him, to ſtop any who may attempt to run away before the return of the whole corps, who ought not to delay. If the enemy come in the interval to attack the bridge, it muſt be defended till the return of the party, that their retreat may not be cut off.

The following caſe will prove its importance. The Count Eſterhaſy, being detached with three hundred cavalry to levy contributions in the environs of Straſbourg, left a lieutenant with thirty men to guard the bridge at Wolfſheim; the lieutenant from ſome motive or other quitted his poſt, when, happily for the detachment, chance brought Mr. Jeney there with ten chaſſeurs, and he was ſcarcely arrived, when he ſaw three large parties of French huſſars advancing to take poſſeſſion of the paſſage. He had only time to throw himſelf with his ſmall party in a hurry into a mill that ſeemed to command the bridge, and, having made loop-holes through the wall, kept ſuch a conſtant and deadly fire, that he diſputed the paſſage till Count Eſterhaſy's detachment hearing the noiſe of the muſketry came almoſt a league, ſurprized the enemy in the rear, and in five minutes took eighty horſes, and ſeveral priſoners.

Every precaution being taken to guard the bridge, the commanding officer ſhould be

be diligent to arrive at the place of ambuſcade two hours before the enemy is to paſs, and place the ambuſcade on the ſide to which he would retire; never on the other ſide, if poſſible, leſt the advanced guard happen to diſcover him, and oblige him to repaſs in ſight of the corps, who ſeeing his ſtrength may ruſh upon him, and drive him back.

The infantry A [Plate X.] ought to be ambuſhed at leaſt ſix hundred paces behind the cavalry B, ſo that, if they are purſued, they can fall back to A, and both afterwards to the guard at the bridge, or to the infantry that are in ambuſh at half way.

If the ambuſcade is placed in a wood, an intelligent non-commiſſioned officer ſhould be choſen to get upon a high tree C, from whence he can ſee the march of the enemy, and give notice of the moſt eſſential circumſtances: there are three; the firſt is, the ſeeing the advanced guard; the ſecond is, the approach of the corps; and the third is, the time when their front is advanced

vanced as far as the ambuſcade B; for which the commanding officer ſhould inſtruct the obſerver what ſignals he is to make from the top of the tree, to communicate the neceſſary information without ſpeaking, which may be done by the means of a ſmall cord D, of a brown or green colour, ſo as to be leaſt perceivable. Let this cord be placed as in the plan, ſo that no branch interrupt it, with one end in the hand of the obſerver, and the other in the commanding officer's in the ambuſcade B.

As ſoon as the advanced guard appears, the obſerver muſt pull the cord, and the commanding officer cauſe the party to mount and remain in deep ſilence. If by a ſtratagem, which is frequently practiſed for particular reaſons, the advanced guard is immediately followed by the corps, which may eaſily be known by their being more numerous than ordinary, and not followed by any other corps; that you may not be deceived by the enemy, the cord ſhould be drawn a ſecond time, and a third time when their front is advanced as high

as

as the ambuſcade, upon which you muſt ruſh out, and pour furiouſly upon the flank of their center in the following manner.

If the advanced guard E is formed only of an ordinary number, they ſhould be let paſs, and at the approach of the principal party or convoy F, the chief to be informed by the ſecond pulling of the cord. At the moment the head of the convoy ſhall be advanced as high as B, the cord muſt be pulled the third and laſt time, at which ſignal the whole party muſt ruſh out without being perceived, and ſuddenly attack the center upon the flank, engaging only with their ſwords, and making ſuch a noiſe as to prevent the enemy from hearing the orders of their officers. They muſt diſarm all whom their bravery or chance throws in their way, taking care not to ſcatter or purſue too far, unleſs you are ſure that they are ſo diſtant from their army or other parties that they cannot be aſſiſted; for in either of theſe caſes, they will not fail to run at the noiſe, and diſturb your retreat.

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In all ſecret expeditions you ought to be extremely circumſpect that you may not be ſeen or betrayed. If the advanced guard diſcovers your before the blow is ſtruck, abandon the enterprize immediately, and retire. When your guide or ſome one of your party deſerts, and you cannot catch them, think immediately of retreating, or placing your ambuſcade ſomewhere elſe; therefore, to prevent ſuch a misfortune, the officers ſhould be charged to examine frequently if they have all their people.

You ſhould never form an ambuſcade for cutting off the enemy's retreat, as this manœuvre will give them an idea of rallying, and attacking you in deſpair; but the caſe is different when you are well informed that you run no riſk in ſtopping their whole force, either from the nature of the defile where they cannot form, or from the ſmallneſs of the number which cannot reſiſt.

It is equally difficult and dangerous to form ſeveral ambuſcades at once; the more

are

are formed, the more they are expoſed to be diſcovered, and leſs in a ſtate to unite for a retreat; but we except when they are to be employed to ſeize foragers, for then it is very proper to form ſeveral, and to diſpoſe them in ſuch a manner that the centries can ſee from one to another. Theſe diſpoſitions being made, they who chance to be next the foragers muſt ſtrike the blow, while the others march to ſecure the retreat of their companions, as ſoon as they perceive it.

In all ambuſcades, no centries ſhould be placed but officers, or non-commiſſioned officers. On downs, behind mountains, or in gullies, the centries ſhould lie with their bellies on the ground, and their feet towards the ambuſcade, the body covered with a grey or green cloak, according to the colour of the ground, with their heads a little raiſed, and wrapped in a handkerchief of a ſtraw-green colour, or white in time of ſnow, ſo as not to be perceived. The number of centries cannot be determined, but ſhould be diſpoſed ſo as

as to watch on all ſides of the ambuſcade, and ſtop every one who from ignorance approaches too near. The centries ſhould give notice of what they diſcover by geſtures, to which all the officers ſhould be very attentive.

In countries where there are no woods, vineyards, or hedges, you may place an ambuſcade in a field of hemp or corn, or ſome ſort of grain, provided it be high enough to cover you, at leaſt with the help of art. When the ſtalk of the corn, &c. is not high enough, you muſt get ſome of the infantry to work with ſpades and pick-axes.

The commanding officer muſt mark out the ground A [Plate XI.] which they are to prepare for an ambuſcade, entering at the ſide B, and raiſing in the front, and at the two flanks, a kind of parapet C, made with an inſenſible ſlope outwards, covered with corn raiſed from the ſurface of the ambuſcade in form of ſquare turfs of a foot thick D. They ſhould be ranged and placed one againſt the other till they have

have gained ſix feet and a half. If the grain is not more than three feet high, it is plain, that forming the ſlope imperceptibly to a foot and a half high, with the earth dug of the ſame depth, the grain which borders the ambuſcade will be ſix foot and a half from the botom, reckoning the thickneſs of the turf, which ſerves to ſhew that ſuch a work ought not to be declined in arable ground ſo eaſily worked. When the ſoldiers have finiſhed the work, a ſubaltern officer muſt lead them back to the place deſtined for the infantry.

The ambuſcade being thus made at a hundred paces from the road where the enemy are to paſs, they ſhould lead the horſes into it one after another by the bridle, ſo as not to enlarge the entry: the horſemen to range themſelves ſtanding, and holding the bridles in their hands, with the reins ſlackened on the horſes necks. The officers ſhould be continually employed in viſiting the party, waking thoſe who ſleep, and be equally careful to deface

all

all traces of the entry, that none may appear near the ambuſcade.

Ambuſcades may be placed advantageouſly in hollow roads when they open obliquely behind that of the enemy, as the road K, [Plate X.] which enters by an acute angle upon the route F of the enemy; nor is there greater difficulty in concealing themſelves in the gullies of ſome rivulet G, [Plate X.] when the borders are of a ſufficient height, or have ſhrubs that run parallel with the road of the enemy. It is extremely dangerous to fix there when the road of the enemy approaches towards, or croſſes too near the ambuſcade, as they cannot fail to diſcover it.

As theſe gullies are not very large, it is neceſſary to have a number of ways to ruſh out quickly on the enemy: I ſuppoſe four, H, H, H, H, by which the cavalry can dart out ſuddenly upon the enemy at F.

It will be proper, before placing the party, to cauſe the rivulet to be cut ſomewhat higher, to give it a new courſe I, ſo that the horſes feet may be dry in the gullies,

lies, and make leſs noiſe; and the ſhorter way they have to go, they will more certainly ſucceed. The commanding officer will not fail to diſpoſe them in ſuch manner, that the whole can ruſh out at once by the four paſſages, and pour in great numbers upon the flank of the enemy.

In ſuch ſort of ambuſcades, the commanding officer ſhould himſelf be the centry, leaning upon the edge, and covering himſelf ſo that he may ſee every thing without being perceived.

In deſerted villages an ambuſcade may be fixed in the gardens G, [Plate XI.] or in the barns H. The doors fronting the enemy muſt be ſhut up, and the paſſages which are marked by ſmall dots made uſe of; for it is a general rule, in all ambuſcades, to ſally forth in ſuch manner as to take the enemy obliquely behind their front.

You ought never to employ infantry in the ambuſcades I have been deſcribing, where the cavalry act, unleſs to favour their retreat: but when you go at hazard, ſeeking

ſeeking to draw the enemy into an ambuſcade, then the infantry ſhould have their turn. Neither woods, villages, nor any places which are much covered, are proper for them; however unſkilled an enemy may be, he will not follow a party on the ſkirts of a foreſt, or in the neighbourhood of ſome covered place; for which reaſon there are no places fitter for ſucceeding with ambuſcades of infantry, than heaths, hilly countries, hollow roads, corn fields, ditches at the ſide of great cauſeys; provided always that you do not plant them on roads that lead to your army, for then the enemy will take care how he purſues you too far.

When you would place an ambuſcade on a heath, or in a country full of little hills, your infantry muſt lie down with their bellies on the ground. If there is ſome water near them, it may ſuggeſt to them to wet their cloaths and cover them with duſt, to give them the colour of the ground; but, that this party ſo laid on the ground may not be cruſhed or trod upon by

by the enemy's horſe when hurried along with violence, they muſt preſerve the flank of the ambuſcade I, next the enemy, with a bar K, which may be made in a hurry with ſome ſtakes drove in the ground, at ten foot from one another, and about five or ſix foot high, held together by croſs pieces tied about five foot from the ground, which can be eaſily done in the neighbourhood of a wood. The time for the infantry to fire, is when the enemy's cavalry L, paſſing before the front, ſtretch their flank the whole length of the ambuſcade; then your cavalry M muſt quickly face about and attack the enemy. Their defeat will be ſo much the more certain, as the fire of your infantry happens to have driven their ſquadrons into confuſion.

To ambuſh in the ditch of a great cauſey, you muſt chooſe the deepeſt place, and at the edge of a corn field which is pretty high, and there place your people ſitting or kneeling. You ſhould collect as many ſmall round buſhes as poſſible, which are to be found in plenty in the country,

country, which ſhould be planted as if naturally along the ſide of the road in front of your party, and beyond the ambuſcade on the ſide you expect the enemy, and here and there ſo open, that the enemy being accuſtomed to them may paſs without diſtruſt. You ſhould then make the corn lean over to cover the ambuſcade; but if there is none near enough the ditch, you muſt have as many ſquares cut in the manner directed above as will cover the edge of the ditch. Some of the corn ſo tranſplanted ſhould be beat down, but to appear as if done by hail or wind.

Mr. Jeney ambuſhed in this manner with fifty men, when under the command of Captain Palaſti, who advanced with his cavalry upon the cauſey leading to Straſbourg, and as ſoon as he was perceived, 400 Bavarian dragoons advanced to attack him: he wheeled about, and the dragoons believing themſelves maſters of the booty, did not fail to purſue, and arrived before the ambuſcade without ſuſpecting. Mr. Jeney let their front paſs, and fired ſuch a deadly


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
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
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a deadly fire upon their center, that he brought to the ground ſeventeen killed or wounded; at the ſame time, the cavalry, who pretended to fly, faced about and attacked the enemy, and would have compleated their defeat, if it had not been for a great ſupport of cavalry and infantry hurrying out of Straſbourg to ſuſtain the dragoons; nevertheleſs, he carried off more than fifty horſes.

An officer, having placed his infantry in ambuſcade, ought to ſend the cavalry at day-break, a non-commiſſioned officer, with ſix of the beſt mounted horſemen, making the advanced guard; they ſhould advance as far before the party as the commanding officer can ſee. At ſight of the enemy, they ſhould begin to retire ſlowly without flying, at leaſt till the enemy comes to purſue with keenneſs: in that caſe, the advanced guard makes the rear-guard, and may drop a few ſhot at the enemy, to harraſs them and draw them on, or make pretended delays to excite them to purſue, till they fall by degrees into the ambuſcade.

When you cannot place your infantry in ambuſh without having a village between them and the enemy, the cavalry ſhould not be ſent beyond the village, becauſe the enemy will never expoſe themſelves to croſs it in following your party, for fear of falling into ſome ſnare; but, inſtead of going beyond it, your cavalry ſhould enter the village, and demand refreſhment for fifty men, if the party are a hundred; then make three or four peaſants carry orders to the magiſtrates of the villages that are towards the enemy, to come to you, and regulate the delivery of waggons and forage, or ſome other pretence. The peaſants will not fail to acquaint the enemy, and to deſcribe your ſtrength and ſituation according to what they have heard; and the enemy will certainly come with ſuperior force, and, that they may come more ſpeedily, they will bring no infantry.

As ſoon as the peaſants are gone, you muſt be careful to let none of the inhabitants leave the place, and ſend continually ſome ſtrong patroles to the rear on the

the road of your retreat, eſpecially to the paſſages by which they can cut off your communication with the ambuſcade. Every horſeman holding his horſe by the bridle muſt be ready to mount, ſo that upon the enemy's appearing you may retire quickly from the village, and fall back one after another upon your ambuſcade.

When a partiſan has no infantry, he may form an ambuſcade with cavalry, which ſhould be as near as poſſible to the enemy. In the night, he ſhould ſend out two or three waggons covered with white linen, that they may be ſeen at a diſtance: care muſt be taken that the harneſs be in good order, ſo that no troubleſome accident happen by the want of attention to it. Each carriage to have four horſes, mounted by two dragoons diſguiſed like waggoners, with their arms in the hands of two or four comrades concealed in each waggon, ſo that they may repulſe any patrole they chance to fall in with.

The waggons ſhould go ſlowly on ſome road parallel to the front of the enemy,

and paſſing at ſome diſtance from their poſt (for it is not neceſſary that they paſs through them), and regulate their march ſo, that they may be within half a league of the ambuſcade at day-break, and readily perceived by the enemy; then let them ſtop while one mounts a tree, or ſome height, to ſee round him. When they perceive the patrole of the enemy, they muſt move off, for the others will not fail to follow; but, if the enemy appears not to be inclined to follow, which the non-commiſſioned officer muſt attend to, and make one of the drivers ſtop, as if ſomething were the matter with his waggon, which will draw them on till they fall into the ambuſcade.

Among the thouſand opportunities that the different marches of the enemy offer for ambuſcades, there is none more proper than the retreat of an army which decamps to fall back. When a partiſan happens to get information of it on the eve by good ſpies, he ought to ſet out immediately with his whole party, making ſuch a round as has

has been drawn in Plate IX. leaving his infantry in ambuſcade at half way.

The cavalry muſt be diligent to arrive at the place of ambuſcade by day-break, which ought to be placed on the route the enemy is to take, and two or three leagues in the rear of his camp.

To be more ſecure of his retreat, he ſhould leave two or three detachments of cavalry between him and his infantry, at a good diſtance from one another; the remainder to line the road in ſeveral ranks parallel to it, and three or four hundred paces behind one another, concealed from the view of paſſengers by the favour of hollows, woods, or hills.

The firſt line being near the road muſt take care of ſutlers, equipages, &c. which are the forerunners of an army, and the firſt to decamp when they are retiring. When they ſecure ſome waggons or mules, the firſt detachment ſhould paſs them to the ſecond, and ſo on till they come to the infantry.

You muſt make haſte to carry off what you can for a full quarter of an hour, after which you muſt preſs your retreat, expecting that the alarm will ſoon paſs to the army, and the light troops be inſtantly at your heels.

CHAP. XV.

Of the Retreat.

EVERY march in withdrawing from the enemy is called a retreat. That which is done in ſight of the enemy, who purſues with a ſuperior force, makes my preſent ſubject; and is, with reaſon, looked upon as the glory of the profeſſion. It is a manoeuvre the moſt delicate, and the propereſt to diſplay the prudence, genius, courage, and addreſs, of an officer who commands; the hiſtories of all ages teſtify it, and hiſtorians have never been ſo laviſh of eulogiums as on the ſubject of the brilliant retreats of their heroes. If it is important,

portant, it is no leſs difficult to regulate, on account of the variety of circumſtances, each of which demands different principles, and an almoſt endleſs detail.

The bounds which I have preſcribed to myſelf will confine me to the moſt eſſential; however, I ſhall explain myſelf in ſuch a manner, that it will be eaſy to apply the general to particular caſes.

The ſucceſs of the retreat depends upon the knowledge of the country that is to be paſſed over, and the goodneſs of the diſpoſition that is made for the troops to defend themſelves. The firſt offers advantages, and contributes infinitely to the ſeizing them; the ſecond reſtrains the ardor of the enemy, and keeps up the force of a party to its higheſt pitch. Both deſerve to be ſtudied.

1ſt, Every officer who commands a detachment ought to apply himſelf carefully to reconnoitre every ſtep he takes, and examine perfectly every route that can conduct him from one place to another; he ſhould obſerve attentively all the ſtratagems

that can be employed for ambuſhing infantry, or poſting cavalry; the courſes of rivers, their bridges and fords; the roads moſt covered with woods, hills, gullies, and villages; and, in a word, he ſhould know all the advantages, as well as the dangers, that lie in his way. It will be eaſy for him to acquire a knowledge of all this, if he will uſe the method recommended in Chapter X. With the aſſiſtance of ſuch a plan he may regulate his retreat with eaſe, and put it in practice to advantage, profiting by every means proper for his defence, or ſurprizing the enemy.

2dly, The diſpoſitions that ought to be made for a party, to ſuſtain their retreat in the face of the enemy, depends upon the number and kind of troops in both corps; for they muſt be varied according as they happen to be of cavalry or infantry united, or of either ſingly.

Every forced retreat in conſequence of an unfortunate action would be almoſt impracticable, if it were not premeditated before you come in preſence of the enemy,

or

or when you are obliged to fly by unknown routes. That which can be made in a fog, or in the night, is eaſieſt, when your rear is ſecured, as you can eaſily ſlip out of ſight of the enemy without any difficulty; and they will be afraid of following you for fear of being ſurprized in the dark: we ſhall only therefore ſpeak of that which is to be made in open day, and under the fire of the enemy.

To conduct it properly, you muſt abſolutely know the ſtrength of the enemy; for it is ſhameful to be the dupe of a falſe alarm, and to retreat precipitately from an ill-founded fear at the approach of an inferior enemy. You muſt therefore be convinced of his great ſuperiority, and know of what his party conſiſts.

If they come with a ſtrong cavalry, united to a more numerous infantry than yours, you muſt immediately render their acting uſeleſs, by hurrying your infantry as quick as poſſible to retreat to the firſt place where they can lie in ambuſh, and ſerve the cavalry advantageouſly, if they

can draw on thoſe of the enemy, as has been ſaid in ſpeaking of ambuſcades.

To conceal from the enemy, and favour the departure of your infantry, you ſhould cauſe your cavalry to advance, and pretend as if they were going to attack the enemy A, [Plate XII.] your party forming in two diviſions B and C, each drawn up in two lines, the ſecond double the firſt, and diſpoſed as in the plan.

The diviſion C is to retire firſt 100 or 200 paces, and then fronting the enemy divide into two wings, leaving an interval for the paſſage of the diviſion B, who, in retiring, muſt leave a rear-guard at fifty paces, which muſt be divided into ſeveral parties D, to ſcamper about the enemy's front; and in caſe they appear deſirous to attack you, your ſmall parties muſt keep a conſtant fire, particularly on the ſides that advance the moſt; and continue this manoeuvre till they have joined the diviſion C, which ſhould immediately detach ſome ſmall parties of the beſt mounted to ſerve for a rear-guard, and to harraſs the enemy,

till

till the diviſion B is drawn up an hundred paces in the rear, and divided into wings, leaving an interval for the diviſion C to paſs through in its turn; and continue to manœuvre it in this manner, till you draw the enemy's cavalry under the fire of your infantry.

When the force of the enemy conſiſts of cavalry alone, your infantry (marked in the plan by dotted right angles) ſhould retire jointly with the cavalry, at leaſt if the country does not expoſe you to be ſurrounded by ſome covered place; becauſe in that caſe your infantry ſhould occupy that place, and form an ambuſcade.

The reſt of the infantry ſhould place themſelves in the ſecond line of each diviſion. If the enemy approaches too near the firſt line, they ſhould fall lightly back upon the two wings of the ſecond, opening the center quickly for the infantry, to fire upon the enemy in platoons, at the ſame time that your cavalry detach ſeveral ſmall parties to advance briſkly to prevent the enemy's forming, who were

thrown into confuſion by the fire of the infantry. The diviſion which retires will force its march, and go to a greater or leſs diſtance according to the purſuit of the enemy. The ſuſtaining diviſion muſt fall back afterwards till it has paſſed between the wings of the ſecond diviſion, who muſt then make the manoeuvre of the firſt, continuing it alternately till the enemy deſiſts from the purſuit.

To facilitate the retreat of the infantry, and gain ſome way on the enemy, many have been of opinion that they ought to tranſport them in waggons; but when the enemy is at our heels, the time is very ill employed in collecting carriages, and harneſſing them; thoſe moments are too precious, and ſhould be employed in cauſing the infantry to move off quickly, by which they will not be expoſed to a train of waggons taken in haſte, which may ſoon break, or be put out of order, and may ſtop the whole line, which not only retards the infantry, but likewiſe the cavalry, when they find the route they were

to have taken blocked up with broken carriages.

The caſe is different when the enemy is at ſome diſtance, or that you have already got ſome way before him; then, if a waggon breaks, it may be thrown immediately out of the road, and each horſe of the carriage carry two ſoldiers, or be diſtributed to other carriages. If many are broken, a part of the men ſhould run on foot for ſome time till they are tired, and then they may change with ſome of the ſtouteſt, who may afterwards change with others, according to neceſſity or the poſſibility of the caſe.

When there happens to be a wood in your rear, you need not enter it if the enemy follows you cloſe, and is prevented by your ſtrength; it is better to coaſt along it by the route marked G, for fear of his coming round you; but, if you cannot avoid croſſing it, the diviſion C ſhould paſs quickly, and at getting out face to the two flanks of the wood. The diviſion B is to remain at the entrance of it, till they

they judge that the diviſion C is ſufficiently advanced, and then fall back, leaving the infantry for a rear-guard, during the whole time of the paſſage through the wood; when the whole ſhould reſume their firſt diſpoſition.

In all defiles, and paſſages of bridges, the ſame manoeuvre ſhould be uſed as for woods; but the firſt diviſion having paſſed, they ſhould form facing the enemy; and the infantry likewiſe draw up on the other ſide, upon the edge of the river.

When the country through which you are to retire happens to be mountainous, the diviſion which falls back ſhould guard the heights by ſmall detached parties, or, if poſſible, guard them themſelves.

A body of cavalry retreating without infantry, ought to form in three lines at two hundred paces behind one another; the two laſt extending their front, that they may appear more numerous, and draw up on the two ſides out of the road. The firſt line being attacked, the ſecond is to

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ſuſtain it, the third to wait the retreat of the firſt, and to ſuſtain the ſecond, and continue to do ſo alternately.

If the enemy ſeem to quit the purſuit, the whole corps muſt reſume the order of an ordinary march; with this precaution, that the rear-guard be reinforced, and the advanced guard weakened.

As to the retreat of a ſmall detachment of cavalry, ſuch as go to reconnoitre the enemy, to diſcover their march, to carry off ſome officer, or for ſome other commiſſion; as they are not numerous enough to ſkirmiſh, and retreat by rule, they have but two ways to chooſe; either to fly, or break through the enemy. They ought to determine for the laſt, when their retreat is cut off on all ſides, ſo that they have no other way to eſcape but by cutting their way through the enemy ſword in hand; but flight is always leſs hazardous when it is practicable.

If

If the officer is certain of the fidelity of his men, and their attachment to him, and ſees that they cannot get out of ſight of the enemy, but are ready to fall into their hands, he ought to try one means ſtill, which has been known frequently to ſucceed. He ſhould diſperſe his party by two and two, by the favour of the firſt covered place, where they may be at liberty to take ſo many different routes. It is evident, that two men may wind from right to left, and eſcape more eaſily than a party of twelve or twenty, who cannot move ſo freely.

Mr. Jeney made uſe of ſuch an expedient ſucceſsfully in Italy, when the Spaniards having advice of his detachment having ſlipped to the rear of their army, they cut off his retreat on all ſides. The whole party being diſperſed, he took two huſſars with him, and was followed ſo cloſe, that every inſtant he thought he muſt be taken; however, he ſaved himſelf by croſſing a marſhy pond. The enemy

enemy ran to turn him, but he got ſo far before them that they could not take him. He got ſafe to his poſt, and in three days the whole detachment met without the loſs of a man; which will prove, that in ſuch a ſituation we need not deſpair, and that in extreme neceſſity, the paſſage of a river or moraſs ought not to be declined.

In a forced retreat, prudence requires that we ſhould ſacrifice every thing to preſerve life and liberty; therefore we muſt not heſitate a moment in diſencumbering ourſelves of every thing that can burthen us, or retard our march. Equipages, booty, priſoners, all muſt go, that we may think only of the means of making our retreat moſt expeditiouſly.

Having gone through what was propoſed at ſetting out, it muſt be left to judges to determine how far the end propoſed in compiling this eſſay has been anſwered. I ſhall only add, that it is my firm opinion, that a corps of a partiſan, formed

formed according to the arrangement given in the beginning of this treatiſe, would be not only capable of great ſervice, but infinitely excel every military eſtabliſhment that has hitherto taken place in this country.

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